2005年8月15日：日本投降日，即二次大战结束六十周年。岁月如梭，逝者如斯。东亚二战一代人已渐行渐远（美国全国广播公司晚间新闻主播汤姆·布罗考把美国二战一代赞为“一代英豪”）。此时此刻，东亚各地举行的各类纪念活动似在表明一个历史的拐点：即本地区无论从形式还是实质上都未能迈向未来，而是在开历史倒车。

在欧洲，胜败双方携手同祭；但在亚洲，人们则各行其是：日本人去广岛、靖国神社或塞班，中国人去北京的卢沟桥、南京大屠杀纪念馆或哈尔滨的前日本生物战731部队旧址，首尔、香港、新加坡、马尼拉等地也举行了各自的纪念活动。

欧洲和亚洲纪念活动的实质和内容也有天壤之别。在诺曼底、莫斯科、华沙、柏林和德累斯顿的聚会，不仅传达了痛苦的反思，而且体现了切身的悔恨，彼此的宽恕，以及真诚的和解；人们发誓不忘人类史上的那场浩劫，以避免重蹈覆辙。欧洲确实摆脱了历史的阴影，而亚洲则大相径庭。此时此刻，亚洲的民族主义如脱缰之马，民族间仇恨不共戴天，国家间对峙日渐加深。

战争的创痛与荒谬

60年易过，而亚洲民族之间的怨恨难消，其中原因有多种。首先，二战始于亚洲，也终于亚洲。与欧洲相比，亚洲战事不单持续时间更长，造成的破坏也更大。1931年日本侵占中国东北三省，将其变成日本的殖民地“满洲国”，二战从此揭开序幕。这比希特勒进兵莱茵区早了五年，比德国入侵波兰（即二战在欧洲爆发日）早了八年，比1941年的珍珠港事件早了足足十年。日本在1931年吞并中国东北，也宣告了西方民主国家1919年建立的凡尔赛体系开始瓦解。国联（联合国前身）判定日本在“满洲事件”中是侵略者，日本在1933年愤然退出国联。日本人的这种“单边主义”得到了德国的响应，同年也退出国联。意大利在1937年、奥地利在1938年、西班牙在1939年陆续退出。此后发生的事情，人尽皆知。。

欧亚两地战事持续的时间长短不一，亚洲是14年（1931年-1945年），欧洲是6年（1939年-1945年），然而具有讽刺意味的是，这两大战场却由于美国的有所作为与无所作为而变得密切相关。欧洲诸强陷于自身的战争而不能自拔，根本无暇顾及亚洲，只有英国人在缅甸算是打了一场大仗。美国作为影响两大战场最终结局的一支决定性力量，一开始只是袖手旁观。1941年6月，当时还是密苏里州参议员的哈里·S·杜鲁门曾经这样生动地表述过许多美国人的感受：“如果德国占上风，我们就要帮俄罗斯，如果俄罗斯要赢了，我们就帮德国，这样就能让他们尽可能多地相互残杀，不过我无论如何也不希望看到希特勒取胜。”【1】实际上，美国自1937年通过《中立法案》后，就在执行“一手交钱，一手提货”的政策。交战国可以从美国购买战争物资，只要他们支付现金，并且用自己的船只将货物运走。简单说，这是一种“双最化”政策，要将收益最大化而将风险最小化。

即使在德国、意大利和日本于1940年9月签订《三国条约》组成轴心国阵营以后，罗斯福总统唯一可以做到的一件事，也只限于“租借”货物给欧洲的盟友，而这些货物都是在战后应该“归还”的。在亚洲，日本继续跻身美国最大贸易伙伴之列，尽管天皇的帝国军队正在肆意蹂躏中国的广大地区。直到日军在1941年夏挥师印度支那，美国才“意外地”启动了对日本的石油禁运政策。这一“失误”是由下级官员造成的，他们全面停止了对日本的石油运输，而罗斯福总统的本意只是局部禁运。只有在日本轰炸珍珠港以后，美国才感到别无选择而对日本和德国宣战。这么一来，发生在亚洲的事件大大加速了欧洲战事的进程。

时间进入1945年，亚洲成为最后结束战事之地。经过半个世纪与邻国以及许多欧洲强国的战争，日本帝国曾经不可一世的军事机器终于在1945年嘎然而止，而这还是由于美中俄三个大陆国家联手，加上美国的原子弹的助力才得以做到的。这场祸及整个亚洲的战争，实际上也使第二次世界大战成为一次真正席卷全球的冲突。美国作为这场战争的唯一赢家，得益于它那得天独厚的地缘战略位置，以及参战较晚，使其得以在20世纪后半叶建立史无前例的全球影响力。

两个轴心国的 两条道路

当战火最终在亚洲大地熄灭，3500万中国人失去了生命，跟他们一起逝去的还有2700万俄罗斯人、1000万德国人、300万日本人、87万法国人、76万英国人以及60万美国人。但是，跟以前的冲突相比，这些人死去的方式迥然不同。尽管欧洲的军事行动更高效、更具破坏力，但交战双方无论从装备情况还是意志来看，或多或少都是势均力敌的。德方相当高的伤亡数字（六年死了1000万人）证实了欧洲战事的严酷。与之相对应的是，日本对中国的侵略在很大程度上是一场一面倒的屠杀，中国被视为手到擒来的猎物。中日两国在伤亡数字上的巨大差异清晰地反映出这种不对等状况（日本军方记录显示，1937年到1945年间，约有40万日本军人死在中国，同期日军的阵亡总数为190万人）。

二战还造成了许多平民伤亡。在欧洲，对阵双方都对平民动用致命武力（当然，单单希特勒对犹太人的种族灭绝就造成了600万人的死亡）。在亚洲，在美国于1945年3月开始对日本城市进行大规模空袭以前，平民伤亡多数时候是由于侵略中国的日本军人对手无寸铁的中国人的屠杀。在臭名昭著的1937年南京大屠杀期间，日军毫无节制的杀戮和强奸行为持续了整整三个月，估计造成30万中国人死亡。

“我们愿为天皇做任何事情，强奸、杀人，一切事情，”在1939年至1945年期间当过兵的日本人普本正与（Masayo Enomoto）在不久前的一个美国电视采访里这么说。“我们会进到一个村子，把男人抓来，盘问他们把武器藏在哪里。盘问完了就杀掉他们。我们被告知，中国人不配用我们的武士刀来杀。于是我们就用石头。”另一个日本老兵绀户一（Hajime Kondo）回忆道。【3】

发生在南京的杀戮与强奸甚至让当地德国纳粹党的领导人约翰·拉贝感到厌恶，他也是南京国际安全区的主管。当拉贝发现自己不能说服日本军事当局停止大屠杀，他在城里走街串巷，试图凭自己的力量阻止暴行发生。他会去正在发生强奸行为的地区，凭借作为日本盟国官员的身份，将日本士兵从他们的猎物那里赶走，有一回他甚至亲手将一个日本兵从一个年轻姑娘身上扯开。

拉贝的日记直到2000年才出版。【4】但在战时，日本的媒体却热衷于报道日军在南京附近的杀人记录。最臭名昭著的例子之一是两个日本少佐，分别名为向井敏明和野田毅，他们在南京附近分头开始斩首行动，看谁先杀够100个人。《东京日日新闻》刊登了他们的照片，配上大标题：“百人斩超纪录，向井106对野田105/两少尉延长战”。【5】

战争结束以后很久，日本坚持认为自己当时在中国的残暴行为属于“正常”的战时损耗， 与发生在欧洲的纳粹屠杀犹太人不可同日而语。事实可能如此。纳粹党卫军对欧洲犹太人的“最后解决”是一项追求效率的系统工作，而日本兵对中国人的杀戮显然是为了取乐。“我们更多地把他们看做东西，而不是人。”曾在1942年至1945年间担任日本军医的汤浅坚（Ken Yuasa）最近这样说。【6】

德国人二战期间确实嗜血无度，但在另一个方面，他们由于担心遭到报复而有所克制：没有对同盟国使用化学和生物武器。日本人就没有这方面的克制，二战期间他们在中国系统地进行化学战和生物战，导致成千上万的中国人死亡。在731部队的生产高峰期，他们一个月可以生产高达600公斤炭疽。一项新近完成的研究显示，大约有27万中国人死于日本在中国发动的化学和生物战。【7】直到今天，在中国依然留有日本投降前匆忙掩埋在中国大地上的大约20万件化学武器。这些东西偶尔也会发生泄漏和爆炸，继续在中国造成人员伤亡。【8】

亚洲还有慰安妇问题。该体系是在1937年南京大屠杀发生以后建立起来的，当时，日本士兵的大量强奸行为甚至引起了日本军方高层的警觉，随后就在亚洲各地建起了日本战时慰安所，大约20万年轻女性被迫从业。德国人在欧洲的罪行累累，但却没有像日本这样有计划地使成千上万年轻女性沦为性奴。毫无疑问，这些年轻女性饱受磨难与羞辱，但人们不禁要问：假如没有这些女性被“雇佣”为慰安妇，那么那些日本帝国军人在亚洲大地横行无阻时对其他女性又会怎样呢？这一假设问题也许永远没有答案。

尽管1931年至1945年间发生了上述种种暴行，但日本的文献、出版物以及官方的说法通常还是将日本对中国的战争称为“满洲里事件”、卢沟桥事件、南京事件，如此等等，不一而足，就好像日本从未真正对中国宣战，也没有任何蛛丝马迹表明，日本自己就是所有这些事件唯一的始作俑者。更有甚者，日本对其侵略行径还狡辩称，日本对中国和亚洲的侵略是所谓“进入”。这一措辞，或者说辩解，其实忽略了两厢情愿的做爱与暴力强奸行为之间的至关重要的重大差别，尽管两者都要通过“进入”这一行为来实现。

过于宽厚的和平与欠公正的审判

战争不可能在国家之间建造爱情，最起码在战争结束之初是不可能的。交战国战后的关系取决于以何种方式实现和平。战争结束六十年后，德国已彻底忏悔并脱胎换骨，带着尊严和尊重，重返欧洲大家庭。与此同时，日本与邻国在历史问题上仍无法沟通。

这两个前轴心国的不同命运的根本差异，在于战后对它们执行的占领政策完全不同：德国是多国共管，日本则是一国独揽。德国投降后，这个国家由美国和它在欧洲包括前苏联在内的盟国共同占领和管制。这种联合占领、共享责任、以及相互制约的机制，确保了一个更具连贯性的去纳粹化进程，即使德国在1947年至1991年间恰好身处冷战中心，也未对这一进程有所影响。乔治?巴顿是一位富有传奇色彩的二战英雄，战后在德国巴伐利亚州任军事长官。因为声称纳粹不过就是一个普通政党，外加他决定当地政府雇佣几个前纳粹官员，就被德怀特·艾森豪威尔将军撤职。【9】

但在日本，被称为“联军最高统帅”（Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, SCAP）实施的占领，却仅仅是在名义上与盟国有关。从一开始，麦克阿瑟就以各种理由决定免除裕仁天皇的全部战争罪行和责任。在东京审判期间，麦克阿瑟明确下令将天皇从战犯审判的名单里剔除，使他免于出庭作证，后来还对战时首相东条英机将军进行引导并得到后者的全面配合，东条英机于是担下全部战争责任，而天皇则被塑造成一位和平爱好者。

真相却是，从“9/18”事变（1931年）、进攻上海（1937年）、南京大屠杀（1937年）、偷袭珍珠港（1941年）、731细菌战部队，到神风突击队自杀式轰炸等等，每一次重大的战略或军事决策/行动，裕仁不是幕后策划就是给予默许。天皇是“战争的啦啦队长。在每一个重要关口，天皇都赞同他的首相和军队”，最近一部纪录片这样提到。1943年战局对日本逆转，天皇则鼓励他的部队“勇对挑战，全力以赴，大获全胜”。他甚至在1945年2月拒绝了一些日本官员提出的关于结束战争的请求，一个月后美国对日本多个城市展开地毯式轰炸，最终在广岛和长崎投下原子弹。【10】

战后，美方对裕仁在战时的所作所为进行彻头彻尾的重新包装，或者说是颠倒是非。直到他在1989年去世，这位天皇留在人们心目中的印象，都是在日本对中国和美国的战争期间担当了一个难有作为、徒有虚名的国家首脑，他对轰炸珍珠港一事一无所知，对阻止类似南京大屠杀这样的暴行也无能为力；反而是他决定投降而带来了和平，他不过是一个性格温和的小个子男人，只对海洋学以及迪斯尼乐园的米老鼠感兴趣。“这几乎可以说是一出好莱坞大戏，”哥伦比亚大学历史学者卡罗尔·古拉克评论道，她认为美国的“公关机器”可以“点石成金”。【11】

随着冷战在1947年开始，麦克阿瑟大幅度调整了美国的对日占领政策，放弃战后的“三D”政策（民主化、去军事化以及对日本的经济体系去中央化），释放战时领袖与官员，同时再度武装日本，这便是当今日本对自己过去在亚洲的行为感到“困惑”的核心问题。后来，1951年召开的旧金山和会，台湾国民党政府中华人民共和国政府均未被邀请出席，尽管中国受日本军国主义之害最深，持续时间也最长。美国对日本的“过分的战争手段”（包括使用核武器）和“过于宽厚的和平”，为日本与邻国目前就日本对亚洲的侵略行为纷争不已埋下伏笔。

这两种不同的占领政策，使德国与日本在历史问题上分道扬镳。迄今为止，前纳粹官员依然在全球被追捕法办。德国的教科书彻底消除了种族歧视的言辞，德国学校传递的信息是，战争的结束并非是德国战败，而是德国从一个罪恶的政权获得了解放。没有任何德国学者会争辩犹太人被杀的精准数字，而单是否认灭绝犹太人的大屠杀就足以构成刑事罪。战后几十年来，德国的政府和企业已经并仍在继续对纳粹德国的成千上万受害者提供财政补偿。1970年，西德总理威利·勃兰特在华沙犹太隔离区起义遇难者的纪念碑前下跪。当时没有人要求他那么做；德国深重的罪责让这个德国最有权势的男人跪倒在地。【12】

如今日本还在道歉，但似乎无人倾听，也没有任何日本邻国愿意相信日本的“反思”，因为这种所谓“反思”之后，一些高官都会出场，极力美化和漂白日本的侵略史。自1980年代以来，日本政府一步步坚持不懈地修改了本国的历史教科书，目的就是淡化自己的责任，同时夸大日本的苦难。结果是在日本，几乎所有50岁以下的国民都知道原子弹落在广岛和长崎，却不知道为什么炸弹偏偏会被投向日本。

进入21世纪，日本的上述种种做法终于“修成正果”：日本的政治和社会生态的右转已势不可挡。就在十年前二战结束五十周年之际，都难以想象谈论日本拥有核武器以及修改放弃战争的宪法第九条这两件事。而如今，这两件事要么正在积极考虑，要么正在积极准备。1990年代，日本的政治家对自己参拜靖国神社还是要保持低调，那儿供奉着大批日本战犯。但在新世纪，议员和首相们则公开参拜，大多数时候还都带有公职身份。进入标志战争结束六十周年的2005年，日本两大保守报纸《读卖新闻》和《产经新闻》联手赞助多达20万人参拜靖国神社。8月2日，日本国会通过一项决议，以淡化日本的军国主义历史，即从十年前一份类似的决议当中删去“侵略”和“殖民统治”这两个词。同日，日本内阁通过了《2005年防务白皮书》，目标锁定中国军事力量的增长，而右翼的扶桑社则开始出售新版历史教科书。

日本对自己的和平主义形象感到不自在，这一点甚至可以从该国最庄重的广岛原爆纪念日（8月6日）体会到。尽管纪念仪式按照通常的程序顺利进行，但这个国家按捺不住的想法却是毋庸置疑的，那就是抛弃日本战后的和平主义，推进宪法修订（去掉或重新诠释第九条），同时开始考虑获得核武器一事。广义而言，广岛作为一个象征，在今天的日本看来已经不再重要，甚至不再符合他们的意愿。《读卖新闻》的一篇社论走得更远，公开宣称它是“空洞的”，呼吁日本的反核运动“应该反映现实”。事实上，日本国内的舆论和趋势都是要避免这些“令人感到羞耻”的纪念日。【13】。在政客与公众看来，更值得庆祝的是另一个纪念日：2005年刚好也是日本在1904-1905年日俄战争取胜一百周年。“我们应该铭记，当年日本真是情绪高涨，二战后却一蹶不振”，前首相中曾根康弘本年5月在东京湾对民众这样说。“我们应该记取那个时候的日本，我们应该建设一个新日本。”他发出呼吁说。防卫厅长官大野功统也表示，希望这一纪念日能“让这个国家，尤其是让终将引领这个国家的未来的年轻一代，意识到热爱与保卫这个国家的重要性，从而为增强防务意识做出贡献”。【14】但是，这两位官员都忘了，日俄战争的战场是在中国和朝鲜，给当地人民造成了巨大的伤害。

就这样，进入战争结束六十周年，日本依然不为所动、不思悔改，不愿意面对自己曾经侵略、占领以及残酷对待邻国的历史事实，其程度是此前任何一个西方帝国主义国家都望尘莫及的。在亚洲，许多人依然不明白，为什么日本为了要从“白人帝国主义”统治下“解放”亚洲而杀戮如此之多的亚洲人？而这“解放”的说辞就是日本在战时为自己侵略行为开脱的惯常手法，如今依然如故。

亚洲民族主义崛起

2005年，当东亚和世界各地都在纪念二战结束六十周年之际，东亚的民族主义亦波涛滚滚。其主要致因是日本的政界精英一直在粉饰历史，其结果是反日情绪和行动在中国、韩国和其他亚洲国家节节升级。具有讽刺意义的是，亚洲国家越是对日本漂白侵略历史的做法的表示反感，日本的修正主义倾向就变得越是强烈。伴随这一系列历史问题以及对之的种种解读，东亚地区的领土争议也在升温。其中包括日本和中国在东海对钓鱼/尖阁诸岛以及专属经济区（EEZ）界定的争议、日本和韩国对独岛/竹岛群岛的争议、日本和俄罗斯对南库页岛/北方领土的争议，以及在较小层面的日本和台湾对钓鱼岛的争议。这一切是在美日关系逐步加强的背景下发生的。2月，在华盛顿召开的2+2会谈中，日本首次同意将其地理上的军事防护扩展到台湾。

就在日本与邻国这些棘手的历史和领土问题升温之际，东京也下定决心，开始在联合国安理会谋求一个永久席位。尽管日本的这种“有钱才有代表权”的要求无可非议，但选在这个时候以这种方式入常却难以奏效，反而在东亚国家引发了又一波唇枪舌战、彼此憎恶的恶性循环。结果，日本越是努力谋求跻身联合国安理会，其他东亚国家就越强力反对，日本国内也对邻国更加反感。

为什么日本这样不在意亚洲国家的看法？为什么很多日本的内政外交政策看上去就是精心策划用以激怒日本的邻国、并且时机恰好选在日本寻求跻身联合国安理会以及被接纳为一个“正常”国家？而此时日本恰恰正需要东亚各国给予支持。难道作为世界第二大经济体以及军费开支第四大国的日本不再看重亚洲了么？日本在远交近攻这条路上还要走多远？日本何时才会将注意力“重返”亚洲？而这又可能是出于何种目的、以什么方式？上一次日本作为一个现代化的、西化的“正常”国家，兴师动众、咄咄逼人地“挺进”到亚洲大陆，是以1894-1895年对中国的战争开始的。难道历史又要回到一个百年周期的起点了吗？

上述种种问题都很难回答，因为国际和地区环境都已发生巨变。不过，稍稍探讨一下日本的身份认同感，可能有助于解析日本怎样以及为何推行某些特定的政策。在日本迈向现代化和西方化的非同凡响的崛起背后，是日本的国家认同感的混淆和扭曲，这是问题的关键。十九世纪，美国海军准将马修·佩里用武力打开了日本国门，而这永远改变了日本对中国的看法及政策。对日本而言，“中央之国”过去曾是一个可以利用、如果不是高人一等的邻居，至少可以进行文化和商业交流；而现在却变成一个为了日本的光荣与繁荣而必须反抗、击败乃至瓜分的对象。当时中国在鸦片战争（1839-1843年）之后，变成一个束手就擒的猎物。日本对中国和其他国家的军事胜利大大提高了日本的自信以及种族优越感，这至少可以部分解释日本士兵于二战期间在亚洲的暴力行为，以及日本为什么不愿意甚至干脆拒绝就战时暴行对亚洲国家道歉。

在20世纪末，日本的国家认同依然维持在“高于和远离”亚洲的位置。按照日本政治学者北冈伸一的说法，日本“是这么一个国家：它位于西方文明的外围，作为一个独立的文明继续蓬勃发展，但并未被西方文化完全压制”。【15】至于日本的地理位置以及它在世界文化版图的具体方位，这段文字则模棱两可，不着边际。这句话传递的唯一信息，是从抽象到空洞的某种无形性。在这位日本学者看来，亚洲根本就不存在。西方国家，以美国为最，也在给日本的认同危机添乱。萨缪尔·亨廷顿在他著名的《文明的冲突》论述中单单挑出日本作为一个独立而分离的“文明”，跟西方、伊斯兰教、儒家、印度教、斯拉夫东正教、拉丁美洲和非洲并列。日本得到的这一特殊待遇是毫无意义的，因为整个非洲还被这位学者描述为一个独立的文明，而实际上那里存在着众多宗教和民族群体。【16】美国人在心里给日本保留一个特殊位置也是可以理解的，这源于美国在过去100多年里一直把日本看作现代化和西方化的一个好学生，除了那“反常”的四年太平洋战争期间以外。

不过，即使日本迷恋西方化， 抛弃自己的亚洲身份，日本还得具体决定到底要加入哪一个“西方”：是欧洲国家更世俗化、自由化、更具和平主义那种西方，还是像美国那样更保守、宗教色彩更浓厚、且动辄诉诸武力的西方？然而美国那一套也不是一成不变的。美国自己围绕怎样跟世界其他国家打交道一事，无论从社会到政界都严重分裂。日本的精英最好能记住，是美国迫使日本在20世纪多数时间采取和平主义外交政策，迄今为止，美日两国以及整个世界都从中受益。

一些粗浅之见

不管日本最终认定自己属于哪个“西方”或哪种“美国模式”，世界都将不可逆转地进入21世纪，在这个世纪，战争的受害者、胜利者以及战败者的区别，在现实世界里将变得越来越不重要。

千年易过，日本的罪孽难消， 不管日本如何对其解读。着眼于未来，日本着实需要面对自己的过去，同时还要明白，宽恕不能以发号施令而获得、更不可能寄望他人的恩惠，必须通过发自内心的忏悔、迈向和解的坚实步骤而赢得。同时，日本对本国历史的“反思”，应该超越执迷于到底发生了什么的地步，转向审视为什么这些事情会发生。并且，这么做的时候，不要怪罪美国人投掷了原子弹，或是指责其他国家，说他们的政府据说在历史上杀害了更多的本国人民。那跟日本在二战期间的亚洲的所作所为是风马牛不相及。最起码，美国人不是无缘无故投掷原子弹，而中国军队也从来没有“挺进”东京。

除了历史问题，日本应该尝试寻求与邻国相处之道，这跟日本认为自己有多么“西化”没有关系。日本不可能总是无视它在东亚的邻国，或是老跟这些国家动粗。从长计议，在与邻国交往中的日本作为一个“正常”国家，不仅意味着有权使用武力，还要有与他国达成和平与妥协的能力和意愿，如同德国在过去六十年所做那样。日本的执政精英总以民主的幌子粉饰参拜靖国神社的举动。但是，缺少节制、没有稳固的中间地带的民主，对日本和其他国家来说都可能是危险的，1920年代的德国魏玛共和国和日本的大正民主制已经证明了这一点。【17】两者都具有典型的议会民主构架，却无力抵御1930年代席卷而来的极端民族主义、军国主义以及种族主义大潮。

美国总统伍德罗·威尔逊曾在凡尔赛和会宣称，要让世界对民主国家变得安全，他显然没有看到硬币的另一面，那就是， 使民主制度对变得对世界更安全也同等重要。之后发生的事情人人尽知。在原子弹落在日本六十年后，为什么日本的邻国依然觉得与日本这个“和平主义”的民主国家在一起并不安全？为何日本的执政精英执意认为，日本在20世纪上半叶的所作所为，除了被击败以外并无不妥之处？ 然而如果日本的过去无可指责，日本是否还会如法炮制？在这个意义上，威尔逊在1919年未能料到、而麦克阿瑟在1952年（美国结束对日占领）未能做到之事，在21世纪仍像幽灵一样缠绕着东亚和美国。

不管美国在过去做了什么，它可能是世界上唯一一个能在历史问题上让日本俯首倾听的国家。在广意义上，美国作为全球唯一超级大国，不仅应该行使它的军事力量和政治影响力，还要努力为自身和他国树立道德权威，对自身施以道义约束。从这个意义上讲，一个民主国家无论在历史和现实问题上，都应该以更高而非更低的道德标准来要求自己。这在大规模杀伤性武器年代来得尤其迫切。这就是说，华盛顿不应以牺牲一个公平国际体系而挑拨亚洲国家相互对立，对此应三思而后行。对北京和东京采取更均衡的手段符合华盛顿的长远利益，也符合该地区和全世界的利益。

于滨 上海美国学会资深研究员

英文《亚洲时报》

2005年8月16日

www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GH16Ad07.html

The Anniversary Elegy

Asia Times online

August 16, 2005

www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GH16Ad07.html

When the "greatest generation", to borrow Tom Brokaw's phrase, finally fades away in East Asia's nations, the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II - celebrated on August 15 to mark the day when Japan surrendered - may well be remembered as a turning point when the region did not move forward into the future but back toward the past, in both style and substance.

While commemorations in Europe were joined by both victors and vanquished, Asians have gone their separate ways: the Japanese to Hiroshima, Yasukuni Shrine or Saipan; the Chinese to Beijing's Marco Polo Bridge, the Nanjing Massacre Museum or Harbin (where the Japanese biological warfare Unit 731 was stationed); and others to Seoul, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and so on.

The substance and chemistry of those events also differ vastly in Europe and Asia. Gatherings at Normandy, Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin and Dresden conveyed not only painful reflection but also heartfelt remorse, reciprocal forgiveness, genuine reconciliation and a determination not to forget and repeat the greatest slaughter in human history. Europe has indeed turned a historical corner. In sharp contrast, the anniversary year in Asia has so far witnessed hyper-nationalism, rising mutual hatred, and intensifying interstate rivalry.

The agony and irony of war

There are plenty of reasons why Asians have not found it easy to become reconciled to the past, even after 60 years. For one thing, World War II both began and ended in Asia. It also lasted longer and was more devastating than the war in Europe. The ball started rolling in 1931 when Japan seized the three northeastern provinces of China and turned them into the Japanese colony of Manchukuo. This was five years before Hitler sent troops into the Rhineland, eight years before the official start of World War II in Europe with the German attack on Poland, and fully 10 years before Pearl Harbor in 1941. Japan's 1931 annexation of Manchuria was also the beginning of the end of the Versailles system put in place by the Western democracies in 1919. When the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations, ruled that Japan was the aggressor in the "Manchuria Incident", Tokyo angrily withdrew from it in 1933. This "unilateralism" of the Japanese was echoed and followed by Germany, which withdrew from the League in 1933. Italy followed in 1937, Austria in 1938 and Spain in 1939. The rest is history.

Despite the different durations of the war - 14 years in Asia (1931-45) versus six years in Europe (1939-45) - the two theaters were intimately connected, ironically, by the action and inaction of the United States. The European democracies were totally consumed by their own war and paid little attention to Asia, save a major campaign by the British in Burma. The United States, a crucial weight in deciding the final outcome in both sectors, was still sitting on the fence. Harry S Truman, then Democratic senator from Missouri, explicitly expressed the feelings of many Americans when he said in June 1941, "If we see that Germany is winning we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many [of each other] as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances." [1] In actuality, ever since the 1937 Neutrality Act the US practiced a policy of "cash and carry". Belligerents could purchase certain war materials from the US if they paid cash and carried them away in their own ships. In short, it was an "MM" policy of maximizing profit while minimizing risks.

Even after Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact to form the Axis bloc in September 1940, the only thing FDR (president Roosevelt) was able to do was "lend and lease" goods to the European allies, which they were expected to "return" after the war. In Asia, Japan remained one of the largest trading partners of the US, while the Emperor's Imperial Army devastated China's vast territory. Following the Japanese army's move into Indochina in the summer of 1941, the US "accidentally" initiated an oil embargo against Japan. This "mistake" was inadvertently made by lower-level bureaucrats who went ahead with a total stoppage of oil shipments to Japan when FDR meant only a partial embargo. Only after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor did the US have no choice but to declare war on both Japan and Germany. Thus the resolution of the war in Europe was hastened by events in Asia.

Fast forward to 1945, when Asia was also the last to stop fighting. After 50 years of war with its neighbors and various Western powers in Asia, the unprecedented military ascendancy of the Empire of the Sun was finally arrested in 1945, thanks to the combined efforts of three continental powers - America, China, and Russia - plus US atomic weapons. This first war to engulf the whole of Asia therefore effectively made World War II a conflict on a truly global scale. The United States of America, the only real winner of the war, was able to achieve an unprecedented global reach in the second half of the 20th century, thanks to its ideal geostrategic location and its late entry into the war.

A tale of two axis powers

When the guns finally fell silent across Asia, 35 million Chinese had died, along with 27 million Russians, 10 million Germans, three million Japanese, 870,000 French, 760,000 British and 600,000 Americans. The manner in which they died, however, was significantly different from previous conflicts. Whereas military operations in Europe were far more effective and destructive, they were also fought between two more or less equally equipped and determined sides. The Germans' relatively high casualty figure (10 million in six years) testifies to the severity of the war. By contrast, Japan's aggression against China was very much a one-sided slaughter with the Chinese viewed as easy prey. The huge difference between the Chinese and Japanese casualties clearly indicates the asymmetry (Japanese military records show that some 400,000 Japanese military personnel died in China out of the total of 1.9 million between 1937 and 1945).

Many of the World War II casualties were civilians. In Europe, both sides resorted to the use of deadly force against the civilian population. (And of course Hitler's attempted extermination of the Jews killed an additional six million.) In Asia, before the US started large-scale air raids against Japanese cities in March 1945, civilian casualties largely meant the slaughter of defenseless Chinese by the Japanese invading army. During the notorious Rape of Nanking in 1937, the killing and raping spree went unchecked for three months and an estimated 300,000 Chinese died. [2]

"We'd do everything for the sake of the emperor, raping, killing, everything," explained Masayo Enomoto, a former Japanese soldier (1939-45) in a recent US TV interview. "We'd march into a village, find the men and question them as to where they kept their arms. And when we finished questioning them, we'd kill them. We were told it was too good to kill Chinese with our swords. So we used stones," recalled Hajime Kondo, another former Japanese soldier. [3]

The killing and raping in Nanjing even sickened John Rabe, the leader of the German Nazi party in the area and head of the International Safety Zone in Nanking. When he failed to persuade Japanese military authorities to stop the massacre, Rabe began to roam the city, trying to prevent the atrocities himself. He'd go anywhere raping was taking place. With only his status as an official of an allied nation, he would chase Japanese soldiers away from their prey and on one occasion even bodily lifted a Japanese soldier off a young girl.

Rabe's diary was publicized only in 2000. [4] The Japanese wartime media, however, avidly covered the army's killing records near Nanking. In one of the most notorious, two Japanese sublieutenants, Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Takeshi, went on separate beheading sprees near Nanjing to see who could kill 100 men first. The Japan Advertiser in Tokyo ran their picture under the bold headline, "Contest to Kill 100 Chinese with Sword Extended When Both Fighters Exceed Mark - Mukai Scores 106 and Noda 105." [5]

For years after the war, Japan insisted that its atrocities in China were "normal" wartime attrition and therefore different from the Holocaust in Europe. This may be true. While the SS troopers' "final solution" of European Jews was systematically done for efficiency, the killings of Chinese by the Japanese soldiers were apparently for fun. "We actually treated them more like things than people," Ken Yuasa, a Japanese military doctor (1942-45), recently stated. [6]

In another category, the Germans' wartime excessiveness was somewhat balanced by its restraint not to use chemical and biological weapons against the Allies for fear of retaliation. There were, nonetheless, no such restraints for the Japanese, whose systematic chemical and biological warfare in China killed hundreds of thousands of Chinese during the war. At the peak of its production, Unit 731 was able to produce 600 kilograms of anthrax per month. A recent study totals at 270,000 the victims of Japanese chemical and biological warfare in China. [7] To date, the Chinese people are still living with 200,000 pieces of chemical weapons hurriedly buried all over China before Japan's surrender. Their occasional leaking and explosions continue to injure and kill people in China. [8]

In Asia, there is also the comfort women issue. The system, which forced some 200,000 young women into the Japanese wartime military brothels all over Asia, was put in place after the 1937 Rape of Nanking when the random raping spree by Japanese soldiers alarmed even the Japanese military high command. For all the crimes the Germans committed in Europe, there was simply no such equivalent for the systematic enslaving of hundreds of thousands of young women. Despite all the sufferings and humiliations of those young women, one may well ask the question, what would have happened if those women had not been "employed" as comfort women when soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army were roaming all over Asia? This hypothetical question may never be answered.

For all these atrocities between 1931 and 1945, Japanese documents, publications and official pronouncements usually described Japan's war on China as the "Manchurian Incident", Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Nanjing Incident, etc, as if Japan had never really "declared" war on China and without the slightest hint that Japan engineered them all. Another glossing over of Japan's war of aggression was to describe the invasion as Japan's "entrance" into China/Asia. The term, or justification, seems to miss a crucial difference between consensual love-making and violent raping, though both are accomplished by the act of "entering".

Softer peace and half justice

No war produces love affairs between nations, at least not immediately afterward. It is the way peace is handled that determines the postwar chemistry. Sixty years after the war ended, a thoroughly remorseful and reformed Germany is able, with dignity and respect, to rejoin the European community of nations. Meanwhile, Japan is barely on speaking terms with its neighbors over the issue of history.

At the heart of the different fate of the two former Axis powers lies the two different occupation policies: one multilateral in Germany and the other unilateral in Japan. After Germany's surrender, the nation was jointly occupied and administered by the US and its European allies, including the former Soviet Union. The joint occupation, shared responsibility and mutual constraints ensured a more consistent de-Nazification process, despite the fact that Germany was at the center of the Cold War (1947-91). General George Patton, a legendary World War II hero and postwar military governor of Bavaria, was fired by General Dwight Eisenhower after making comments that the Nazis were nothing more than a normal political party and his personal decision to employ some former Nazi officials for local administration. [9]

In Japan, however, the occupation by the so-called "SCAP" (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) involved the allies in name only. From the beginning, MacArthur decided for a variety of reasons to exempt Emperor Hirohito from any war guilt and responsibility. During the Tokyo Trials, MacArthur explicitly instructed that the emperor be taken off the list of war criminal trials, kept him away from testifying and later coached wartime prime minister General Hideki Tojo, with the latter's full cooperation, to shoulder all responsibility for the war and to cast the emperor as a peace-lover.

The truth is that Hirohito was behind or acquiesced in every major strategic and military decision/operation: Manchuria (1931), Shanghai (1937), Nanking (1937), Pearl Harbor (1941), Unit 731, Kamikaze suicide bombings (1944), etc. The emperor "is a cheerleader for the war. At every turn, the emperor agreed with his ministers and military," noted a recent documentary. When the tide of the war started to turn against the Japanese in 1943, the emperor encouraged his troops to "rise to the challenge, make a tremendous effort and achieve a splendid victory". He even rejected in February 1945 a plea from some Japanese officials to end the war, thus opening the door for the Americans' carpet bombing of Japanese cities a month later and ultimately Hiroshima and Nakasaki. [10]

The remaking, or disinformation, of Hirohito's wartime record in the postwar years was thorough and complete. Until his death in 1989, the emperor was remembered as a helpless figurehead during Japan's wars with China and the US who knew nothing of the plan to bomb Pearl Harbor and had no power to stop atrocities such as the Rape of Nanking; who brought peace through surrender; and who was a mild-mannered little man interested in only marine science and Mickey Mouse in Disneyland. "It was almost a Hollywood production," commented Columbia University historian Carol Gluck on what she called the "efficient" US "publicity machine". [11]

When the Cold War started in 1947, MacArthur radically reversed the US occupation policy - which now lies at the heart of Japan's current "confusion" over its own historical behavior in Asia - from the postwar "three-D" policy (democratization, demilitarization, and decentralization of Japan's economic system) to one of releasing wartime leaders and officers and rearming Japan. Later, neither the Nationalist government in Taiwan nor the People's Republic of China were invited to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference, despite the fact that China suffered the most and longest from the Japanese militarism. The US's "harder war" (including nuclear weapons) and "softer peace" toward Japan have sown the seeds for the current disputes between Japan and its neighbors over the issue of Japan's wartime aggression in Asia.

The two different occupation policies led to startlingly different results with respect to the past in Germany and Japan. To date, former Nazi officers have been systematically chased around the world and brought to justice. German school books have been purged of racist references, and the message in German classrooms is that the end of the war was not a defeat but the liberation of Germany from a criminal regime. While no German scholars would engage in a debate about how many Jews were actually killed, the mere denial of the Holocaust remains a criminal offense. Throughout the postwar decades, the German government and companies have provided, and continue to provide, financial assistance to hundreds of thousands of victims of Nazi Germany. In 1970, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt fell to his knees before a monument to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. No one requested that he do so: it was the heavy burden of German guilt that dragged the most powerful man in Germany to the ground. [12]

Japan is still apologizing today. Nobody, however, seems to be listening. Nor are any of Japan's neighbors willing to believe Japan's "reflection", which is usually followed by more rhetoric and actions by some high-level officials to beautify and whitewash Japan's history of aggression. Since the 1980s, the Japanese government has gradually and persistently revised the nation's history textbooks in order to minimize its responsibility and maximize its own suffering. The result? Almost all Japanese under the age of 50 know that atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki but have little idea of why the bombs fell on Japan.

At the onset of the 21st century, all of these developments in Japan have borne their logical "fruits" - the overwhelming right-turn in the Japanese political and social environment. Only 10 years ago, at the 50th anniversary of the war, the possibility of Japan's acquiring nuclear arms and revising its official renunciation of war was unthinkable. Nowadays, both are either in active consideration or preparation. In the 1990s, Japanese politicians still kept a low profile for their visits to Yasukuni, where numerous Japanese war criminals are enshrined. In the new century, lawmakers and prime ministers openly rush to visit the shrine, most in their official capacity. For the 60th anniversary, the two largest conservative newspapers, the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Sankei Shimbun, are sponsoring a 200,000-person visit to Yasukuni. On August 2, the Japanese parliament passed a resolution that plays down Japan's militarist past, omitting the words "invasion" and "colonial rule", which were put into a similar resolution 10 years earlier. On the same day, the Japanese cabinet passed the 2005 Defense White Paper zeroing in the tremendous growth in Chinese military power, and right-wing Fusosha Publishing Inc put school textbooks on sale.

Japan's uneasiness with its pacifist image could even be felt on the nation's most solemn Hiroshima day (August 6). Although the commemoration went through the usual rituals, the unmistakable national impulse was to shed Japan's postwar pacifism, go ahead with constitutional revision (remove or reinterpret Article 9) and toy with the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons. In a broad sense, the symbolism of Hiroshima is no longer viewed as important or even desirable for Japan now. An editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun went so far as to call it "empty" and to urge that Japan's anti-nuclear movement "should reflect reality". Indeed, the tone and trend in Japan is to avoid these "humiliating" anniversaries. [13] In their place, politicians and the general public are embracing another anniversary: the centennial celebration of Japan's victory in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. "At that time Japan's spirit was very strong but it went down after World War II," former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone told a crowd at Tokyo Bay in May. "We should remember Japan's spirit at that time and we should build a new Japan," he urged. Defense Agency director-general Yoshinori Ono also expressed hope that the anniversary would "have the nation, especially the young generation who will lead the future of Japan, realize the importance of loving and defending our country and thus to make a contribution to the ... awareness of defense in general". [14] Both officials, however, forgot that the war was fought in China and Korea with tremendous damages to the local peoples.

Thus, on the 60th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan remains unmoved, unrepentant and reluctant to face the historical fact that it invaded, occupied and brutalized its neighbors to an extent that no Western imperialist powers had ever done. Many in Asia still wonder how and why so many Asian peoples were slaughtered in order to be "liberated" from the rule of "white imperialism", a common justification for Japanese actions both during the war and now.

The rise of Asian nationalism

There was a general rise of nationalist feeling across East Asia during much of 2005 when the region and the world were commemorating the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. Much of this originated inside Japan where political elites have consistently whitewashed history. As a result, anti-Japan sentiment and activities escalated in China, South Korea and other Asian nations. Ironically, the more Asian nations have expressed their opposition to Japan's effort to whitewash history, the more revisionist Japan has become. In the midst of all these issues over history and its interpretations, territorial disputes in the region are also growing. These include Japan-China disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and demarcation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea; Japan-South Korea over the Tokdo/Takeshima Islets; Japan-Russia over the Southern Kuriles/"Northern Territories;" and to a lesser degree Japan-Taiwan over the Diaoyu islands. All this is taking place against a backdrop of the strengthening US-Japan alliance. In February, at the 2+2 conference in Washington, Japan agreed for the first time to extend its geographic military protection to Taiwan.

As all these thorny issues of history and territory between Japan and its neighbors are heating up, Tokyo has also launched a determined effort to acquire a permanent UN Security Council seat. While nothing is wrong with Japan's desire to address the issue of "taxation without representation", the timing and manner simply do not work and have led to another vicious cycle of mutual misperception and resentment among East Asian nations. Thus the more Japan struggles to get itself onto the UN Security Council, the stronger the effort to avert it in the region, leading to still more resentment inside Japan against its neighbors.

Why does Japan pay so little attention to Asian opinions? How come so many Japanese policies, domestic and foreign, appear calculated to offend its neighbors, precisely when Japan needs the region for its bid for the Security Council seat and to be accepted as a "normal" state? Is Asia no longer important for Japan, the second largest economy with the fourth largest military spending in the world? How far will Japan travel along this trajectory of allying itself with the distant US while being nasty with neighbors? When will Japan "return" its attention to Asia, for what purpose, and by what means? The last time Japan massively and aggressively "advanced" into the Asian continent as a modernized and Westernized "normal" state, it began with the 1894-95 war with China. Is history returning to the starting point of a centennial cycle?

These questions, among others, are difficult to answer due to the vastly different international and regional environment. A glimpse into the Japanese sense of identity, however, may offer some clues regarding how and why Japan pursues certain policies. Behind Japan's extraordinary rise to modernize and Westernize is a key issue of Japan's mixed and twisted national identity. In the 19th century, the opening of Japan by US Commodore Matthew Perry forever changed Japan's perception of and policies toward China. The "Central Kingdom", which used to be a useful if not superior neighbor for the purpose of cultural and commercial exchange, was now to be defied, defeated and dismembered for the pride and prosperity of the Japanese nation. And China happened to be such easy prey after the Opium War (1839-43). Japan's military victories against China and others furthered its self-confidence and sense of racial superiority, which at least partially explains the violent behavior of Japanese soldiers in Asia during World War II and its reluctance and refusal to apologize to Asian nations regarding its wartime atrocities.

At the end of the 20th century, Japan's perception of its national identity continues to be one of "above and away" from Asia. According to Japanese political scientist Shin'ichi Kitaoka, Japan is "a country that sits on the outskirts of Western civilization but continues to thrive as an independent civilization not completely overwhelmed by Western culture." [15] Nowhere does this statement offer any explicit idea regarding where Japan is located in both the physical and cultural worlds. The only message from the quote is one of intangibility ranging from abstraction to emptiness. Asia simply does not exist according to this Japanese scholar. Western nations, particularly the United States, are also contributing to Japan's identity crisis. In his famous treatise The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington singles out Japan as an independent and separate "civilization", along with the West, Islam, Confucian, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin America, and Africa. The special treatment of Japan makes little sense when the whole of Africa is defined as a separate civilization despite the numerous religious and ethnic groupings there. [16] One may understand Japan's special place in the minds of Americans based on America's perception of Japan over the past 100 years as a favorite pupil of modernization and Westernization, except for the four-year "anomaly" of the Pacific War.

Even with its obsession for Westernization at the expense of its Asian identity, Japan still needs to decide which "West" to join: the Europeans' more secularized, liberal and pacifist version or America's more conservative, religious, and from time to time, more militaristic one? The American legacies, however, are by no means fixed. The US itself is deeply divided in its society and politics over how to relate to the rest of the world. Japan's elite would do well to remember that it was the United States that forced Japan to adopt a pacifist foreign policy for much of the 20th century, which has so far benefited both nations as well as the world.

Some modest proposals

Regardless of which "West" or which "America" Japan chooses to identify with, the world is irreversibly moving into the 21st century, in which distinctions among victims, victors, and vanquished of the war will come to signify less and less in the real world.

What happened in the past cannot be changed, though it has been constantly reinterpreted. For the sake of the future, Japan really needs to face its own past while understanding that forgiveness cannot be demanded or even expected but must be earned with heartfelt remorse and concrete steps toward reconciliation. Japan's "reflection" on its past should also move beyond an obsession with what happened and look at why things happened. This should be done without blaming the Americans for dropping atomic bombs or accusing other nations that their governments are said to have killed more of their own in the past. These are totally different things from what Japan did in Asia in World War II. At a minimum, Americans did not drop the atomic bombs without reason. And Chinese troops have never "advanced" into Tokyo.

Beyond history, Japan should try to find a way to live with its neighbors, no matter how "Westernized" it perceives itself to be. There are limits to how much Japan can continue to ignore or get tough with its neighbors in East Asia. In its long-term interactions with neighbors, Japan as a "normal" state does not only imply the right to use force but also the ability and willingness to make peace and reach a compromise with others, as Germany has done in the past 60 years. The frequent shrine visits by Japan's ruling political elite are justified with and defended by a claim of exercising democracy. Democracy without moderation and a stable middle ground, however, is perhaps dangerous for both itself and others, as were the cases of the Weimar Republic in Germany and Japan's Taisho democracy in the 1920s. [17] Both had infrastructures typical of a parliamentary democracy. Neither, however, survived the tidal waves of extreme nationalism, militarism and racism in the 1930s.

When US president Woodrow Wilson declared his intention to make the world safe for democracies at Versailles, he obviously failed to see the other side of the coin, that is, an equally important task was to make democracy safe for the world. And the rest is history. Sixty years after the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, why do Japan's neighbors still feel unsafe with such a "pacifist" democracy, whose ruling elite increasingly insists that nothing was wrong with what Japan did in the first half of the last century except Japan was defeated? But if nothing was wrong then, will Japan do it again? In that sense, what Wilson failed to see in 1919 and MacArthur failed to do in 1952 (end of US occupation of Japan) continue to haunt East Asia, as well as the US in the 21st century.

Regardless of what it did in the past, the United States is perhaps the only nation in the world that Japan may still listen to on the subject of history. In a broader sense, the US as the sole superpower of the world should not only exercise its military power and political influence, but also strive for moral authority and ethical restraints over itself and others. In this regard, a democracy should be held to higher, not lower, moral standards regarding both past and present issues. This is particularly imperative in the era of weapons of mass destruction. There are therefore limits to how far Washington should play off one Asian power against the other at the expense of a just international system. A more balanced approach to Beijing and Tokyo is in the long-term interests of Washington, as well as of the region and the world.

Yu Bin is a professor of political science at Wittenberg University in the US, senior research associate for the Shanghai Institute of American Studies, and visiting scholar at Fudan University in Shanghai. He is also a regular contributor to Comparative Connections. He can be reached at byu@wittenberg.edu

Notes

[1] New York Times, June 24, 1941, p. 7.

[2] Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (Penguin Books, 1997).

[3] Cited from Hirohito, Emperor of War, Discovery Channel, August 6, 2005.

[4] John Rabe, The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe (Vintage, 2000).

[5] Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (Penguin Books, 1997).

[6] Hirohito, Emperor of War, Discovery Channel, August 6, 2005.

[7] Xinhua, "Zhuanjia: qinhua rijun xijunzhan zhishao danhai yu 27wan zhongguoren [Experts: at least 270,000 Chinese fell victims to biological warfare by the invading Japanese forces]," August 9, 2005, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/36033391.html.

[8] For more information regarding Japan's chemical and biological warfare in China, see Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932_45 and the American Cover_Up, revised edition (Routledge, 2001); Daniel Barenblatt, A Plague upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation (HarperCollins, 2004); Hal Gold, Unit 731Testimony (Tuttle Publishing, 2004).

[9] See www.historylearningsite.co.uk/george_patton.htm.

[10] Hirohito, Emperor of War, Discovery Channel, August 6, 2005.

[11] Hirohito, Emperor of War, Discovery Channel, August 6, 2005. Also see Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (HarperCollins Publishers, 2000).

[12] For a sharp comparison of the postwar policies in Germany and Japan, see Foreign Report, "Japan, Germany and War Guilt," Jane's Defense Weekly, June 15, 2005, Internet version.

[13] Norimitsu Onishi, "Mourning Pacifism in Hiroshima," New York Times, August 8, 2005; Joichi Ito, "Nagasaki and Hiroshima: An Anniversary To Forget," New York Times, August 8, 2005; Kazuo Ogoura, "Don't Judge Japan Only by Its Past," International Herald Tribune, July 22, 2005.

[14] Mie Kohiyama, "Japanese Urged To Seize Spirit of Victory Over Russia on Centennial," Agence France-Presse (AFP), May 27, 2005.

[15] Ito Ken'ichi, Nishio Kanji, Kitaoka Shin'ichi, Japan's Identity: Neither the West nor the East (Tokyo: The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc., February 1999), p. 1. Excerpted from the Japanese version, Nihon no Aidentiti: Seiyou Demo Nai, Touyou Demo Nai (Tokyo: Foresto Shuppan, 1999). Cited in Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (Palgrave, 2003), p. 27.

[16] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 7 (Summer 1993).

[17] For debates regarding the more aggressive behavior of certain democracies, see Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec. 1997); Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (W. W. Norton & Company, 2000).

(Copyright 2005 Yu Bin)