From Reestablishing Diplomatic Ties to Signing the Treaty: The Formation of Legal Norms in Contemporary China-Japan Relations and the Taiwan Issue

Yang Bojiang

Abstracts: From the resumption of diplomatic relations to the conclusion of the Treaty between China and Japan, spanning six years of strenuous negotiations, China-Japan relations have undergone a historic turnaround through the “two-step” approach. The “Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China” legally affirms the principles and content outlined in the “China-Japan Joint Communique”, and lay up the overall framework, political foundation and developmental direction of the contemporary China-Japan relations. From a macroscopic perspective, the treaty holds significant far-reaching implications beyond the bilateral relations. It serves as a mutual confirmation of the legal basis of the post-war order in the Asia-Pacific region. In negotiations of normalizing China-Japanese relations and signing of treaty, the Taiwan issue always remain a tangible or intangible focus. Regarding Taiwan’s status, Japan attempts to avoid openly acknowledging “one China” and “Taiwan as a part of China” aiming to create strategic ambiguity and maintain flexibility. Japan’s “dual-track and double-face” policy on Taiwan is characterized not only by phased, utilitarian purposes but also by long -term strategic considerations, especially the maintenance of the strategic priority of the “U. S.-Japan security system” and the alleged juridical authority of the “San Francisco system”. However, the essence of Japan’s “dual-track”, “double-face” approach fundamentally underscores the inherent contradictions and non-integrative nature of Japan’s Taiwan policy. Considering Japan’s political and strategic dependence on the U. S.-Japan alliance and its commitment to safeguarding vested interests acquired under the “San Francisco system”, while simultaneously limiting China’s options for national reunification to achieve containment objectives, Japan encounters challenges in altering its established position. Nevertheless, the discernible flaws in Japan’s related policy and legal rationale deserve further observation and comprehensive research.

Key words: China-Japan relations, Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Taiwan, “San Francisco system”, U.S.-Japan security system

About the author: Yang Bojiang is a senior research fellow and doctoral supervisor at the Institute of Japanese Studies and the Research Center for East China Sea Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

CLC No.: D822.331.3 DI code: A

Document No.: 1002-7874(2023)05-0001-18

Project funding: The research is part of a key program of the National Social Science Fund of China on the Study of the Historical Process and International Influence of Post-War Japan (No. 22VLSO14)

Over the past two years, China-Japan relations have seen significant milestones. The year 2022 marked the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, while the year 2023 marked the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan. These events mark a substantial shift in their relations, moving past a century-long history through a "two-step" approach: the resumption of diplomatic ties followed by the signing of the Treaty. Throughout history, China and Japan have signed four key political documents that shape their relationship, with the Treaty of Peace and Friendship holding a special significance. It serves as a bridge between their past and future relations, guiding both countries to uphold its principles amidst changing circumstances. From a macroscopic perspective, the Treaty serves as a mutual confirmation of the legal basis of the post-war order in the Asia-Pacific region. In negotiations of normalizing China-Japan relations and signing of the Treaty, the Taiwan issue always remains a consistent focus. Japan avoids openly acknowledging "one China" and "Taiwan as a part of China," opting for strategic ambiguity and flexibility in its "dual-track and double-face" policy on Taiwan. However, this approach underscores inherent contradictions and non-integrative aspects of Japan's Taiwan policy, making it hard to justify the so-called "gray-zone" it seeks.

In 1972, China and Japan issued the China-Japan Joint Communique to normalize diplomatic relations. Six years later, both sides signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which, legally confirmed the principles and content established in the Joint Communique, stipulated the overall framework, political basis, and development direction of contemporary China-Japan relations, and became the legal norm for contemporary bilateral relations. Both the normalization of their diplomatic relations and negotiations over the signing of the Treaty have attracted attention from the Chinese and Japanese academic community. Chinese scholars have made significant strides in multidisciplinary research, particularly from a legal standpoint.[1] Meanwhile, Japanese scholars in the 1990s began reassessing the "1972 regime," and recent discussions have focused on elevating the Treaty of Peace and Friendship to a more robust legal norm in Japan-China relations.[2] Today, there remains a critical need to examine the process of how China and Japan normalized diplomatic relations and signed the Treaty, especially the legal foundation for China-Japan relations and the Taiwan issue, from macro, holistic, and legal perspectives, given the evolving post-war dynamics between China and Japan, including shifts in the Taiwan issue. These dynamics intersect with multiple dimensions of Asia-Pacific international relations, amidst a trend towards multilateralism in bilateral relations and the emergence of competitive global alliances. The research outcomes will provide in-depth insights into China-Japan relations in reality.

I. Two strategic steps for a historic turnaround

China and Japan have a long history of connections. Modern diplomatic relations between the two began in 1871 with the signing of the China-Japan Friendship and Trade Treaty between the Qing government and Japan, which established equal diplomatic relations between the two sides within a modern international law system. However, this period of cooperation was short-lived. Just three years later, Japan militarily invaded Taiwan, initiating a century-long cycle of expansion, aggression, and counter-aggression between the two nations. It continued to be in a state of confrontation and isolation after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 against the backdrop of the Cold War between the West and the East.[3] That was a period dominated by unequal treaties between China and Japan. After the First Sino-Japanese War, commonly known in China as the Jiawu War, Japan compelled the Qing government to sign the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895, which stipulated that "all treaties and agreements previously concluded between China and Japan are thereby terminated... Any new treaties or agreements concluded between the two countries should be based on the treaties and agreements currently in effect between China and the Western countries."[4]

In 1900, the Eight-Nation Alliance—comprising troops from Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Italy, and Austria-Hungary—invaded China and coerced it into signing the Boxer Protocol the following year. Japan further exerted its influence in 1915 by forcing China to accept its "Twenty-One Demands" under the guise of the "Fourteen Points" treaty during World War I. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-1945), in December 1939, Japan forced the Wang Jingwei regime to sign a secret agreement that went beyond the requirements of “Twenty-One Demands”; after the establishment of the Wang Jingwei-controlled puppet government, Japan signed the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty with it on November 30, 1940. On December 8, the 1941, Pacific War broke out. The next day, the Chinese government declared war on Japan, and issued a declaration of war against Japan, and proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan had been abrogated. The declaration led to the complete abolition of all unequal treaties between China and Japan since modern times by the Chinese government. Against this background, Japan still signed the “Japan-China Alliance Treaty” with the Wang Jingwei-controlled puppet government in October 1943.

After the end of World War II in 1945, there were over 20 years of confrontation and isolation between China and Japan. That continued until 1972 when the two countries issued the Joint Communique, announced the end of the state of war and decided to establish diplomatic relations. The Treaty signed in 1978 altered the course of their relations for a century. The two steps, contributing to a historic turning point, were highly aligned. In fact, from the perspective of the legislative process, China and Japan, as neighboring countries that had been at war for a long time, should have resumed diplomatic relations by first concluding a peace treaty.

The Joint Communique was a diplomatic document signed between the Chinese and Japanese governments, distinct from a treaty that requires ratification by each nation's legislature. The sequence of signing the Communique first stemmed from Japan's domestic circumstances at the time. Under Japan's parliamentary cabinet system, government documents like the Joint Communique can be brought into effect simply by a cabinet meeting convened and chaired by the prime minister. In contrast, treaties must undergo deliberation and approval by the National Diet, a process that is typically more time-consuming and challenging to navigate. The concept of achieving diplomatic normalization in two phases was reportedly suggested by the Chinese side. In July 1972, after Tanaka Kakuei became Japan’s prime minister, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Yoshikatsu Takeiri, chairman of the Komeito, held talks, suggesting that China and Japan complete the normalization of diplomatic relations in two steps. The first step was for Japanese leaders to visit China, and the two governments would issue a joint communique declaring the establishment of diplomatic relations. The second step was to conclude a treaty, which would be approved by each national legislature, officially fixing the friendly relations between them in a legal format. Premier Zhou made the suggestion with careful consideration of Japan’s domestic politics. Taking the two steps was a realistic choice to expedite the process of diplomatic normalization. Later, the Japanese side accepted the proposal.[5]

The Taiwan issue was very crucial in the negotiations for reestablishing diplomatic relations. Before Tanaka Kakuei visited China, the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan drafted two sets of documents outlining the Japanese government's stance on Taiwan in the joint communique with China. The first option only mentioned "understanding and respect" for China's position without committing to specific historical declarations. The second added a commitment to adhere to Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration. During negotiations, the first option was rejected by the Chinese side, and ultimately, the two sides reached a consensus based on the second Japanese proposal. Ji Pengfei, then Chinese foreign minister, recalled the negotiation process. "The two prime ministers… entrusted the task of drafting the joint government statement to Mr. Ohira [Minister of Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira] and me. During the drafting of the joint communique, we put a lot of effort into finding appropriate expressions for the end of the state of war, the Taiwan issue, and the handling of the 'Japan-Taiwan Treaty' in a way that could reflect the spirit of the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations while also considering both sides’ different positions."[6] The Joint Communique ultimately adopted the following statement regarding the Taiwan issue: "The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China." "The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation." At that time, the Chinese side insisted on adding the phrase "maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation" in Japan's statement to emphasize that Taiwan's status was not undetermined. [7] These important terms were again confirmed later in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

In a word, the two steps of signing a joint communique and concluding a peace and friendship treaty were designed and planned as a whole from the beginning. While announcing that the government of Japan and the government of China "have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972," the Joint Communique stated in Article 8 that China and Japan agreed that, "with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship." This indicated that the leaders of both countries had already formulated a comprehensive plan for the subsequent treaty, including its fundamental principles, main contents, and its relationship with the Joint Communique. Subsequently, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed six years later was based on the Joint Communique and legally confirmed the principles and main contents thereof. Regarding the notable "anti-hegemony clause" the Joint Communique stipulated that "neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." The Treaty of Peace and Friendship expanded upon this by adding the phrase "or any other region" after "Asia-Pacific region" thereby solidifying the commitment that "neither Party shall seek hegemony within the Asian and Pacific region or in any other region and that both shall oppose any attempt by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."

From the Joint Communique to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the only unexpected development was that the second step took longer than initially expected. The reasons for the delay included domestic politics in China and Japan, and external influences from the former Soviet Union and the U.S. In China, the first generation of CPC central leaders passed away one after another, causing some changes in domestic politics. In Japan, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who signed the Joint Communique, resigned in December 1974 and was succeeded by Miki Takeo. In December 1976, the Miki Cabinet stepped down and the Takeo Fukuda Cabinet was established. The frequent changes in Japanese prime ministers, coupled with factional struggles within the Liberal Democratic Party and the obstruction from pro-Taiwan and anti-China forces, inevitably hindered the treaty negotiation process. Taking office during the "thawing period" of the Cold War, the Takeo Fukuda Cabinet proposed an "all-round peace diplomacy" policy in an effort to improve its relations with China and the former Soviet Union while maintaining its alliance with the U.S. At the same time, the former Soviet Union made huge efforts to restrain the improvement of China-Japan relations and hinder the progress of their treaty negotiations. In February 1975, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev sent a letter to Prime Minister Miki Takeo, proposing a treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union. In January 1976, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Japan to negotiate this treaty and attempted to involve Japan in the Soviet-proposed "Asian Collective Security System." In January 1978, Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao visited the Soviet Union at its invitation. The latter offered a draft proposal for a Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between the USSR and Japan. Japan insisted that the two countries should settle the northern territorial issue before concluding a peace treaty, while the Soviet Union refused to include the understanding that the northern territorial issue is included among "unresolved problems" remaining since World War II into the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration and took the position that the territorial issue had already been resolved. Ultimately the two sides failed to reach a consensus.

During Takeo Fukuda's later years in office, there were noticeable developments conducive to signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, in China, Japan and the international landscape. In China, as the decade-long Cultural Revolution ended, Deng Xiaoping made a political comeback. After coming back in power, Deng led the negotiations over the signing of the Treaty with Japan in person. Deng also started mulling reform and opening up in light of the changes in both the domestic and international landscapes.[8] By February 1978, China and Japan had signed agreements on trade, aviation, and maritime shipping, marking significant progress in the economic sector. These agreements consolidated the foundation for a peace and friendship treaty and heightened the urgency for its conclusion. In Japan, the Fukuda Cabinet failed to achieve its goal of improving Japan-Soviet relations, which became mired in deadlock. The Soviet Union adopted a tough diplomatic policy toward Japan, first restricting visits by Japanese to graves of their relatives in the northern territories, then starting to build military bases on these islands. Given that the Fukuda Cabinet had "low approval ratings and an unstable political base within the party, concluding a peace and friendship treaty strongly supported by public opinion with China was of great significance for the new government to establish its credentials." Then, the focus of its foreign policy shifted toward strengthening relations with the U.S. and improving ties with China.[9] Globally, favorable changes also emerged. The Cold War between the East and the West intensified again, with offensive and defensive roles reversed. Affected by the Vietnam War and the "Watergate Scandal," the U.S. turned its attention inward, while the Soviet Union went on the strategic offensive, actively intervening in regional conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. Strategically, the U.S. increasingly desired to bolster China as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, thus showing a more active attitude toward the treaty negotiations between China and Japan. Within the Democratic Carter's administration, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who took a hardline posture toward the Soviet Union, gained influence. According to his testimony, at the time, the U.S. wanted to improve China-Japan relations to pose pressure on the Soviet Union.[10]

II. Laying the political, legal foundation for contemporary China-Japan relations

In September 1972, the Chinese and Japanese governments signed the Joint Communique, marking the end of the abnormal state of affairs between the two countries and "opening a new chapter in their relations." As the first of the four political documents between China and Japan, the Joint Communique established principles for bilateral relations, confirmed the fundamental consensus reached on key issues, and laid the political foundation for contemporary China-Japan relations. Key points included:

(1) Theme and Direction of China-Japan Relations: emphasizing "the development of good-neighborly and friendly relations," and "establish[ing] relations of perpetual peace and friendship."

(2) Historical Responsibility: "the Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself."

(3) The Taiwan issue: "the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations from the stand of fully understanding 'the three principles[11] for the restoration of relations' put forward by the Government of the PRC. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this."

(4) Handling Disputes: both countries worked to transcend disputes, and seek common ground while reserving difference. "In spite of the differences in their social systems, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship."

(5) Regional and Global Impact: normalization and friendly relations between "are in the interests of the two peoples and conducive to reducing tension in Asia and promoting global peace."

(6) Principles of Cooperation: "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence were affirmed. Disputes were to be settled peacefully in accordance with these principles and the UN Charter."

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship, a pivotal legal agreement between China and Japan. This Treaty has historic significance as it legally confirmed the principles and contents established in the Joint Communique and stipulated the overall framework, political basis, and development direction of contemporary China-Japan relations. In its preamble, the Treaty explicitly states, "affirming that the aforementioned joint statement constitutes the basis for relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles set out in that statement should be strictly observed," thus clearly defining the relationship between the two documents as an integral whole. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship officially came into effect after being signed by the governments of China and Japan and ratified by each national legislature. In doing so, the two countries incorporated into their respective legal system China-Japan relations that rapidly developed since the restoration of their diplomatic relations.[12] Among the four political documents signed between China and Japan to date, the Treaty is undoubtedly the most important, as it established legal norms for contemporary China-Japan relations.

From a historical perspective, peace and friendship, as a theme manifested in the Treaty, represent the essence of China-Japan relations in modern times and remains the only viable choice for further development.[13] Since the start of the two countries' efforts to restore diplomatic relations, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai prioritized the signing of this treaty. He was invited to Japan for multiple times. During a visit to China, then Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka expressed hope that Premier Zhou would be the first foreign head of state invited to Japan's state guest house after the completion of house renovations. Premier Zhou, however, insisted that he would not visit Japan before the two countries signed the peace and friendship treaty, which he believed was a crucial step in establishing official diplomatic relations.[14] From the perspective of diplomatic practice, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship has provided legal and political support for the development of China-Japan relations since its signing. In the past nearly 50 years, the bilateral relations, despite ups and downs, especially conflicts in political and security fields since the 21 century, have always hold onto the bottom line of "peace" and "cooperation."

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship occupies an especially significant position, serving as a connecting link among the four political documents. China and Japan have carried forward the spirit of the Treaty and aligned it with the ever-changing situation in different periods by refining and improving its terms. Following the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, two additional political documents were signed: the China-Japan Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development signed in Tokyo in November 1998, and the China-Japan Joint Statement on Advancing Strategic and Mutually Beneficial Relations signed and issued in Tokyo in May 2008. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, these two documents comprehensively mapped out the development path for China-Japan relations in the new situation, while affirming the validity of the Joint Communique and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. They further refined and developed the principles, and spirit established in the Joint Communique and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, as well as regulations on a series of major issues. Together, the four documents constitute the political foundation and legal norms for the development of China-Japan relations in the new era.

The 1998 Joint Declaration offered important insights into the trends of the times and the development path for China-Japan relations in light of the developments of the global political and economic landscape, on the basis of reaffirming the commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. For example, the document identified peace, security, and development as the theme of the times, positioning China-Japan relations as "a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development." The two sides incorporated China-Japan cooperation into the multilateral cooperation network and examined bilateral relations from an Asian and world perspective, stating that they will exert greater influence on "international politics, economics and security." Especially, "the Japanese side restated its policy of continuing cooperation and assistance for the economic development of China." The Japanese side reiterated that it will continue to support China's efforts for the early accession to the WTO. The declaration made a clearer presentation than the preceding two political documents about political foundation for China-Japan relations. "Both sides believe that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history are the important foundation for further developing relations between Japan and China." "The Japanese side observes the 1972 Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 15 August 1995 Statement by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this." The declaration also clarified the Taiwan issue in China-Japan relations. For the first time, Japan included the expression "There is only one China" into a legal official document, which more explicitly defined its position on the Taiwan issue.[15] The Japanese side promised it "continues to maintain its stand on the Taiwan issue which was set forth in the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC and reiterates its understanding that there is one China. Japan will continue to maintain its exchanges of private and regional nature with Taiwan. These expressions are of great significance as Japan clearly stated "there is one China," which affirmed the meaning of "one China" in stipulations of the Joint Communique in 1972, and clearly confine Japan-Taiwan relations to "exchanges of private and regional nature." This leaves Japan with no legal room to develop official relations with Taiwan and restricts its policy options that allow it to interfere in the Taiwan issue and upgrade Japan-Taiwan cooperation in accordance with domestic applicable laws.[16]

The 2008 declaration built on the preceding three political documents and introduced new contents:

(1) The declaration explicitly positioned China-Japan relations as "strategic relationship of mutual benefit."

(2) It emphasized that "pursuing long-term peace, friendship and cooperation is the only choice for both sides."

(3) It reaffirmed that the two countries are "cooperation partners and not threats to each other."

(4)Both sides reiterated that they will "settle all disputes by peaceful means, without recourse to the use or threat of force."

(5) It clarified the direction and areas for cooperation. The two sides decided to set up framework for dialogue and cooperation and conduct cooperation in the following five fields: enhance political mutual trust, promote cultural and people-to-people exchanges to enhance friendship between the two peoples, enhance mutually beneficial cooperation, work together for the development of the Asia Pacific region, and work jointly to address global issues. Of particular note, they promised to work together to make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship.[17]

From a global perspective, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship has far-reaching implications that go beyond constituting the political foundation and legal norm for contemporary China-Japan relations. It also comes as a mutual confirmation of the legal basis for the post-war order in the Asia-Pacific region. The Cairo Declaration issued in December 1943 stated that "Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." The Cairo Declaration legally established the illegality of Japan's occupation of Taiwan, confirmed that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory, and provided an international legal basis for China to deal with the Taiwan issue after the end of World War II. In July 1945, the Potsdam Proclamation was issued. Paragraph (8) of the Potsdam Proclamation reads, "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." On August 15 that year, Japanese Emperor Hirohito delivered a recorded radio address to the nation, to the Japanese people that the Japanese government had accepted the Potsdam Declaration demanding the unconditional surrender of the Japanese military. On September 2, 1945, Japanese representatives signed the official Instrument of Surrender. The first article stated that Japan accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation jointly issued by China, the U.S. and Britain on July 26, 1945, with the Soviet Union joining later. At the juncture of the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the Japanese government reaffirmed its commitment to accept and comply with the Potsdam Declaration. The 1972 Joint Communique stated "the Government of Japan fully firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation." International legal documents, including the Cairo Declaration, unequivocally affirm the legal status of Taiwan as an integral part of Chinese territory and establish the principles and framework for post-war policy for Japan, serving as the legal foundation for the post-war order in the Asia-Pacific region. While Japan professes to "abide by" these international legal documents, it simultaneously regards the San Francisco Peace Treaty as the legal foundation for the post-war regional order and uses this stance to evade a direct acknowledgment of "one China" and the fact that "Taiwan is part of China," laying bare the inherent contradiction in its policy position.

III. The Taiwan issue: A focal point from the very beginning

The Taiwan issue was the focus of the negotiations over the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. As the Taiwan issue involved a number of complicated deep-rooted factors, including the regional order in the Asia-Pacific and the Japan-U.S. security agreement, and given the then international landscape and domestic situation in Japan, it was impossible for the two sides solve all problems at once during the negotiations.[18] In November 1974, prior to the launch of preliminary talks about the treaty negotiations, the two sides confirmed the nature of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and its basis, recognized the main problems at stake, and agreed that the Treaty of Peace and Friendship would be based on the spirit of the Joint Communique, under the basic principle that "the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship advances the Joint Statement. We must not retreat from it."[19] From November 14, 1974 to May 7, 1975, China and Japan held 12 preliminary talks in Tokyo. During their talks, the two sides confirmed that the preamble of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship would mention the compliance with the Joint Communique, establishing their basic positions on the Taiwan issue in this form. Apart from this, there would be no specific reference to the Taiwan issue. As a result, the inclusion of the principles (including the Taiwan issue) and main contents of the Joint Communique into the Treaty of Peace and Friendship became the focus of the treaty negotiations. And due to the emergence of new factors like economic cooperation and the "anti-hegemony clause," the Taiwan issue became less noticeable than during the normalization of diplomatic relations negotiations. Both sides also adopted a "shelving" approach when it comes to the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands during the treaty negotiations. In fact, China and Japan had to temporarily "bypass" some topics after the start of their normalization of diplomatic relations negotiations. For example, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, especially its "Far East clause" concerning Taiwan, was automatically extended in 1970; the U.S. and Japan signed the Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in 1971; the U.S. transferred the administration of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. The reason was, obviously, if the Chinese leaders demanded the abolition of the security treaty and the withdrawal of U.S. military bases from Japan to restore diplomatic relations between China and Japan, then the normalization of their diplomatic relations in September 1972, and in the foreseeable future, would definitely be impossible to achieve.[20]

During the treaty negotiation process, the Taiwan issue still received much attention from both sides. It is just that both sides chose to confirm their position by clarification about the Joint Communique. On August 15, 1974, then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, acting on behalf of Premier Zhou, communicated with visiting Chairman of the Komeito Yoshikatsu Takeiri about the treaty, and asked Takeiri to convey three points to Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka: negotiate relatively quickly; to achieve the wish of friendly relations between the two countries, it is also necessary to reflect the development of bilateral relations and the current situation since the conclusion of the Joint Communique; questions that cannot be solved or are difficult to solve can be put aside for later. Here, "questions that are difficult to solve" referred to the Taiwan issue and the Diaoyu Islands dispute. China did not expect that the "anti-hegemony clause" would become a problem. Deng emphasized that the focus of the China-Japan relations lies in the Taiwan issue.[21] Similarly, how to deal with the Taiwan issue was of high concern in Japan, from both the pro-Treaty camp and the anti-Treaty camp, to the cautious camp. When the treaty negotiations were restarted after a nearly three-year hiatus, the anti-China forces in Japan mainly used the Taiwan issue to hinder the negotiations. The right-wing political group Seirankai, or "Summer Storm Club," within the Liberal Democratic Party, held a plenary meeting and proposed four conditions for the resumption of treaty negotiations, the first of which was "to strive to preserve the status of Taiwan." Other conditions included "confirming that the Senkaku Islands (i.e., the Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated islands - note by the author)" are Japanese territory, and confirming that the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" has disappeared "formally and substantially."[22] Since the Chinese side insisted that a discussion would be unnecessary if "abide by the Joint Communique" was written into the preamble of the Treaty, there was not much discussion on the Taiwan issue in the treaty negotiation between the two sides.

At the same time, China and Japan both showed an increasing desire to cooperate in economic development, adding momentum and a sense of urgency to the treaty negotiations. In China, a large-scale modernization drive started following the end of the decade-long Cultural Revolution. On June 5, 1978, Deng Xiaoping, during a meeting with a delegation from the Nippon Hoso Kyokai, expressed the wish and judgment from the perspective of China's Four Modernizations that it was necessary to conclude a treaty with Japan as soon as possible. Deng said he believed the prospects for the two countries' cooperation are good, stressing that there were many things China can learn from Japan, and China needed the help of friends to achieve the Four Modernizations.[23] In Japan, the business community saw China as an important source of energy and resources and as an important destination for their products after experiencing the impact of two oil crises. They strongly urged the Fukuda Cabinet to conclude a peace and friendship treaty with China as soon as possible. In February 1978, a Japanese business delegation led by Toshio Iguchi, Chairman of Nippon Steel Corporation, visited China. The visit led to the signing of a long-term trade agreement between China and Japan. Under the eight-year trade pact, each nation was to buy a 10 billion U.S. dollars worth of goods from the other between 1978 and 1985. That same year, China launched the reform and opening up drive. Accordingly, economic and trade cooperation between China and Japan developed rapidly. In October 1978, Deng visited Japan in a "key journey for China's reform and opening up." During his visit, Deng attended the ceremony of exchanging the instruments of ratification for the new Japan-China peace treaty signed in August 1978. The ceremony was called the "Opening Ceremony for the Economic Interdependence between China and Japan." For a long period afterwards, "the economic interdependence based on mutual supply of needed goods and mutual benefits" became the basic paradigm and prominent feature of China-Japan relations.[24]

One noteworthy aspect of the bilateral interactions between China and Japan from the resumption of diplomatic relations negotiations to the treaty negotiations, as well as their diplomacy with third parties such as the U.S. was Japan's position on the Taiwan issue. Both the Tanaka Cabinet in 1972 and the Fukuda Cabinet in 1978 tried their best to avoid taking a clear stance on the sovereignty over Taiwan. By using expressions like "understanding" and "respecting" China's position, Japan avoided a positive recognition of "one China" and "Taiwan is part of China," as well as a clear definition of the nature of the authorities in Taiwan and the nature and level of Japan-Taiwan relations. Japan cited two reasons in its official explanation. First, according to the spirit of relevant international laws, the Taiwan issue should be decided by the U.S. and other Allies through consultation after World War II, but there has been no consensus among relevant countries on this question. At the same time, Japan already renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan through the San Francisco Peace Treaty, so it has no legal position on Taiwan's ownership.[25] Second, Japan was influenced by the U.S., specifically, bound by the Japan-U.S. security treaty. Just as the Japanese academic circles analyzed the reasons for pro-U.S. and anti-China policy adopted by the Eisaku Sato Cabinet: Under the post-war international political pattern in the Far East, the Sato Cabinet to take great-power action in the relations with China is just an illusion, and Sato can only consider Japan's China policy in the framework of the post-war Japan-U.S. relations.[26]

A third country played a crucial yet complicated role in the creation of the Joint Communique and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. That was the U.S. First, for the purpose of confronting the former Soviet Union, the U.S. encouraged China and Japan to resume diplomatic relations and enhance cooperation. In the context of China-Japan treaty negotiations, the U.S. took a more proactive stance than before amid the intensifying the "Soviet offensive and US defense" strategic posture during the Cold War between the East and the West. The personal urging of President Jimmy Carter played a crucial role in prompting Prime Minister Fukuda to make up his mind to sign the treaty. In April 1978, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda and Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao visited the U.S., and met Secretary of State Cyrus Roberts Vance. During the talks, Vance stated that a solid front between China and the Soviet Union poses a threat to the world, and the U.S., Japan, and Europe should help China together. Vance also said that the U.S. wanted to advance formal dialogue with China as soon as possible because if China's economy grows into a liberalist mechanism like Japan, the U.S., and Europe, it will not drift away from them. However, there were difficulties within the U.S., so Vance added Mr. Sonoda Sunao should take the first step toward a treaty with China. President Carter also urged Prime Minister Fukuda to actively promote the treaty with China.[27] It is evident that the main purpose of the U.S. in supporting the China-Japan treaty was to promote the formation of a strategic posture involving the U.S., Japan, and China to jointly counter the Soviet Union. Second, ever since the Tanaka Cabinet explored improving relations with China, the U.S. was most concerned about the handling of the Taiwan issue in the Sino-Japanese normalization talks, fearing that Japan might sign a document favorable to China's future change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Thus, the U.S. showed great concern over the specific negotiation tactics of Japan.[28]

Therefore, Japan maintained close communication with the U.S. throughout its negotiations with China for the restoration of diplomatic relations. Japan also promised to the U.S. that "the Japanese government fully recognizes the importance of the Japan-U.S. relationship and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, so in consultation with the Chinese government, it will not touch upon the Japan-US Security Treaty and will oppose any topics that may be detrimental to the Japan-US security relationship; the Japanese government will not obstruct the use of U.S. military bases by the U.S. for the defense of Taiwan."[29] On August 23, 1972, the Tanaka Cabinet officially stated its position on the sovereignty over Taiwan during the Sino-Japanese negotiations for the restoration of diplomatic relations, indicating that Japan "has no intention of excluding Taiwan from the 'Far East clause' of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty."[30] During his talks with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was very concerned about China's attitude toward the Japan-U.S. security system,[31] indicating the Japanese side's high sensitivity to maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance. During their talks that began on September 25, 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka raised the issue of China-Japan normalization of diplomatic relations and "third-country relations," emphasizing that Japan hoped to achieve normalization of diplomatic relations without damaging its relationship with the U.S. as the Japan-U.S. alliance is of great significance to Japan's existence. Premier Zhou clearly stated that the Joint Declaration would not involve the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, adding that China would not interfere in the Japan-U.S. relationship.[32] On July 21, 1978, treaty negotiations between China and Japan were restarted in Beijing, and by August 11, a total of 16 rounds of talks at the administrative level had been held between the two countries' negotiating delegations. In the first session, Han Nianlong, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, confirmed that the Joint Communique between Japan and China was a criterion for developing the friendly neighborhood relations between the two countries and a basis and foundation for conclusion of the Treaty. Ambassador of Japan to China Shoji Sato presented the views of the Japanese government. The first point was that the Japan-U.S. relationship occupies a special position in Japan’s foreign relations.[33] In the foreign ministers' talks on August 9, Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao also explicitly proposed holding dialogue on issues related to the smooth progress of the negotiations, and the so-called "related issues" were first and foremost the Japan-U.S. relationship.[34]

Japan's policy on Taiwan is greatly influenced by the U.S. because the Taiwan issue is associated with the overall regional strategic layout of the U.S. Through the "San Francisco Peace Treaty" signed in September 1951, the U.S. planned the Cold War under the disguise of post-war treatment and manipulated the formation of the "San Francisco system."[35] Subsequently, at the behest of the U.S., the "Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty" was signed in April 1952 and the "U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty"[36] was signed in December 1954, incorporating Taiwan into this system. The so-called San Francisco Peace Treaty violated a series of international legal documents signed during World War II by the Allies, and contradicted the principle that the post-war occupation and reconstruction of Japan required unanimous agreement among all countries, especially the major powers. Especially, it violated the provisions of the 1942 UN Declaration signed by 26 countries including China, the U.S., the UK and the Soviet Union, violated the UN Charter and basic principles of international law.[37] Meanwhile, it altered several significant decisions concerning Asia-Pacific issues that had been previously addressed in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration. These issues involved, directly or indirectly, Taiwan, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Okinawa, and more. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration outlined a framework for post-war Japan's disposal by the Allies, and clearly stipulated the principles for post-war handling, which Japan accepted. The San Francisco Peace Treaty modified these agreed-upon frames and principles. On the Taiwan issue, it altered the expression "all the territories Japan had seized from China, such as Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, should be restored to China" used in the Cairo Declaration to "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores." Therefore, from the standpoint of Japan and the U.S., recognition that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC" will create a big hole in the "San Francisco system."

Japan claimed that the San Francisco Peace Treaty is an international framework for Japan's handling of the aftermath of World War II,[38] and used the treaty to argue that, as Japan "abandoned Taiwan," it does not have the right to define its ownership. However, in practice, Japan has adopted a pragmatic double standard about this treaty. For example, under the treaty, Japan will concur in any proposal of the US to the UN to place under its trusteeship system, with the US as the sole ad ministering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the U.S. will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.[39] However, in reality, the Ryukyu issue was not referred to the UN trusteeship process, but was instead privately resolved between the U.S. and Japan. The treaty also stipulates that Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. But the fact is, Japan has never used the San Francisco Peace Treaty as a legal basis for resolving the territorial dispute with Russia.[40] Similarly, on the Taiwan issue, if Japan repeatedly emphasizes that it no longer has the right to recognize the ownership of Taiwan according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, then what is the legal basis for various interventionist behaviors such as incorporating the "Far East clause" involving Taiwan into the Japan-U.S. bilateral treaty and limiting China's options for resolving the Taiwan issue?

IV. Japan’s “dual-track-, double-face” policy and its inherent contradictions

Regarding Taiwan's status, Japan attempts to create strategic ambiguity and thus maintain flexibility. This is Japan's "dual-track and double-face" policy on diplomacy toward China and the U.S. Between Japan and the US, Japan has integrated Taiwan-related interventionist functions into the bilateral security cooperation mechanism. In July 1951, the U.S. submitted a "Security Treaty Draft" to Japan, which included the "Far East clause" designed to clarify how to deploy U.S. forces in Japan in the event of a similar incident to the one that occurred in Korea in an area outside of Japan. Five hours after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 1951, Japan and the U.S. signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which included the "Far East clause." In January 1960, the U.S. and Japan signed a new US-Japan Security Treaty, which continued to retain the "Far East clause," and gradually solidified the functional positioning of "defending Taiwan" in the Japan-U.S. security system.[41] In November 1969, on the eve of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's visit to the US, the U.S. used "returning" Okinawa as a condition in exchange for Japan's consent to send troops from the Japanese mainland and Okinawa to Korea and Taiwan.[42] Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon issued a joint communique after the talks, announcing the "return" of Okinawa in 1972. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.[43] After the Cold War, with the complex evolution of the Asia-Pacific region, the functional setup of the Japan-U.S. security system in intervening in the Taiwan issue not only remained preserved but also continued to be strengthened. Key steps are as follows: In 1996, the leaders of Japan and the U.S. issued the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliances for the 21st Century in Tokyo, which allowed them to "more actively intervene in regional disputes, and even meddle in the internal affairs of other countries";[44] in 1997 and 2015, Japan and the U.S. successively revised their defense cooperation guidelines, enhancing their regional intervention capabilities. As a domestic legal support for the U.S.'s intervention in the Taiwan issue, the Japanese Diet passed the Regional Contingencies Law in 1999 and the new security legislation in 2015. In April 2021, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. President Joe Biden held a talk and issued a joint statement expressing concerns over the "peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." It was the first time that a so-called "Taiwan clause" had been included in a joint statement by the leaders of Japan and the U.S. since the "Sato-Nixon Joint Statement" was issued in 1969.

In engaging with China, Japan adopts a policy of distinguishing between legal judgment and political judgment regarding the Taiwan issue, using ambiguous expressions such as "fully understanding and respecting," but "not recognizing" the Chinese position. After the Joint Communique between the Government of the PRC and the Government of Japan was issued in September 1972, Takakazu Kuriyama, Treaties Division Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, explained this position in a parliamentary debate: "It is not the stance of Japan, as a country that renounced all rights in regard to Taiwan through the San Francisco Treaty, to make any pronouncements regarding the current legal position of Taiwan. We are fully cognizant that China's position regarding the San Francisco Treaty differs from that of Japan. However, Japan, as a party to this Treaty, cannot tear down its position. However, it is also the unchanging position of the Government of Japan that the intention of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration was to revert Taiwan to China. Furthermore, our nation fully respects the standpoint of China that 'China is one.' Naturally, we absolutely do not have either the intention of trying to once again make Taiwan a territory of Japan or the intention of supporting the independence of Taiwan. Consequently, in the future, we have no expectation for Taiwan to be the territory of any country except for the PRC" In the Joint Communique, Japan said it "fully recognizes and respects the standpoint of the PRC, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation," which reflects the position of the government.[45] On October 28, 1972, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira also stated in his diplomatic address to the 70th session of the Japanese Diet, "Regarding the status of Taiwan, as the past governments have repeatedly stated, as we renounced Taiwan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, we are not in the position of independently recognizing Taiwan's legal status. But at the same time, on the other hand, if we compare the lines and lines of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, according to the intention of these two declarations, Taiwan should be returned to China, and this is the unchanging view of the government that has accepted the Potsdam Proclamation. The government's position of 'adhering to Article 8 of the Potsdam Communique' as stated in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement is precisely such a view."[46] It can be seen that in Japan's official position, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation are regarded as "historical sources," and their status as the basis of international law dealing with the Taiwan issue has been replaced by the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

In the course of negotiations over the normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations, Japan's "dual-track and double-face" policy on Taiwan is characterized by phased, utilitarian purposes. On one hand, Japan emphasizes the fundamental principle that Taiwan belongs to China to meet the needs of restarting diplomatic negotiations with China. On the other hand, it suggests addressing Taiwan's ownership in a future tense manner, meaning that the strategic positioning of the Taiwan issue within the Japan-U.S. security framework remains unchanged, thus alleviating the concerns of the U.S.[47] However, in the long term and at a deeper level, considering that the Taiwan issue is deeply intertwined with multiple dimensions of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan's aim is to utilize the strategic ambiguity generated by the "dual-track, double-face" policy to secure as much maneuver as possible in response to changes in the international situation. From Japan’s perspective, Takakazu Kuriyama, who participated in the negotiations as Treaties Division Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, later elaborated as follows: The peace of the Taiwan Strait is extremely important for the maintenance of Japan's security, and Japan's statements regarding the ownership of Taiwan are closely related to the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security framework. If China's claim that Taiwan is an integral part of the PRC were accepted, China's use of force against Taiwan would be justified under international law as part of a civil war. Moreover, the legal basis for our country's support of U.S. military actions in the defense of Taiwan would be lost as it would be seen as unlawful interference in China’s domestic affairs. Therefore, as long as the Chinese side maintains its position of using force against Taiwan, maintaining a certain ambiguity in its policy on Taiwan has become a principle that the Japanese government must adhere to.[48] The remark candidly reveals the careful considerations of the Japanese side on the Taiwan issue.

However, the "dual-track, double-face" nature of Japan's policy means that it has inherent contradictions and non-integration, which are ultimately unable to support the so-called "gray area" it seeks. Chinese scholar Zhai Xin offered an illustration about this point. The Japanese government fully understands and respects the principles of the Chinese government on the Taiwan issue, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. These two points, logically consistent, manifest Japan's position on the Taiwan issue. It is based on this Article 8 provision that Japan must fulfill the provisions of the Cairo Declaration, which in turn expressly provides for the return of the territories Japan stole from China, including Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, to the "Republic of China." Accordingly, for Japan, by acknowledging the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing China, the "Republic of China" referred to in the Cairo Declaration can be "understood logically as the People's Republic of China." The stance of "maintaining its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration" implies that Japan is contractually bound to recognize the ownership of Taiwan to the People's Republic of China. In essence, Japan's position should be unambiguously clear.[49] Regarding the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the "Republic of China," on October 1, 1949, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was established, replacing the "Nationalist Government" as the sole legitimate government representing all of China. This transition of power occurred without any alteration to China's international legal status. By October 1971, with the adoption of Resolution 2758 by the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly, which upholds the principle of "one China," the People's Republic of China secured recognition from the vast majority of the world's nations. From an international legal perspective, from the "Republic of China" to the People's Republic of China, "China's sovereignty and inherent territory did not change. As a natural result, the government of the PRC should enjoy and exercise China's full sovereignty, which includes its sovereignty over Taiwan."[50]

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan, particularly with the advent of the post-Cold War era, accompanied by intense strategic competition between China and the United States and the significant shift in the balance of power between China and Japan, Japan has been increasingly inclined to leverage so-called "gray zone" to navigate cautiously on the Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, the historical fact is that since the negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations, China has maintained a consistent and unambiguous position on the Taiwan issue. That is, the resumption of diplomatic ties is contingent upon the repeal of the "China-Japanese Peace Treaty" by Japan. Both the "China-Japanese Peace Treaty" and the San Francisco Peace Treaty cannot be seen as the legal foundation for the negotiations as they themselves were illegal and invalid. From the very beginning, the Chinese government never recognized them, so they do not have the force of law.[51] As for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S., former Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao once explained that "although the interpretation of Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty includes Taiwan within the 'Far East' scope, its necessity has already disappeared'[52] at the time when China and Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and affirmed that the Joint Communique is the foundation of friendly cooperative relations between the two countries.

It can be seen that Japan will not easily change its position on the Taiwan issue and its "dual-track, double-face" policy, given its political and strategic dependence on the Japan-U.S. alliance system, and for the purposes of containing China by limiting its choices for achieving national reunification and maintaining the vested interests it can obtain under the "San Francisco system." Since the end of World War II, Japan has gained dividends of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation amid the East-West Cold War. Under the protection of the U.S., it first completed post-war reconstruction at a low cost and then gained a series of undue benefits through the "San Francisco system," including the assumption of administrative rights over Okinawa in 1972. Should Japan alter its stance on the Taiwan issue, it could potentially undermine the foundational integrity of the "San Francisco system," which revolves around the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. This shift might engender scrutiny and even a reassessment of Japan's own accumulated benefits under this framework. Consequently, similar to the dynamic in China-U.S. relations, the strategic rivalry between China and Japan concerning the Taiwan issue is expected to persist for a long time. China-Japan relations are set to align with the developments in the Asia-Pacific region, moving forward amid ups and downs.

(Editor in charge: Ye Lin)

References

[1] Gao Hong, "The Historical Breakthrough and Future Norms of China-Japan Relations — Reflections on Their Practical Significance from the Perspective of the Treaty Process," Japanese Studies, 2018, No.4, pp. 17-29; Liu Jiangyong, "The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan and the Legal Basis of China-Japan Relations," Northeast Asia Forum, 2018, No. 5., pp. 14-25; Liu Jianping, "Exploration of China's 'Turn to International Law' in Its Diplomacy with Japan — A Reappraisal of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan," Xian Dai Guo Ji Guan Xi (Contemporary International Relations), 2018, No. 10, pp. 14-18.

[2] Kokubun Ryosei, "The Evolution and Path of Developing Coordinated Relations under the '1972 system'," Japanese Studies, 1997, No. 5, pp. 43-50; Miyamoto Yūji, "Making the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty the True Foundation of Japan-China Relations, " Fukuda Yasuo, editor, "Eternal Neighbor: Our Japan-China Fifty Years." Sanwa Bookstore, 2023, p. 9.

[3] Yang Bojiang, "Promote the Spirit of the Treaty and Push China-Japan Relations Back onto the Track of Normal Development," Northeast Asia Forum, 2018, No. 5, pp. 3-13.

[4] Wang Yunsheng, Sixty Years of China-Japan Relations (Volume 2), Beijing: Life, Reading, New Knowledge Sanlian Bookstore, 1980, pp. 305-309.

[5] Zhang Xiangshan, "Before and After the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan," Japanese Studies, 1998, No. 4, pp. 1-2.

[6] Ji Pengfei, "In Memory of My Friend Mr. Masayoshi Ohira," in Wu Xuewen et al., Contemporary China-Japan Relations (1945-1994), Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 1995, pp. 190-191.

[7] Song Zhiyong & Tian Qingli, A History of Modern Japan-China Relations, Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2010, p. 248.

[8] Shi Guifang, "Deng Xiaoping and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan," Beijing Party History, 2004 Special Issue, pp. 40-43.

[9] Iokibe Makoto, Postwar Japanese Diplomatic History (1945-2005), translated by Wu Wanhong, Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2007, pp. 130-134.

[10] Feng Zhaokui, Dialogue: Beijing and Tokyo, Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1999, pp. 86-87.

[11] "The three principles for the restoration of relations" are (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the sole legitimate government representing China; (2) Taiwan is a province of China and an inalienable part of China's territory; (3) the Japan-Republic of China (ROC) treaty of 1952 is unlawful and should be abolished. See a joint statement by the delegation of the China-Japan Friendship Association and the Japanese Social Democratic Party visiting China, as published in Collections of Post-War China-Japan Relations Documents (1971-1995) compiled by Tan Huan, Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1997, page 81.

[12] Gao Hong, "The Historical Breakthrough and Future Norms of China-Japan Relations — Reflections on Their Practical Significance from the Perspective of the Treaty Process," Japanese Studies, 2018, No.4, pp. 17-29

[13] Zang Yunhu, "On the Historical Thinking of China-Japan Relations in the Past Century—From the Perspective of the Treaties in 1871 and 1978," Social Science Journal, 2019, No. 3, pp. 110-118.

[14] Xiao Hong & Liu Feng, "The Secret History of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan—An Interview with former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Japan Fu Hao," Extensive Collection of the Party History, 2003, No. 6, pp. 15-19.

[15] Yang Bojiang, "Seeking the Cross-century's Development of China-Japan Relations with Rational Thinking," Xian Dai Guo Ji Guan Xi (Contemporary International Relations), 1999, No. 9, pp. 1-6.

[16] Yang Bojiang, "Promote the Spirit of the Treaty and Push China-Japan Relations Back onto the Track of Normal Development," Northeast Asia Forum, 2018, No. 5, pp. 3-13.

[17] Yang Bojiang, "China-Japan Relations: Situation and Tasks at the 'Warm Spring' Period," Xian Dai Guo Ji Guan Xi (Contemporary International Relations), 2008, No. 6, pp. 1-5.

[18] Yang Bojiang, "Reconsideration of the Normalization of China-Japan Diplomatic Relations and the Handling of the Taiwan issue," Northeast Asian Journal, 2022, No. 1, pp. 3-14.

[19] The Editorial Board of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Documents of Deng Xiaoping: A Chronology from 1975-1997 (Part I), Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2004, p. 323.

[20] Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, China's Japan Policy: Adjusting to New Challenges, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2015, pp.232-234.

[21] Collection of China-Japan Relations after WWII (1971-1995), edited by Tian Huan, p. 166

[22] Tracks of Japanese Diplomacy, edited by Wu Xuewen, Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 1990, pp. 121-122.

[23] The Editorial Board of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Documents of Deng Xiaoping: A Chronology from 1975-1997 (Part I), p. 323-4.

[24] Xu Xianfen, "The Negotiation Process of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan," in the compilation of Japanese Studies (20th volume) by the Japan Research Center of Peking University, Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2018.

[25] Takakazu Kuriyama, "Japan's Position on the Taiwan issue—The Meaning of the Third Paragraph of the Japan-China Joint Communique," Kasumigaseki Foreign Service Association (KaFSA) Report, No. 10, 2007, pp. 3-12.

[26] Senda Hisashi cho, Satō Naikaku kaisō, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1987, p. 141.

[27] Feng Zhaokui, Dialogue: Beijing and Tokyo, Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1999, pp. 86-87.

[28] Yoshiko Ogawa, Post-War Japan-China and U.S.-China Relations, The University of Tokyo Press, 1992, p. 185.

[29] Ikeda Naotaka, Japan-U.S. Relations and Two Chinas (Japanese edition), Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2004, pp. 413-415.

[30] Basic viewpoint about the Taiwan issue, Asahi Shimbun, August 24, 1972.

[31] Yang Bojiang, "Reconsideration of the Normalization of China-Japan Diplomatic Relations and the Handling of the Taiwan issue," Northeast Asian Journal, 2022, No. 1, pp. 3-14.

[32] Shi Guifang, "Decrypted Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Observing the 'Seeking Common Ground while Shelving Differences' in the Development of China-Japan Relations," Contemporary China History Studies, 2011, No. 6, p.106.

[33] Documents in the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1/01/-396-2.

[34] Documents in the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1/01/-396/16, 1/01-396/17.

[35] The "San Francisco system", based on the "San Francisco Peace Treaty," is a collection of bilateral and multilateral treaty frameworks dominated by the U.S. It is in essence a unilateralist security system serving America's Cold War strategy. See Yang Bojiang, "The 'San Francisco System' and Its Impact on Regional Security Order," Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Japan Institute, October 19, 2022. http://ijs.cssn.cn/xsyj/bkwz/202210/t20221019_5550305.shtml [July 10, 2023].

[36] The "U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty" was a comprehensive agreement that primarily focuses on military cooperation and also encompasses political, economic, and social collaboration between the U.S. and the Taiwan authorities. It became invalid automatically when the U.S. established diplomatic relations with China in January 1979. Following this, the U.S. Congress passed the "Taiwan Relations Act," which incorporated certain elements of the treaty, effectively succeeding it in terms of its role.

[37] White Paper: The Taiwan issue and China's Reunification in the New Era, The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office, The People's Republic of China, August 2022. Source (in Chinese): https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2022/content_5705838.htm?eqid=cdca4d73001c64a70000000664561bde [July 10, 2023].

[38] Senkaku Islands Q&A, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website. http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/territory/senkaku/question-and-answer.html#q1 [July 10, 2023].

[39] Akira Kotera et al. eds., International Law Documents (in Japanese), Yuhikaku Publishing, 2014, pp. 836-840.

[40] Liu Jiangyong, "The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan and the Legal Basis of China-Japan Relations," Northeast Asia Forum, 2018, No. 5., pp. 14-25.

[41] Yang Bojiang, "Reconsideration of the Normalization of China-Japan Diplomatic Relations and the Handling of the Taiwan issue," Northeast Asian Journal, 2022, No. 1, pp. 3-14.

[42] U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984, p.545.

[43] "A Documentary History of U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1945-1997," Edited by. Hosoya Chihiro, et al. The University of Tokyo Press, 1999, p. 790.

[44] Yang Bojiang, "What Does the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliances Mean?" Xian Dai Guo Ji Guan Xi (Contemporary International Relations), 1996, No. 6, p. 5.

[45] Song Zhiyong & Tian Qingli, A History of Modern Japan-China Relations, p. 251.

[46] Document 13: Foreign Minister Ohira's Speech at the 70th Session of the Diet (Part Relating to the Normalization of Japan-China Relations), Basic Collection of Japan-China Relations (1972-2008), The Kazankai Foundation, October 2008, pp. 32-35.

[47] Zhai Xin, "The Formation and Essence of Japan's Official Position on the Taiwan issue: Based on an Examination of the Tanaka Kakuei Cabinet's Policy toward the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China," Japanese Studies, No. 1, 2009, pp. 28-38.

[48] Takakazu Kuriyama, "Japan's Position on the Taiwan issue—The Meaning of the Third Paragraph of the Japan-China Joint Communique," Kasumigaseki Foreign Service Association (KaFSA) Report, No. 10, 2007, pp. 3-12.

[49] Zhai Xin, "The Formation and Essence of Japan's Official Position on the Taiwan issue: Based on an Examination of the Tanaka Kakuei Cabinet's Policy toward the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China," Japanese Studies, No. 1, 2009, pp. 28-38.

[50] White Paper: The Taiwan issue and China's Reunification in the New Era, The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office, The People's Republic of China, August 2022. Source (in Chinese): https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2022/content_5705838.htm?eqid=cdca4d73001c64a70000000664561bde [July 10, 2023]

[51] Song Zhiyong & Tian Qingli, A History of Modern Japan-China Relations, p. 251.

[52] Quoted from Song Zhiyong & Tian Qingli, A History of Modern Japan-China Relations, p. 252.