节大磊，北京大学国际关系学院副教授

（后附英文版）

过去一两年来,中美之间的不信任与日俱增，引发了人们对于台湾局势是否将再趋紧张的担忧，台湾问题再度成为亚太地区的热点关注。自1949年国民党内战失利并败走台湾以来，中国大陆政府一直将统一台湾视为中华民族的神圣使命。美国政府虽未与台湾正式建交（与许多国家一样），却与其保持着密切的非正式联系。华盛顿还定期向台北提供军事防御装备，并主张以和平、非胁迫的方式解决台湾问题。

中国政府并不信任台湾领导人蔡英文，因其所属党派民进党历来倾向于台湾完全独立。因此，自她2016年5月上任以来，两岸关系持续紧张。从那以后，北京、台北和华盛顿都采取了在其他方看来将会改变台海现状的行动。虽然几乎没有理由担心危机即将到来，但三方领导人都应密切关注一些令人担忧的、可能预示未来严峻形势的趋势。

变化中的现状

台湾地区领导人采取了一些让大陆政府感到不安的举措。

首先，蔡英文并未像前任马英九（国民党）那样承认“九二共识”。在北京看来，这一选择是对现状的严重背离。简单地说，“九二共识”是指两岸代表均坚持“一个中国”原则，但可对“中国”的内涵各做解释。尽管蔡英文承认“九二会谈”的“历史事实”，表示尊重“中华民国的现行宪政体制”，并会“珍惜”“过去二十多年来海峡两岸的协商和交流互动”成果，但这些声明并不足以让中国大陆完全放心。

其次，北京的观察家将蔡英文的一些内部策略视为她对台湾独立或逐步迈向独立的一种支持。相比前民进党领导人陈水扁更激进的倾向独立的做法，她的这一意图并不那么昭然若揭。但中国大陆对诸如通过修改历史教科书来虚化中国历史元素等文化台独的趋势以及割裂两岸文化与历史纽带的尝试深感忧虑。此外，对于发表更为激进言论的民进党其他高官或台独势力，蔡英文并未喝止。比如，行政部门负责人赖清德去年曾多次自称是“台独工作者”。蔡英文或曾私下劝告赖清德对两岸关系保持低调，但在中国大陆看来，一位台湾高官敢于如此口无遮拦，应是故意而为。

与此同时，台独势力还在推动“2020东京奥运台湾正名公投”，并寻求2019年举行“台湾独立”公投。“正名公投”呼吁使用“台湾”这个名称参加2020年东京奥运会，而不是政治上较不敏感的“中华台北”；而“独立公投”可能会引发中国大陆根据《反分裂国家法》动用武力。简而言之，除了不完全支持“九二共识”之外，蔡英文对北京许多人来说还代表着走向“台独”的不祥之兆，但方式比陈水扁更迂回。

平心而论，蔡英文也认为北京正在改变台北的现状。由于对蔡英文的极度不信任以及不满其拒绝完全承认“九二共识”，北京开始释放信号并向台湾当局施加压力：先是扣留部分利益，之后采取在台北看来更具胁迫性的手段，限制其“国际空间”及展示中国的军事实力。

中国大陆对台湾采取了多种反制措施。蔡英文上台后，海峡两岸几乎立即停止了制度化的沟通协商机制，访问台湾的旅行团体和学生数量大幅下降。随着中国大陆再次鼓励台湾为数不多的盟友放弃正式“外交关系”，北京和台北在马英九政府时期所默许的非正式“外交休兵”就此结束。自蔡英文就职以来，台湾已失去五位“外交盟友”，其中包括圣多美与普林希比共和国（2016年12月）、巴拿马（2017年6月）、多米尼加共和国和布基纳法索（2018年5月）以及萨尔瓦多（2018年8月）。

台湾的“国际空间”也在其他方面出现萎缩。台湾自2009年开始以观察员的身份参加联合国世界卫生大会，但2017年和2018年均被拒之门外。2016年，联合国国际民航组织召开理事会大会时也出现了类似情况。由于北京敦促台湾非邦交国更改台湾办事处的名称，以更好地反映“一个中国”的原则，台北认为自己受到的压力正在增多。同样，中国也对外国航空公司官网有关台湾的称谓提出了要求。在军事层面，台湾注意到人民解放军空军飞机绕岛操练的频率越来越高，人民解放军海军的航母战斗群在台湾海峡现身，以及解放军在台湾附近海域举行实弹演习。

两岸关系的发展固然令人不安，但双方尚未踏上不可逆转的对抗道路，挽救两岸关系的可能性仍然存在。但是，唐纳德·特朗普政府最近推出的政策可能会改变这一点。

华盛顿登场

和在其他政策领域一样，特朗普2016年成功当选美国总统给两岸关系带来了极大的不确定性和不可预测性。特朗普与蔡英文的非正统通话（近四十年来美国总统从未这样做过），以及他口无遮拦地质疑美国是否有必要继续坚持“一个中国”政策，都显示开端并不顺利。

特朗普2017年2月重申美国将奉行“一个中国”政策，2017年4月又与中国国家主席习近平进行了友好和富有成果的元首会晤，显示美方的台湾政策似乎一度恢复正常。然而接近2017年年底时，美国国会与白宫的一系列举动似乎向中方表明美方将会进一步利用敏感的台湾问题，对中国大陆施加地缘政治影响力。更糟糕的是，上述变化发生在美国考虑从根本上调整对华政策，以及中美贸易之争可能产生灾难性后果之际。

在北京看来，最值得关注的是特朗普决定于2017年年底签署《2018财年国防授权法案》，并于2018年3月签署《台湾旅行法》。《2018财年国防授权法案》不仅重申了长期存在的《与台湾关系法》和“六项保证”（华盛顿与台北非正式关系条款），而且还建议美国扩大和提升同台湾的军事关系，其中包括两方海军互设停靠港的可能。

与此同时，《台湾旅行法》在美国众议院口头表决通过，并获得参议院的一致同意。该法旨在打破华盛顿和台北政府官员之间进行正式接触的自我制约。虽然《台湾旅行法》相当于一种具有国会决议意味的非约束性“正式意见”，但它的通过以及所吸引的国会支持程度向北京发出了一种强烈的信号。

美国专家喜欢强调此类立法目前几乎无需采取任何切实的政策行动，但相关条款的确增加了它们未来成为常规做法的可能性。中国大陆的一些悲观主义者由此担心，美国长期奉行的“一个中国”政策很可能正在动摇。此外，在中国许多观察家看来，特朗普立刻签署《台湾旅行法》，而不是等待一段时间后使其自动生效，说明白宫正在对“一个中国”政策主动采取修正主义立场。

美国其他政府部门的一些做法也加重了中国的疑虑。2018年4月，美国国务院批准了美国公司向台湾出售潜艇制造技术的营销许可。此外，在一年一度的新加坡重要安全会议“香格里拉对话”上， 美国国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯于2017年和2018年连续两年强调了美国根据《台湾旅行法》对台湾的承诺。马蒂斯的言辞并无特别之处，但选择如此显眼的地区安全论坛发声，无疑会加重北京对华盛顿企图将台湾安全问题区域化的担忧。虽然美国前国防部长莱昂·帕内塔在2012年“香格里拉对话”上也提到了《台湾旅行法》，但他在当时两岸关系改善的背景下也谈到了中美三个联合公报和“一个中国”政策。相比之下，副总统迈克·彭斯在2018年10月的一场关于美国对华政策的重要讲话中重申了马蒂斯的言论，并“谴责”了中国大陆企图拉拢台湾的三个拉美盟友的行为。

简而言之，北京意识到美国政府的某些部门似乎正在集体发力，意欲以牺牲“一个中国”政策为代价来抬高美台关系。即便美国官员（比如国家安全顾问约翰·博尔顿和助理国防部长薛瑞福）最明显的亲台观点还未完全体现在美国的正式政策中，北京对华盛顿的立场趋向惶恐不安也是理所当然。

鉴于北京与台北之间的关系本已脆弱，至少存在两种方式会导致两岸紧张局势升级，甚至引爆危机。第一，出于对华盛顿政策调整的担忧，北京可能会对台湾展开报复——因为台湾是更容易的目标。如果发生这种情况，蔡英文政府便会认为迄今为止所采取的相对克制的做法并未奏效，转而采取更激进的策略。蔡英文如果做出这种逆转，北京必会认为对她的担心完全合理，继而导致两岸关系进一步恶化。

事实上，这种动态趋势可能已经存在。在布基纳法索2018年5月底与中国建交之后，蔡英文对这一事件的表态比她在以前失去邦交国时发表的言辞更为激烈——她直接指责北京是在挑战台湾“底线”，称台湾将“不再容忍”这种局面。

第二，鉴于华盛顿的亲台政策，台北可能认为美国会考虑将台湾纳入其在该地区的防务部署中。对北京而言，试图将台湾问题区域化或国际化的问题极其敏感，但台北似乎正在积极探寻这一结果。在最近接受采访时，蔡英文试图揭露中国欲做地区霸主的野心，并呼吁国际社会“制约中国”。接着，蔡英文在2018年10月10日的双十节庆中再次指责中国试图改变“区域现状”，并称“全世界都在应对中国势力扩张”。

同样，陆委会主委陈明通在2018年7月华盛顿举行的一次会议上援引《美国国家安全战略报告》的描述，称中国是一个“修正主义大国”，并警告其他国家留意中国的“锐实力”以及中方改变国际秩序的本意。陈明通强调，台湾作为印度-太平洋地区的“自由民主国家”，愿与其他国家一道捍卫所谓的“基于规则的国际秩序”。换句话说，台北嗅探到了与美国的印度太平洋战略保持一致，并将台湾安全问题升级为印度太平洋安全问题的机会。若将这种言论变为行动，北京势必做出强烈反应。

可控但危险的状况

尽管这些事态发展令人担忧，但台海局势暂时不可能完全失控，原因有三。随着中国大陆的实力和影响力不断增强，其对自己控制两岸局势的能力更加自信，并认为时间站在自己这一边。这意味着北京现在拥有更强的战略定力，因此不太可能反应过度。比如，习近平主席在2018年7月会见前国民党主席连战时曾强调，北京将“坚定不移地”坚持现有的对台政策。

此外，台湾海峡的和平与稳定仍与美国的利益息息相关。华盛顿想要改变“一个中国”政策的任何企图，都有可能破坏这些利益。这方面的一个例证是2018年6月，台北为美国在台协会新建的办公大楼正式启用，以便美国非官方代表开展工作，进一步促进台湾与美国之间的非正式关系。与此相关的两个事实可能表明，华盛顿仍在某种程度上顾忌北京对台湾问题的敏感性：美国只派遣了负责教育与文化事务的助理国务卿出席典礼，而这个官职相对较低，且缺少政策敏感性。另外，有关美国海军陆战队将驻守美国驻台协会的传言也未坐实。

此外，无论是转向更激进的方式，还是全盘接受华盛顿的所有支持，蔡英文政府都有其自身原因需要保持谨慎。比如，蔡英文在与特朗普通话之后不得不淡化其重要性，称这并不代表一种政策变化。台湾非常明白，作为北京、台北和华盛顿“战略三角”中的最小参与方，受海峡两岸任何潜在的对抗或冲突影响最大的将会是自己。特朗普不可预测的处事风格以及他所称的打台湾牌，只会加剧台北对过度依赖华盛顿或被用作博弈筹码的担忧。此外，民进党和蔡英文似乎已经吸取了陈水扁政府由于行动过激而对台湾自身利益造成巨大损害的教训。

尽管这些因素可以从某种程度上缓和对抗风险，但如果北京、台北和华盛顿继续对抗下去，各方关系继续恶化，两岸之间再掀危机也并不意外。无论是中国大陆严重的悲观情绪，台湾对两岸关系性质的挑衅性再定义，还是华盛顿可能将军舰驶入台湾港口，它们任何一方都有可能引发紧张局势。

无论这些假设性危机将如何呈现，其危险程度必会超过以往。1995年至1996年的台海危机无疑影响到了该地区的稳定性；不过当时中国大陆的政策工具仍然较少，特别是在军事方面。陈水扁执政的那些年确实动荡不安，但具有讽刺意味的是，北京和华盛顿的目标似乎比以前更加一致，因为它们都对陈水扁的政策和行为感到沮丧。

未来一两年如若再次发生危机，其大背景将是北京和台北之间几乎完全缺乏信任，以及华盛顿和北京已然展开的战略竞争。此外，一旦危机来临，中国必会在局势足够紧张时部署更强大的军事力量，而这种危机必会导致三败俱伤。

Is the Taiwan Strait Heading Toward Another Crisis?

JIE DALEI

Mounting mistrust between China and the United States over the past year or two has raised the specter of resurgent tensions about the status of Taiwan, a recurring flash point in the Asia Pacific. Ever since the Kuomintang (KMT) lost the Chinese Civil War and fled to Taiwan in 1949, Beijing has regarded eventual reunification with the island as a sacred national cause. While the United States (like many countries) has no formal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, the U.S. government maintains robust informal ties with the island. Washington also periodically provides Taipei with defensive military equipment and advocates that the issue of Taiwan’s relations with mainland China should be settled in a peaceful, noncoercive manner.

Beijing views Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen with mistrust because the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) she belongs to has historically been sympathetic to the cause of outright Taiwanese independence. The relationship between mainland China and Taiwan has been quite strained since she took office in May 2016. Since then, Beijing, Taipei, and Washington all have taken actions that other parties have perceived as changing the uneasy status quo in the Taiwan Strait. While there are few reasons to expect an imminent crisis, the leaders of all three sides should keep an eye on worrying trends that could be signs of rougher waters ahead.

A CHANGING STATUS QUO

Taiwan’s leaders have taken a number of steps that China has found disconcerting. First and foremost, Tsai has not endorsed the 1992 Consensus as her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT did, a choice that constitutes a major departure from the status quo in Beijing’s eyes. Simply put, the 1992 Consensus refers to an understanding reached by representatives from the two sides, who agreed that there is one China but that they can have different interpretations of what that China is. Although Tsai did acknowledge the “historical fact” of these 1992 talks, voiced respect for the “existing Republic of China constitutional order,” and vowed to “cherish” the results of “over twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait,” her statements have not been sufficient to fully reassure mainland China.

Secondly, observers in Beijing see some of Tsai’s internal measures as manifestations of her purported (albeit less overt) stance in favor of Taiwanese independence or incremental progress toward Taiwanese independence, in contrast to former DPP leader Chen Shui-bian’s more radical pro-independence approach. In particular, mainland China has been highly alarmed by what it sees as a trend toward cultural Taiwanese independence and efforts to cut cultural and historical bonds across the strait, as embodied in measures such as the revision of Taiwanese textbooks to downplay elements of Chinese history. Furthermore, Tsai has not reined in other senior leaders in the DPP or pro-independence forces when they have made more radical statements. For example, Premier William Lai has claimed multiple times in the last year that he is a “Taiwan independence worker.” Although Tsai might have privately admonished Lai to be more low-key about cross-strait relations, many in mainland China find it very telling that such a high-ranking official in the Tsai government would dare to make such explosive remarks.

Meanwhile, pro-independence forces are pushing for what has been termed a name rectification referendum for the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo and seeking a Taiwanese independence referendum to be held in 2019. The former calls for the name Taiwan to be used instead of the politically less sensitive name Chinese Taipei when the island participates in the 2020 Summer Olympics, while the latter could trigger the use of force by Beijing as stipulated in mainland China’s Anti-Secession Law. In short, on top of not fully endorsing the 1992 Consensus, Tsai represents for many in Beijing an ominous trend toward Taiwanese independence, albeit in a more incremental way than Chen before her.

In fairness, Tsai also sees Beijing as changing Taipei’s status quo. Due to deep distrust of Tsai and displeasure at her refusal to fully recognize the 1992 Consensus, Beijing started to send signals and put pressure on her government, first by withholding certain benefits and later by what Taipei perceived as more coercive means of constraining its international space and displaying Chinese military power.

China’s response to Taiwan has taken various forms. After Tsai assumed power, official contact between the two sides was almost immediately suspended, and the number of tour groups and students from mainland China that visit Taiwan dropped significantly. The informal diplomatic truce that Beijing and Taipei had tacitly maintained during the Ma administration also ended, as China resumed efforts to encourage Taiwan’s few remaining allies to abandon formal diplomatic relations with the island. Since Tsai’s inauguration, Taiwan has lost five diplomatic allies: São Tomé and Príncipe in December 2016, Panama in June 2017, the Dominican Republic and Burkina Faso in May 2018, and El Salvador in August 2018.

Taiwan’s international space has shrunk in other respects as well. Taiwanese representatives were denied access to the UN World Health Assembly in 2017 and 2018 after attending under observer status since 2009. A similar situation transpired at the UN International Civil Aviation Organization’s Council Assembly in 2016. In the eyes of Taipei, the pressure campaign is intensifying as Beijing—to better reflect the One China principle—has pushed for changes to the names of the island’s representative offices in countries with unofficial relations with Taiwan. Similarly, China has made demands about how foreign airlines should refer to Taiwan on their websites. Militarily speaking, Taiwan has noted the increasing frequency of encirclement drills around Taiwan by People’s Liberation Army Air Force aircraft, appearances by Chinese aircraft carrier battle groups in the Taiwan Strait, and Chinese live-fire drills in waters not far from the island.

Despite all of these unsettling developments, the two sides are not yet on a path of irreversible hostility, and the possibility of salvaging cross-strait relations still remains. But recent U.S. policies under President Donald Trump could change that.

ENTER WASHINGTON

As in other policy areas, Trump’s 2016 electoral victory has brought a great deal of uncertainty and unpredictability to cross-strait relations. Trump’s unorthodox phone call with Tsai (something no U.S. president had done for about forty years) and his careless statement temporarily questioning whether the United States would continue to stand by its One China policy marked a rocky start.

For a time, Washington’s Taiwan policy seemed to return to normal after Trump reaffirmed the United States’ One China policy in February 2017 and held an amicable, fruitful summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in April 2017. Yet toward the end of 2017, a series of moves by the U.S. Congress and the White House seemed to suggest to Beijing that Washington is determined to escalate its efforts to use the sensitive issue of Taiwan to exert geopolitical leverage over mainland China. To make things worse, these changes have taken place as the United States contemplates adjusting its China policy in fundamental ways and as Beijing and Washington are engaged in a highly contentious trade dispute with potentially disastrous consequences.

Most conspicuous from Beijing’s perspective were Trump’s decisions to sign into law the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in late 2017 and the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA) in March 2018. The 2018 NDAA not only reaffirmed the long-standing Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the Six Assurances—provisions that set the terms of Washington’s informal relationship with Taipei—but also recommended that the United States expand and elevate military relations with Taiwan, including through the possibility of port of call exchanges between the two navies.

The TTA, meanwhile, was passed by voice vote in the House of Representatives and by unanimous consent in the Senate. The law aims to break self-imposed constraints on the level of official contact between government officials in Washington and Taipei. Although the TTA amounts to a nonbinding “formal opinion” known as a sense of Congress resolution, its passage and the level of congressional support it attracted sent a strong message to Beijing.

U.S. experts like to emphasize that such legislation requires few tangible policy actions for now, but these provisions do nonetheless increase the likelihood that these proposals will become routine practices in the future. Some pessimists in mainland China consequently worry that the United States’ long-standing One China policy could very well hang in the balance. Furthermore, many Chinese observers interpreted the fact that Trump signed the TTA instead of letting it automatically take effect after a set amount of time as proof that the White House is actively taking a revisionist stance on the One China policy.

Other parts of the U.S. government have done things that have reinforced China’s misgivings. In April 2018, the State Department approved a marketing license for U.S. companies to sell submarine technologies to Taiwan. Moreover, for two consecutive years in 2017 and 2018, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stressed U.S. commitments to Taiwan under the TRA at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a major security conference held each year in Singapore. The venue of such a prominent regional security forum heightened Beijing’s concerns that Washington is attempting to turn Taiwan’s security into a regional security issue. Although former secretary of defense Leon Panetta also mentioned the TRA at the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, he spoke about the Three Communiqués and One China policy too, delivering his speech in the context of improving cross-strait relations. By contrast, Vice President Mike Pence echoed Mattis's remarks when he gave a major October 2018 speech on U.S. policy toward China, in which he “condemned” mainland Chinese efforts to poach three of Taiwan’s Latin American allies.

In a nutshell, Beijing senses that there seems to be a collective interagency push in some parts of the U.S. government to elevate U.S.-Taiwan relations at the expense of the country’s One China policy. Even if the most pronounced pro-Taiwan views of U.S. officials such as National Security Adviser John Bolton and Assistant Secretary of Defense Randy Schriver are not yet totally reflected in formal U.S. policy, Beijing is understandably alarmed at how things in Washington seem to be trending.

In light of the already fragile relationship between Beijing and Taipei, cross-strait tensions could be aggravated or even driven to a crisis point in at least two ways. First, out of concern about Washington’s policy adjustments, Beijing could respond by retaliating against Taiwan as it is the easier target. If that were to happen, the Tsai government could conceivably conclude that the relatively restrained approach it has pursued to date does not work and switch to more radical tactics. Such a reversal on Tsai’s part could in turn convince Beijing that its fears about Tsai are completely justified, prompting the relationship to deteriorate further.

In fact, this kind of dynamic may already be at play. After Burkina Faso established diplomatic relations with China at the end of May 2018, Tsai’s response was much tougher than her past statements after losing previous diplomatic allies, as she accused Beijing of challenging Taiwan’s “bottom line” and stated that Taiwan will “no longer tolerate” such developments.

Second, Washington’s pro-Taiwan policies could make Taipei believe that it is possible to integrate the island’s security into U.S. defense arrangements in the region. Attempts to turn the Taiwan issue into a regional or international security matter have always been an extremely sensitive subject for Beijing, yet Taipei seems to be actively seeking that outcome. During a recent interview, Tsai tried to expose China’s purported ambitions to become a regional hegemon, and she appealed to the international community to “constrain China.” Then at the Double Ten Day celebration on October 10, 2018, Tsai again accused China of attempting to change the “regional status quo” and stated that “the entire world is dealing with the expansion of Chinese influence.”

Likewise, at a conference in Washington, DC, in July 2018, the Mainland Affairs Council’s Minister Chen Ming-tong cited the U.S. National Security Strategy’s characterization of China as a “revisionist power” and warned other countries about China’s “sharp power” and Beijing’s supposed intentions to change the international order. Chen emphasized that Taiwan, as an Indo-Pacific democracy, is willing to work with others to defend the so-called “rules-based international order.” In other words, Taipei saw an opportunity to align itself with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and to turn Taiwan’s security into a broader Indo-Pacific security issue. If this rhetoric is translated into actions, Beijing can be expected to react strongly.

A MANAGEABLE BUT DANGEROUS SITUATION

Despite these worrisome developments, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely to spin completely out of control for the time being for three reasons. Due to its growing power and influence, mainland China has gained much more confidence in its ability to keep things under control across the strait and believes that time is more or less in its side. This means that Beijing now has greater strategic calmness (zhanlue dingli) and is not likely to overreact. In July 2018, for instance, Xi met with former KMT chair Lien Chan and stressed that Beijing will continue to adhere to its existing Taiwan policies “steadfastly.”

Moreover, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait seem to remain important interests for the United States. Any attempts by Washington to change its One China policy would risk disrupting these interests. On this point, a useful reference point is the opening of a newly constructed office complex in Taipei in June 2018 for the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), where unofficial U.S. representatives facilitate the informal relationship between Taiwan and the United States. Two facts related to the AIT building’s opening probably suggest that Washington still takes Beijing’s sensitivity about Taiwan into consideration to some degree. The United States only sent an assistant secretary of state for educational and cultural affairs, a relatively low-level official with a nonsensitive policy portfolio, to the dedication ceremony. In addition, rumors that the U.S. Marines would be stationed to safeguard the building have not yet materialized.

Furthermore, the Tsai government has its own reasons to be cautious about switching to a more radical approach or accepting all of Washington’s offers of support without any reservations. After the phone call with Trump, for instance, Tsai had to downplay its significance by stating that it does not represent a policy change. As the smallest player in the strategic triangle between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, Taiwan understands well that it would likely suffer the most from any potential confrontation or conflict across the strait. Trump’s unpredictable style and his talk about playing the Taiwan card only reinforces Taipei’s fears about being unduly reliant on Washington or being used as a bargaining chip. Furthermore, it seems that the DPP and Tsai have taken to heart the lessons from the Chen administration about the great damage an overly radical approach could do to Taiwan’s own interests.

Although these considerations somewhat moderate the risks of confrontation, if the negative interactions between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington continue and if relations keep deteriorating, it is certainly not inconceivable that another crisis across the strait could transpire. Such tensions could be triggered by any of the three parties, whether by strong pessimism on the part of China, a provocative redefinition by Taiwan of the nature of cross-strait relations, or the potential that Washington might sail a warship to a Taiwanese harbor.

However such a hypothetical crisis were to unfold, it could be more dangerous than previous ones. The 1995-–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis certainly unsettled the region, but mainland China’s policy toolkit was still quite small at the time, especially in military terms. The years of the Chen administration were turbulent indeed, but ironically Beijing’s and Washington’s aims seemed more aligned than ever before as they both grew frustrated with Chen’s policies and actions.

If another crisis were to take place in the next year or two, it would unfold amid an almost total lack of trust between Beijing and Taipei and during an emerging strategic competition between Washington and Beijing. Furthermore, when push comes to shove, a much more capable Chinese military could conceivably be deployed if tensions ran high enough. Such a crisis would be a losing proposition for all sides.