【Abstract】In the intellectual history of modern China, the Western philosophical term “metaphysics” has been widely translated with a Chinese phrase xing (er) shang xue 形而上学which was initiated by Yan Fu严复according to the basic meaning of a key sentence in Zhou Yi周易 at the beginning of 20th century. Under his influence, metaphysics was widely defined as a study or pursuit of the supersensible/formless reality for the special purpose of achieving the ultimate completeness in practical daily living in modern Chinese academic circle. Generally speaking, it is simply because a large portion of traditional Chinese learning focused upon studying some formless or supersensible things such as Dao道, ben-ti本体, and some other ti-s体 that modern Chinese scholars tend to take them as metaphysical theories. Moreover, in using the Western term “metaphysics” to re-interpret traditional Chinese learning, most of Chinese scholars seemed unaware that the basic meaning of metaphysics had been transformed to a high degree from a neo-Confucian perspective. This paper will examine how modern Chinese scholars accept and interpret the western term “metaphysics” with some typically Chinese characteristics, if or not their arguments about metaphysics was made upon a good understanding of this term in its Western context, how some “Chinese” types of understanding toward the meaning of metaphysics has been formulated in modern China.
One of the most notable features of modern Chinese academic studies has been that of re-interpreting traditional Chinese learning in terms of Western academic and philosophical categories. To the contrary, this paper will argue that there also exists a corresponding reverse process, one to which not enough attention has been paid by scholars of modern Chinese studies. This reverse process consists in re-interpreting Western philosophical concepts in terms of traditional Chinese academic categories and concepts. In fact, these two processes have occurred simultaneously and can in effect be seen as two sides of the same coin.
What has happened is that, on the one hand, modern Chinese scholars have been trying to re-interpret traditional Chinese thought with Western categories and concepts, and at the same time they are interpreting, and therefore mis-understanding the meaning of Western categories and concepts by confounding them with conceptions from the Chinese academic traditions. It is the interweaving of these two processes that forms the typical character of modern Chinese academic studies.
By examining how modern Chinese scholars have interpreted the meaning of “metaphysics” as a Western philosophical term, this paper will try to show how the meaning of the Western term “metaphysics” has been to a large degree shaped by traditional Chinese thinking, especially by that of neo-Confucians.
From Metaphysics to Xing Er Shang Xue形而上学
Xing er shang 形而上versus xing er xia形而下
The introduction of Western philosophical terms, including “metaphysics,” into China may be traced back to the 17th century when European missionaries first introduced selected philosophical ideas and scientific knowledge to China. The earliest Chinese translation and interpretation of the Western term “metaphysics” was made by an Italian Jesuit missionary Juliano Aleni (1582-1649) in his book An Outline of Western Learning (Xi-xue-fan《西学凡》), published in Chinese in 1623 during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1663)(Cf. Chen, 60-62). Until the end of the 19th century and even into the early part of 20th century, many different translations of the Western term “metaphysics” have been introduced into China: li-xue理学, chun-lixue纯理学, shen-li-zhi-xue 神理之学, zhi-xue 智学, ai-zhi-xue 爱智学，zhe-xue 哲学, chun-li zhe-xue 纯理哲学，chao-wu-li-xue 超物理学, xuan-xue 玄学 and so on (CHEN, 60-68; YAN, 1986, 1055; YAN, 1981, 12, 417; FAN, 243-245). Even so, the term “metaphysics” was never widely accepted by Chinese academia until the famous Chinese scholar Yan Fu严复 (1853-1921) interpreted it in a possible relation to a famous sentence from the Chinese classic Zhou Yi (Book of Changes《周易》) at the beginning of 20th century.
Between 1900 and 1902, in translating John Stuart Mill’s (1806-1873) System of Logic from English into Chinese, Yan Fu (1853-1921) confronted the philosophical term “metaphysics.” He argued, in his notes toward the original texts, according to his understanding of Western metaphysicians such as Plato, Aristotle and Descartes, that metaphysics in its Western sense is “a study of what is outside of sensible-material existence 出形气学, ” or “a study of what is beyond sensible-material existence 超夫形气之学, ” and “is distinct from various studies of the sensible-material things 与格物诸形气学相对”(YAN, 1986, 1055; YAN, 1981, 12,45). As will be seen later, this interpretation of the term “metaphysics,” in terms of a contrast between sensible and supersensible existences, is directly connected to a famous sentence in the “Appended Remarks 1” of Zhou Yi (Books of Changes), and thus Yan Fu has been recognized by later generations as the first Chinese scholar to interpret “metaphysics” as “xing-er-shang-xue形而上学” (WANG, 1999, 6067; ZHANG, 1990, 12; HUANG & YANG, 579-582). [2]
The relevant sentence in the “Appended Remarks 1” of Zhou Yi may be translated into English as follows:
That which is antecedent to the material form exists, we say,
as Dao 形而上者谓之道, and
that which is subsequent to the material form exists, we say,
as qi (a definite thing)形而下者谓之器. [3]
In above passage, the original Chinese phrase, xing-er-shang-zhe形而上者 in Zhou Yi , translated as “that which is antecedent to the material form,” literally means “the formless” or “the supersensible”, and xing-er-xia-zhe形而下者, translated as “that which is subsequent to the material form,” literally means “the sensible, or “the material.” [4] Thus the same sentence could also be translated as below:
What is supersensible/formless is called Dao;
what is sensible/material is called qi (a definite thing).
The key point in this modification is that it distinguishes “to be supersensible/formless” (xing er shang形而上; or in its condensed form, xing shang形上) from “to be sensible/material” (xing er xia形而下; or in its condensed form, xing xia形下 ). The former is then defined as Dao and the latter as qi 器, as understood in Zhou Yi, and it is this distinction which forms the common basis for nearly all discussions and interpretations of the term “metaphysics” in modern China after Yan Fu.
The implication of Yan Fu’s translation and interpretation is thus to define metaphysics as a special study of the supersensible (or, formless) reality, or a study characterized by going beyond the sensible world. Yan Fu’s translation became so influential that nearly every earlier translation of this term (as quoted above) was eclipsed until 1920’s. To be more exact, most Chinese scholars in the 1920’s usually use one of the three alternate phrases as Chinese translations of the term “metaphysics”: xing er shang xue 形而上学, xing shang xue形上学, or xuan xue玄学. The Chinese phrase “xing shang xue” is an apparently abridged form of the phrase “xing er shang xue” without any difference in its literal meaning from the latter. By contrast, the phrase “xuan xue”, although widely used in 1920’s, has become rare since the 1930’s.[5] Generally speaking, modern Chinese intellectuals tend to use only the terms, xing er shang xue or xing shang xue, rather than any of the older terms such as li-xue, ai-zhi-xue and so on, which were used to refer to metaphysics by the Jesuit missionaries and early Chinese scholars, to refer to metaphysics after 1920s.
Why must xing (er) shang xue?
Why did Yan Fu’s translation, rather than many of the earlier translations, become widely accepted by Chinese intellectuals in such a relatively short time? To answer this question, we need to make clear two key facts as follows:
First of all, Yan Fu’s interpretation of metaphysics in terms of the distinction between “xing (er) shang” and “xing (er) xia” could seemingly be justified from the original meaning of this term in Aristotle”s books and in some other Western metaphysical theories. As is well-known, the word “metaphysics” comes from the Greek words “meta ta physika,” which is the name supposedly given to some of Aristotle’s untitled works which were compiled after his work, Physics. As has been pointed out by Western scholars, the literal meaning of this word “metaphysics” was, in the Middle Ages, changed to refer to a study of supersensible entities or the most fundamental principles of the physical/sensible world as a whole. Thus “metaphysics” came to mean a more fundamental science than the various natural sciences which take concrete physical or sensible things as their objects. Moreover, in the ancient and even in the modern history of Western philosophy, metaphysics often has meant a study of what is supersensible (Edwards, 289). This fact becomes apparent when we examine the metaphysical theories of many theological philosophers in the Middle ages (e.g., Thomas Aquinas), and of classical metaphysicians, such as Plato, Leibniz, John Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel and so forth, who have been well-known in modern Chinese academia since the beginning of the 20th.
Second, Yan Fu’s translation directly connects the meaning of metaphysics as a Western term to a major portion of traditional Chinese learning. As is well-known, the study of Dao as a supersensible/formless entity occupies a central position in traditional Chinese learning. In fact, the central teaching of Confucianism and even of traditional Chinese learning could even be called the study or pursuit of the supersensible/formless Dao. Another important fact is that the above-mentioned sentence in Zhou Yi has a very special importance in neo-Confucian history. Neo-Confucians, such as Zhang Zai (1020-1077), Cheng Yi程颐 (1033-1107) and Zhu Xi 朱熹(1130-1200), were used to cite this sentence to demonstrate the essential features of Confucian learning (ZHU & LU ). Partly because of this, neo-Confucian learning is also called Dao-xue (a study or pursuit of Dao). Considering the fact that neo-Confucianism had dominated Chinese thought for over 700 years, since south Song dynasty, it is easy to understand how important the Zhou Yi sentence became to the intellectual history of ancient China.
As a result, Yan Fu’s interpretation seemed to have completed a necessary bridge between the central core of traditional Chinese learning, namely, the study of Dao, and the central core of Western philosophy, namely, metaphysics. This fact is, I think, the most important reason that so many modern Chinese scholars accepted Yan Fu’s translation and his interpretation of the term “metaphysics” in such a short time. In comparison with other translations of metaphysics such as li-xue理学, zhi-xue智学, zhe-xue哲学, chao-wu-li-xue超物理学, xuan-xue玄学 and so on , we can find no one of the earlier translations with this specific feature. The Chinese phrases such as li-xue 理学 or those which relate to li-xue, and xuan-xue玄学 are the exact names of one part or branch of traditional Chinese learning: Li-xue is simply another name for neo-Confucianism, and xuan-xue is the name of the dominant school of learning in the Wei and Jin period 魏晋时期(A.D. 220-316) in China. Unfortunately, neither of their underlying Chinese meanings conforms to the literal meaning of the Western term metaphysics. The Chinese phrases which relate to zhe-xue哲学 or li-xue 智学 literally mean a “study of the love of wisdom,” and not only cannot display the literal meaning of metaphysics, but are also, since the end of 19th century in Japan and China, used to refer to another Western term, that of “philosophy”. The Chinese phrase chao-wu-li-xue 超物理学, literally meaning “a study beyond physics,” could have exactly represented the literal meaning of the Western term, but it could not be related in any way to traditional Chinese learning. In a word, the invention of the Chinese phrase “xing er shang xue” or its abridged form, “xing shang xue” was unique, and that is why the Chinese phrase xing (er) shang xue, as the Chinese translation of the term “metaphysics” was so easily accepted by Chinese scholars.
Is metaphysics equivalent to xing (er) shang xue?
The influence of Yan Fu’s interpretation of metaphysics was thus far-reaching. It not only established the most accessible way for Chinese scholars to understand the Western term metaphysics within the Chinese intellectual context, but more importantly, it initiated an available road toward re-interpreting traditional Chinese learning within the Western categories, a tremendously significant development in the minds of modern Chinese scholars.
First of all, we have seen that, since the 1920’s, the meaning of metaphysics in its original (Western) sense has been widely defined in Chinese academic circles as the study or pursuit of the supersensible/formless world or entity. In fact, many extraordinary Chinese scholars after Yan Fu, argued that xing er shang xue, or xing shang xue, were the most apt Chinese phrases for expressing the original meaning of the term “metaphysics” in its Western sense. For examples: in his early period (1920s), Zhang Junmai(1887-1969), a famous modern Confucian, used both the Chinese phrase xuan xue and xing shang xue to refer to metaphysics (GUO, 1923a, 62; GUO, 1923b, 11). But till 1930s, he refused to use xuan xue because he found that the literal meaning of xuan xue 玄学may suggest metaphysics as a “mystical theory”（ZHANG, 1989, 159）. He divided beings into two worlds: the sensible/material world and the supersensible/formless spiritual world and took metaphysics as a special study of the supersensible spiritual world. In his mind, Kant, Hegel, Bergson and other European metaphysicians” views could be positive references to support his understanding of metaphysics (ZHANG, 1981, 45-49, 54-57, 59-61; ZHANG, 1996, 705-726, etc.). Tang Junyi (1909-1978) (TANG, 1989a, 95-100), another famous modern Confucian, argued that the Chinese phrase xing shang xue was strong enough to comprise all of the important dimensions of the Western term metaphysics through an etymological analysis and a historic study on the one hand. On the other hand, he claimed that the advantage of this Chinese phrase also lies at an important fact that it suggests a profound direction of metaphysical studies from neo-Confucian perspectives. Another famous scholar Feng Yu-lan (1895-1990) also remarked that the Western term metaphysics (xing shang xue) is originally characterized by “going beyond the sensible experiences” (FENG, 1948, 3; FENG, 1997, 3).
The above dominant understanding of metaphysics strengthened such a tendency in modern China, that is, the meaning of metaphysics in its original Western sense could be understood from the literal meaning of its Chinese translation: xing (er) shang xue. This is why most of contemporary Chinese scholars, when they are using the Chinese term “xing er shang xue” (or its abridged expression, xing shang xue) to refer to the Western term “metaphysics”, they are accustomed to understand this term from its literal meaning in Chinese expression -- xing (er) shang xue-- within the context of Zhou Yi. There do exist a large amount of examples, let’s mention only two of them here. Huang Kejian, a famous contemporary Chinese philosopher in Mainland China, in a comparative study of Chinese and Western metaphysics, tries to elucidate the way to develop a metaphysical study at present time by saying that “in ancient China there is a thinking that “that which is antecedent to the material form exists, we say, as Dao”(HUANG, 1998, 1-2, 11). Luo Guan, a living scholar of religious studies in Taiwan, defends the legitimacy of using the Chinese term “Confucian xing shang xue” to refer to “Confucian metaphysics” by pointing a fact that traditional Chinese learning, particularly neo-Confucianism, is characteristic of the way of thinking of going beyond the sensible world (xing er shangg形而上). He also attacked using the Chinese phrase xuan xue to refer to metaphysics (LUO, 9-10).
Metaphysics in the Intellectual Context of Modern China
A study or pursuit of ben-ti?
Since metaphysics is defined as a study of what is supersensible/formless in modern Chinese intellectual circle, then every traditional Chinese doctrine which in any way relates to Dao seems a metaphysical theory (Note that Zhou Yi defines what is supersensible as Dao). This is exactly the reason that many Chinese scholars working after Yan Fu think it is legitimate to call those parts of traditional Chinese learning which relate to Dao “metaphysical theories.” Moreover, since neo-Confucianism (which is sometimes also called Dao-xue道学, that is, a study or learning of Dao) not only takes the discussion of Dao as one of its exclusive concerns, but also used or invented a group of Chinese phrases composed of a special character “ti体”, including ben-ti本体, shi-ti实体, xing-ti性体, xin-ti心体and so on as alternatives of Dao which also refer to something formless and supersensible and as the ultimate reality or goal of self-cultivation, the natural consequences were not only that neo-Confucianism was taken to be the most typical representative of “Chinese metaphysics” in modern China, but more importantly, the meaning of metaphysics had also been interpreted from a neo-Confucian perspective. That is, metaphysics is also interpreted as a study or a special pursuit of the above-mentioned ti-s. Ding Wenjiang, Zhang Jumai, Tang Junyi[6] and Mou Zongsan (1909-1995) are most remarkable examples.
Generally speaking, the Chinese character ti体literally implies something like “the fundamental part” or “the body of a definite thing; ” The Chinese phrase ben-ti本体 is usually translated as “substance” in English (sometime misleading in my view), but in Confucian and especially neo-Confucian tradition, as a synonym of Dao, it is an achievement of a long-term self-cultivation and personal moral practice in daily life, which has a strong sense of psychic feeling, subjective affection, and internal experience. To be sure, the Chinese terms ti or ben-ti (with ben literally referring to “basic” or “fundamental”) was originated within the traditions of Daoism and Buddhism and have usually been used in traditional learning, at least since the Wei and Jin eras (A.D. 220-A.D. 316), as synonyms for the concept of Dao. Together with shi-ti 实体, with shi literally referring to “real” or “actual”, and xing-ti性体 , with xing implying “human nature” or “humanity”, these terms composed of ti体were appropriated by the neo-Confucians since the Song dynasty and are particularly important for people to understand neo-Confucianism. In traditional Chinese learning, then, ben-ti/shi-ti often signifies not only the origin of all cosmological phenomena and their processes but also, and more importantly, the highest value/goal of each individual’s life and one’s daily moral practices. Xing-ti, stressing more the subjective dimension of Dao but not seen as having any essential difference from ben-ti, is specifically used to refer to the origin of life, or as the authenticity of human nature as the goal of self-cultivation or personal moral practices. We will continue to discuss the essential meaning of ti-s and their differences from Western metaphysical concepts blow.
The debate over the relationship between metaphysics and science, which occurred in Chinese academic circle since 1923, could be seen as a good example of understanding metaphysics as a pursuit of ti’s (see GUO, 1923a/b; ZHONG & YANG). One of the central topics of this debate is if metaphysical study is still a meaningful today in contrast to the success of sciences. The two leading figures of this debate, who initiated this debate and became strongly against with each other, Ding Wenjiang (1887-1936) and Zhang Junmai has no difference in taking neo-Confucianism as a Chinese model of metaphysics (GUO, 1923b, 13-14, 20-24, 95; ZHANG, 1981, 45-49, 54-57, 59-61, etc.). However, Ding, under influence of European positivism, thought that the neo-Confucian metaphysics is totally meaningless simply because its subject matter, namely, ben-ti, is too much mystic and never really exists. Taking the Chinese phrase ben-ti as equivalent to Western metaphysical concept “substance”, he further defined metaphysics, both in its Chinese and in Western senses, as a special study of “ben-ti 本体 independent of minds and feelings” after a survey of European metaphysical tradition (GUO, 1923b, 11, 13-14, 20-24).
Zhang, as the opposite of Ding in this debate, also define metaphysics as a special study of the formless or supersensible ben-ti 本体 and called it zui-hou-zhen-shi (ultimate reality最后真实 )(ZHANG, 1996, 722, 724, etc.). But different from Ding, he insists that this ben-ti does exist and could only be grasped by metaphysical studies instead of scientific studies as pointed by neo-Confucians long long ago. He emphasized that the method of metaphysics is totally different from that of science and that metaphysical studies should appeal to intuition, feeling and particularly self-cultivation as proposed by Confucianism. Consequently, what is unachievable from scientific point of view could actually be achieved by metaphysical studies. For examples, Dao or benti, which is seen as the ultimate transcendental reality and also the only reasonable purpose of every life in traditional Chinese learning, could never be known by means of science, as Kant rightly pointed out. However, they did have been truly grasped by many traditional Chinese scholars through metaphysical studies. Zhang remarked that, as had already been discussed in neo-Confucianism, the supersensible spiritual world could be grasped by means of cultivating the human mind and character (xin and xing 心性) (GUO, 1923a, 95).It is this special role of metaphysics that lends metaphysics an irreplaceable significance, in contrast to the various natural sciences, and for this reason metaphysics is not only able to be used to judge scientific studies but is also a necessary guide for daily life (ZHANG, 1996, 722). In his mind, the problem of Ding is to believe scientific method as the only criteria in pursuing the transcendental reality.
The ultimate completeness in practical living
Another interpretation of metaphysics with remarkable Chinese or neo-Confucian features is to believe that there is a necessary connection between the study of the supersensible beings (xing er shang zhe形而上者) and the purpose of achieving excellence in the art of practical daily living and thus it is widely taken for granted in modern China that metaphysics was invented, by both Chinese and Westerners, for the purpose of achieving an ultimate completeness in practical living. The formation of such kind of view is primarily because, I think, as soon as Chinese scholars think metaphysical studies as equivalent to the pursuit of Dao, then, what will naturally happen is that, in their minds, the central task or essential purpose of metaphysical studies could naturally be understood from traditional Chinese learning which relates to Dao. This fact is extremely important for us to understand why several new-Confucians, including Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi and Feng Yu-lan, even go further, first taking neo-Confucianism as the most powerful model of metaphysical studies in general and as surpassing nearly all Western metaphysical theories, and then attempting to develop their own modern metaphysical studies based on neo-Confucian themes.
Let’s remind ourselves that, Dao, the central concept of traditional Chinese learning, does indeed imply a strong relation to achieving excellence in practical daily living. In Confucianism, the supersensible/formless Dao stands for the highest value of human life, the ultimate completeness of the art of practical living, the ultimate concern of self-cultivation and the final goal of all personal moral practice. “The Master said: If, in the morning, I should hear about the Way [Dao], in the evening, I could die content! (Huang, 1997,68)” “Hearing” about the Dao means “accomplishing the highest value of personal life and thus achieving the ultimate completeness of the art of practical living.” Particularly in the case of neo-Confucianism, this ultimate concern implies not only theoretical studies but more importantly, a life-long, diligent and difficult self-cultivation of everyday life practices. For neo-Confucians, it is this kind of specific subjective experience that formulates the strongest witness that one is going to achieving Sagehood.
In 1946, Feng Yu-lan got published a work entitled The New Words of Wisdom《新知言》 specifically discussing the method of metaphysical studies in which he took not only neo-Confucianism but also Zen Buddhism as the truly significant direction of metaphysical studies (FENG, 1948, 5-15, 58-66, 86-97,etc.; Fung, 1997, 6-16, 64-74, 97-114). Feng claimed that metaphysics as a Western philosophical term is originally meant to “go beyond the sensible experiences”, thus he concluded that the significance of metaphysical studies is not to positively provide us any knowledge, but specifically to enhance our spiritual condition 精神境界 because it should present the last enlightenment on the meaning of life人生最后的觉解, namely, the highest level of wisdom in practical living. [7] Note that in this work he takes for granted that a study of the sensible world should be conducted for the special purpose of practical living, for, otherwise, according to his own definition of metaphysics, we would be unable to understand how he could have derived the importance of metaphysical studies in the first place. To understand Feng’s logic, we should keep in mind that in traditional Chinese learning, to go beyond the daily sensible world and to grasp the supersensible existence, the Dao, does mean acquiring an ability to return the daily sensible world so as to master it and to succeed in achieving excellence in the art of practical daily living.
This is exactly the same case as for Zhang Junmai, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. I mentioned above the central focus of the debate over the relationship between science and metaphysics, which occurred in 1923 in Chinese academic circle. Zhang’s position is that metaphysical theories could not only be used to judge various sciences, but also present us the practically effective guidelines of daily life. He insisted that “the outlook on life人生观” is not an issue of scientific studies but of the exclusive subject matter of metaphysics (GUO, 1923a, “forward”; ZHANG, 1996, 722-726). Tang Junyi claimed that the ultimate purpose of philosophical studies is to achieve our spiritual condition精神境界 at the highest level and thus to become a sage (TANG, 1986, 9-56).
Having surpassed Western metaphysics?
Mou Zongsan seems to be the most notable case of modern Chinese scholars who obviously claimed that neo-Confucianism represents the best example of metaphysical studies which has excelled almost all European metaphysical theories. In his famous work The Ti of Heart-Mind and the Ti of Human Nature《心体与性体》（1968/1969）after a comparative study of neo-Confucian metaphysics and Kant’s metaphysic of morals, Mou Zongsan concluded that Kant had never really finished describing a “moral metaphysics” but only a “moral theology” (MOU, 1968/1991, 139) . He claimed that Kant’s metaphysics of morals presents a study of morality which is “metaphysically conducted”, thus Kant only used metaphysics as a method rather than did metaphysical research for its own purpose. Namely, Kant did not have been able to invent a genuine metaphysical doctrine because he claimed that the transcendental reality is beyond the capacity of human reason. By means of “metaphysically conducted”, I think he does mean to “make a try to go beyond the sensible world ” but not necessarily to “make clear the transcendental reality.” This is different from a possible “moral metaphysics” advocated by Mou, which implies a study from a moral point of view and for the purpose of establishing a metaphysical system (MOU, 1968/1991, 140). and by means of “for purpose of establishing a metaphysical system”, I think he means to get in hand the ultimate transcendental reality by means of self-cultivation and daily moral practices.
According to Mou’s view, the biggest difference between Kant and neo-Confucians lies at a fact that the ultimate transcendental reality (Noumenon, or thing in itself), which appears as unachievable for human beings in Kant’s mind, could in fact be achieved by the specific way invented by Chinese neo-Confucianism nearly 1000 years ago. This fact gave Mou the most important confidence to claim that “neo-Confucianism had excelled Kant a long time ago” (MOU, 1968/1991, 171). In his books, Mou described the transcendental reality with a group of concepts of ti (xing-ti, shi-ti, ben-ti, etc.) and thought them as the exactly same things as Kant’s concepts of Noumenon or things themselves. [8] Perhaps we could ask Mou such a question: what kind of the specific way exist which, so crucial in pursuing metaphysical studies, but unfortunately, Kant could not realize? To be sure, here Mou simply implies a process of self-cultivation with a strong psychic experiences and internal feelings which prevailed in neo-Confucianism. The reason that Kant failed to realize this type of specific way, according to Mou’s conclusion, involve two points: First, Kant was limited by his analytic way of thinking; second, he “did not take as his guidance the sagehood with its harmoniousness, flexibility and divinity, which appears concretely useful, morally clear, compassionately merciful, and extremely cordial (MOU, 1968/1991, 139).”
Under influence of Confucian tradition, Mou laughed at Kant by saying that Kant mistakenly thought intellectual intuition is not a capacity of mankind (MOU, 1980, 183-202). Mou claimed, Neo-Confucians of Song Dynasty did have already discovered intellectual intuition by means of self-cultivation. He listed a series of Neo-Confucian documents to prove that a lot of traditional Chinese scholars did live with intellectual intuition. Kant never knew that the intellectual intuition as the most important capacity did have already been established by neo-Confucians long long ago! Mou believed that if we can go beyond Western philosophical tradition and have a good study of traditional Chinese learning, we will find that not only in neo-Confucianism but also in Taoism and Buddhism the intellectual intuition functions very well in traditional Chinese learning, by appealing to which Chinese scholars had greatly succeeded in achieving the excellence of practical daily living. By “intellectual intuition functions very well,” it is meant that some ancient Confucians, Taoists and Buddhists had ever been able to arrive at the ultimate transcendental reality through intellectual intuition. Different from Kant, Mou thought that the intellectual intuition could be found by means of self-cultivation including quiet sitting, self-reflection and daily practices (as displayed in neo-Confucianism) instead of logic reasoning and analysis (as displayed by Kant) (MOU, 1980, 184-215). Let’s tentatively stop discussing Mou’s views here. I will make more analyses about Mou’s criticism against Kant below.
Metaphysics with Chinese Characteristics
In fact, most modern Chinese scholars who entertain metaphysical concerns are under the impression that at least some of the basic assumptions of the meaning of metaphysics had already formed in minds of modern Chinese scholars and, in their view, it is these assumptions that form a common basis for conducting comparative studies between Chinese metaphysics and Western metaphysics. These basic assumptions can be summarized as follows:
· That metaphysics is a study or pursuit of the supersensible/formless reality;
· That such a study necessarily implies a development of personal character which may help one to achieve excellence in the art of practical living or the ultimate meaning of life; and therefore,
· That thinkers, in both Western and Chinese history, have pursued metaphysical studies in order to achieve an ultimate completeness in practical living.
The first assumption leads many Chinese scholars to call those part of traditional learning which relates to Dao or ti-s, particularly neo-Confucianism, as metaphysics; the second and third have caused some modern Confucians took neo-Confucianism as the genuine metaphysics superior to nearly all Western metaphysical theories. A reader might understand why and how these assumptions could be formed in modern China from my foregoing discussions.
Sensible or supersensible?
To be sure, although I claimed in the foregoing passages that Yan Fu’s interpretation of the meaning of metaphysics in terms of the distinction between xing er shang and xing er xia may have been justified according to Western metaphysical tradition, a closer examination of Western metaphysical history might provide a somewhat negative answer. While in traditional metaphysical theories the analysis of supersensible substances often forms the central part, it still seems wrong or at least over-simplified to take the so-called “supersensible world, or substances” as the only major concern of traditional Western metaphysicians. As has been pointed by many scholars, metaphysics has been continually changing its meaning from ancient time up until the present. Aristotle defined first philosophy (metaphysics) as “to on hei on” (being qua being, 1026a30). But according to a summary written by a noted Western scholar, metaphysics may mean to characterize the world as a whole instead of as in the various natural sciences; it can also be an attempt “to establish in dubitable first principle as a foundation for all other knowledge; to examine critically what more limited studies simply take for granted; or to compile an inventory of what sorts of things ultimately or in the last analysis thee are” (Flew, 229). In contrast to traditional metaphysics, modern metaphysics seems more interested in providing “a kind of logic of reality; an inquiry of a fundamental kind, concerning the general structure of our thought about the world"(Parkinson, 252).[9] Indeed, the meaning of the term metaphysics has become particularly complicated today, and it is nearly impossible to find a coherent definition which will include all different dimensions of its meaning from ancient time up to now. I do think that it is partly due to a misconception of the term “metaphysics” in its original sense that modern Chinese scholars tend to take metaphysics as a study or pursuit of supersensible reality.
Benti and substance
Moreover, it must be a big mistake to confuse the Chinese conceptions of the supersensible/formless Dao or ti (ben-ti, shi-ti, or xing-ti, or even Dao-ti) with the supersensible substances in traditional Western metaphysical theories. Many modern Chinese scholars, including Ding Wenjiang, Zhang Jumai, Tang Junyi[10] and Mou Zongsan, obviously claimed that a group of the traditional Chinese concepts composed of a Chinese character “ti体”, such as ben-ti 本体，shi-ti 实体 or xing-ti性体, as equivalent to the Western metaphysical concepts such as substances, essence, thing in itself or Noumenon (in Kant’s sense). As mentioned above, this is another important reason that they recognized neo-Confucianism as metaphysics. However, as is well-known, the important thing here, concerning all these ti-s, is that no distinction is to be made between their descriptive sense and their normative sense. Ti, as well as Dao, exists both as a fact and as a value. They are the final end of every regular person in order to achieve the ultimate meaning of his life. Besides, ti can also be a “process,” implying “getting rid of one’s daily un-trained, confused life” in order to achieve a really free internal condition, by means of which one is able to psychically experience the presence of ti as a unity of heaven and man, and thus as true, internal and transcendent freedom. This kind of personal internal experience is also described by Chinese scholars as “ultimate reality” (zui-hou-zhen-shi 最后真实 or终极实在).In neo-Confucianism., ti体, ben-ti本体, shi-ti 实体 or xing-ti性体were never to be understood as impersonal universal rules or as able to be objectively measured or scientifically calculated. Moreover, since the meanings of ti-s, had always been discussed by traditional Chinese literati for the special purpose of achieving the ultimate completeness in meaning of life, that is, of becoming a sage and thus of acquiring an outstanding ability for dealing with daily human relations, it also becomes a dominant idea in neo-Confucian tradition that the ti’s, or Dao, can only be achieved within a special type of mystical personal inwardness, a psychic or subjective condition, or a moral feeling or emotion by means of self-cultivation.
It is now necessary to point out that the key Western metaphysical concept, “substance” originated in a totally different intellectual context from these ti concepts, although ti usually translated into English by the word, “substance.” To identify ben-ti, shi-ti, xing-ti or Dao as equivalent to the Western metaphysical term “substance, (which for many metaphysicians is supersensible or formless) is entirely wrong. To be sure, the word “substance” is the Latin translation of the Greek word ousia, which is often used by Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s dialogues, ousia is another name for “form” (eidos/Idea), which implies the essence of a thing or the true reality. Even though Plato’s “ousia” is supersensible and could exist as a normative value or the ultimate purpose of everyday life, it definitely yields to logic arguments and cognitive analyses through dialogues which, as dialectic, are taken as the copestone of all sciences by Plato, rather than to personal internal feeling and psychic subjective experiences in self-cultivation. Regarding Aristotle, the highest substance—called “first substances”—is not only sensible, visible or experiential but also exists as a given, a descriptive fact. As the object of his research, substances are the most important existence in the world but not necessarily transcendental. More importantly, substance could be the first cause of the world or the most basic element in the world but not necessarily the final end or ultimate purpose of a regular person. Moreover, a study of substance is also not conducted for the purpose of achieving the excellence in the art of practical daily living. In Metaphysics, Aristotle talks about “material substances” and even names “water”, “gas”, “fire”, “atom”, “number”, “nous”, proposed as the fundamental elements by earlier Greek philosophers, as substances (985b10, 992b1, 1042b9, 1044a15, etc.). It is after Aristotle that the discussion of the descriptive dimension of “substances”, dominated by cognitive analysis and theoretical interests, had ever been the mainstream of Western metaphysical theories for a very long time. Most of classic Western metaphysicians, including Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Spinoza, and so on, tried to take the study of substances to be a super science (the queen of the sciences), because it was to reach intellectually impregnable conclusions and thus to possess a unique kind of certainty. This kind of discussions of “substance” is entirely different from the discussions of the ti-s (or Dao) in ancient China.
For Practical Daily Living?
A scholar with a good Western intellectual background might ask: how could it be possible for Chinese scholars to accept metaphysics as a pursuit of the excellence in the art of practical daily living without any hesitation? While it is correct that “almost everything in metaphysics is controversial” (Edwards, 300), metaphysics, at least in its traditional form, is a kind of knowledge that is surely not concerned with the achievement of completeness in the art of practical living or of the ultimate meaning of life. As is well-known, many of contemporary Western philosophies do propose a lot of criticisms against traditional Western metaphysics and display a profound tendency to interpret metaphysics from a perspective of daily life, and thus, according to some living Chinese scholars (ZHANG, 1996; ZHANG, 1999), they have already become closer to traditional Chinese learning. However, this is not the same case regarding traditional Western metaphysics. For most of traditional metaphysicians, such as Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and so on, metaphysics might be beneficial for practical daily life but is not necessarily pursued for the exclusive purpose of practical daily living. When Descartes, Spinoza, Lock, Berkeley, Kant and many other Western metaphysicians make a study of so-called “substances, ” it is never taken for granted in their minds that substance is a exclusive end of every life in the world and that a pursuit of substance represents the only way for a regular person to achieve the completeness in practical daily living or the ultimate meaning of life. A study of substance could often made for purpose of making clear of the first causes or the most fundamental elements of the world, but not necessarily for purpose of inventing a system of guidelines for practical daily living. Substance is an existence but not necessarily a value or the meaning of life for a regular person.
To relate metaphysics with daily life could be a good point of view, but it is not right to think that the study of the supersensible world (the ultimate transcendental reality) had always been connected to the purpose of achieving the excellence in the art of practical daily living, and I wonder why, in modern China, it is rarely questioned if or not this assumption does match, or in what a sense match, the Western sense of metaphysics. As is well-known, usually modern Chinese scholars tended to argue their understanding of the meaning of metaphysics by means of citing a series of traditional Western metaphysicians such Plato, Aristotle, Kant and so on. They usually tended to think their understanding of the meaning, task and purpose of metaphysical studies have their roots in Western metaphysical theories and thus they are unaware that their understanding of metaphysics has been to a large degree shaped by neo-Confucianism.
Kant and Mou Zongsan
Mou’s criticism against Kant’s metaphysics of morals was, according to some scholars (e.g., LI), significant in breaking through the limitation of Kant’s philosophy and the Western metaphysical tradition in general, but, it seems to me that he had never had a clear awareness that the above mentioned assumptions concerning the meaning and task of metaphysics, taken for granted by Mous, were not certainly shared, not only by Kant and but also by most of traditional Western metaphysicians. Scholars may think that Kant”s effort of saving phenomenon after David Hume maybe seen as a turn into practical world. But this seems not to necessarily suggest that Kant did intentionally assume achieving an art of practical daily living as the central task of his metaphysical studies. According to the summary by Howard Caygill, with a deep connection to and as a result of a reflection upon the metaphysical tradition from Ancient Greek philosophers (e.g. Aristotle) through Thomas Aquinas up to Wolff and Crusius, metaphysics of Kant could means “a science of the limits of human reason”, or being “composed of “a priori synthetic knowledge” “, or as the “criticism of the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure a priori knowledge” and the “systematic connection [of] the whole body (true as well as illusory) of philosophical knowledge arising out of pure reason” (Caygill, 291, 292). In his Fundamental Principles of Metaphysics of Morals mentioned for many times by Mou, Kant has a clear remark concerning the meaning of metaphysics, its division and its distinction from other branches of philosophy:
All philosophy insofar as it is founded on experience may be called empirical, while that which sets forth its doctrines as founded entirely on a priori principles may be called pure. The latter, when merely formal, is called logic; but when limited to determinate objects of the understanding, it is called metaphysics. In this way there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysics: a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. (Kant, 1)
When Mou claimed that Kant had never succeeded in founding a moral metaphysics but only a moral theology (MOU, 1968/1991,139), it seems clear that his conception of metaphysics is totally Chinese (or to be more exact, neo-Confucian), of which Kant might share only little with him. What Mou mean by moral metaphysics is essentially a practical pursuit of founding within oneself the moral personality of a sage, which implies a union of man and Heaven. It is called metaphysical studies simply because it is oriented toward approaching the transcendental reality. Therefore, for Mou, (moral) metaphysics is invented for the special purpose of establishing the excellence of personal practical living by means of grasping the transcendental reality. The transcendental reality is not something far from human intelligence. It is the final end of all human activities. It could even be seen as the only purpose of life. Thus the moral metaphysical studies should be conducted in daily practices. It should never been limited to be a theoretical research. But for Kant, metaphysics (of morals and of nature) is a special science for purpose of making clear of the fundamental principles of human world. Transcendental reality is something far from human capacity. It implies absolutely a theoretical research. Kant actually had no conception of taking transcendental reality as the final end of human life. Moreover, Metaphysics of morals pursued by Kant implies a parallel between metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals. But a moral metaphysics pursued by Mou was seen by him as the genuine metaphysical activity and the distinction between a metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals would never exist in his metaphysical studies. All genuine metaphysical studies must strive to become a moral metaphysics according to Mou Zongsan (MOU, 1968/1991, 140). This is because a good pursuit of the transcendental reality, as happened in neo-Confucian tradition, necessarily implies a completeness of a great Sagehood which is tremendously significant and should be taken as the exclusive concern of all human activities especially of human learning according to Confucianism.
Let’s return to a basic question: what is the theoretical basis upon which Mou developed his criticism of Kant? First of all, in my view, Mou believed that Kant did share with him in defining metaphysics as a special pursuit of the supersensible transcendental reality. He claimed that Kant did have tried to “go beyond the sensible world” (xing er shang) (MOU, 1968/1991, 135-136, 140), but unfortunately, he did not succeed in doing so and failed to grasp the ultimate reality as a supersensible or transcendental world described by him as “original source and true nature of the universe” (shi-ti or ben-ti of the universe宇宙万物底实体本体) (MOU, 1968/1991, 138). Second, in Mou’s mind, the real task of metaphysical studies what Kant assumed must be exactly the same as what neo-Confucianism assumed, that is, the ultimate completeness in practical living. Mou emphasized that the last and also one of the most important senses of metaphysics is a great capacity to apply one has learnt in theory into personal daily practices, including implementing ren (humanity), exerting xing (human nature) to the utmost and making appropriate resolutions of concrete events. This, he thought, would lead toward the ultimate completeness in practical daily living (MOU, 1968/1991, 117). When he claimed that Kant was totally wrong in taking “freedom of the will” only as a presupposition, a postulate rather than a presence (MOU, 1968/1991, 133), I think he implies by the term “presence” a mystical subjective and psychological experience of freedom rather than any universal knowledge about freedom.
We can now understand how Mou could so confidently believe that “neo-Confucian metaphysics” has far surpassed Kant and probably nearly every known Western metaphysical theory.[11] His logic is that Kant, as well as most of Western metaphysicians, had assumed the same task of metaphysical studies as neo-Confucians did, but unfortunately, different from neo-Confucianism, Kant never really succeeded in achieving his goal. While Mou’s criticisms of Kant appear to be an effort to overcome the limits of traditional Western metaphysics, it is important to point out that Mou’s view of metaphysics seems to me to have been away from Western metaphysical tradition and his criticism of Kant thus seems unfair to Kant. In condemning Kant’s way of thinking characteristic of “analyzing step by step”, Mou was able to change metaphysical studies from a theoretical analysis into a daily moral practice, in perfect accordance with neo-Confucianism and its ideal of highly-personalized psychic feelings, emotions and experiences, rather than universal knowledge or intellectual discovery. In a word, I think his self-confidence in the development of his criticisms have been based upon his right understanding of neo-Confucianism but not necessarily of metaphysics in its Western senses.
Perhaps someone might defend Mou’s metaphysics by claiming that Mou has rightly pointed out some defects in Western metaphysics, such as the distinction between “Noumenon” and “phenomenon”, or that between “objective” and “subjective”, and so on. But My interest here is to know if his claim came out of his misunderstanding of Western metaphysics, or if he was aware that some assumptions in understanding the task of metaphysical studies taken for granted by him might not be shared by Western metaphysicians (such as Immanuel Kant whom Mou had spent a large amount energy to study). If Kant and the other Western metaphysicians do not share his basic assumptions as to the task, method and purpose of metaphysical studies, what could be the basis upon which Mou’s comparative study of Kant and neo-Confucians rests? Other scholars might also claim that any supposed limitation of traditional Western metaphysics does not necessarily suggest a neo-Confucian definition of metaphysics as an acceptable alternative (Thoraval, 1-37).
Conclusive Remarks
Today, “Chinese metaphysics” has become a popular usage, not only in referring to neo-Confucian theories but also, in large part, referring to traditional Chinese learning as a whole. It may seem implausible to criticize a philosopher who takes some parts of neo-Confucianism to be metaphysical theories, or even impossible for a scholar of Chinese studies to refuse to use the word “Chinese metaphysics” in discussing ancient Chinese thought. In fact, most of Western scholars of Chinese studies, when they use the phrases such as “Chinese metaphysics”, “Confucian/neo-Confucian metaphysics”, I don’t think thtat most of them do share with most of Chinese scholars discussed in this paper as to the definition or central task of metaphysics. Even so, scholars could argue that the way in which many modern Chinese scholars such as Zhang, Feng, Mou and Tang interpreted metaphysics from a Confucian or neo-Confucian point of view could have its significant implications and might involve a possible progress of metaphysical studies. To be sure, the purpose of this paper is neither to attack nor to justify in any sense this kind of evaluation. I just want to know how the Western term metaphysics has been accepted and (mis)understood by modern Chinese scholars both in literal sense and in historic sense, and to examine the fundamental assumptions which were widely taken for granted by those modern Chinese scholars who introduced metaphysics into traditional Chinese learning or conducted comparative studies of “Chinese metaphysics” and Western metaphysics. Suppose modern Chinese scholars of metaphysical studies did make a “progress” in metaphysical studies, I am more interested in knowing if “this progress” was made upon basis of misunderstandings or misconceptions of metaphysical concepts in their Western senses. It seems to me important that modern Chinese scholars be made aware that their basic assumptions have their roots in traditional Chinese learning and do not exactly coincide with Western metaphysical tradition.
As for the problem of the term xing er shang xue as a Chinese expression of metaphysics, it is not my point that the translation of Western term “metaphysics” as xing er shang xue in Chinese language is a big mistake or a bad translation. As already shown above, the reason that xing er shang xue as a translation could be quickly and widely accepted in modern China has much to do with something else. The disclosing of similarity or one-sided commonality between Western metaphysics and the traditional Chinese learning of Dao made many Chinese scholars not only feel happy to accept Yan Fu’s interpretation of metaphysics, but also to assume that an available way to modernize traditional Chinese learning has been discovered. The problem does not lie at if the translation of the term metaphysics is accurately right, but I want to emphasize is that, while it is absolutely impossible for modern Chinese to understand and interpret Western thought through a “Chinese prism” under influence of traditional Chinese learning especially at the beginning stage of introducing Western thoughts into China, we should nevertheless realize that in modern China the urgent need for the modernization of Chinese society calls for a simultaneous modernization of traditional Chinese learning.
By “modernization of traditional Chinese learning,” I mean that most Chinese intellectuals must now arrive at the point of correctly re-interpreting traditional Chinese learning in terms of Western concepts, categories, and disciplines. This practical purpose has thus far led many Chinese scholars to be in a too much of a hurry to introduce Western learning into China. And doing so has often prevented them from reaching the depths of Western philosophy before they too quickly “discover a connection” between Chinese and Western learning. Unfortunately, these influences and some misconceptions about Western metaphysics have so far not been clearly recognized, even today, by very many scholars of Chinese studies. And this not only explains partly why Yan Fu’s interpretation of the term “metaphysics” as xing-(er)-shang-xue in terms of the distinction between xing-er-shang and xing-er-xia was so widely accepted in a such a short time, but also why such a multitude of views of the meaning of metaphysics, and its purpose and significance in a Chinese mode, have dominated Chinese academic circles for such a long time.
In the intellectual history of modern China, the above two factors (one is without being able to escape from a “Chinese prism” and another is the need to modernize traditional Chinese learning) have strengthened with each other. The formation of the above three assumptions as to the meaning, purpose and task of metaphysics could also be seen as a result of interact of these double factors. Consequently a new type of conception of metaphysics with Chinese characteristics has been formulated in modern Chinese academic circle, which provides modern Chinese intellectuals the best reason to believe that a substantial amount of traditional Chinese learning, particularly the central part which relates to Dao, could be categorized along with the central part of Western philosophical theories, that is, with metaphysics. Interestingly, it is on basis of discussing of a series of Western metaphysicians such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and so on that this new type of conception of metaphysics arises in modern China. Another important consequent is that, since most of modern Chinese scholars believe that both many ancient Chinese scholars and most of Western metaphysicians were engaging in the same kind of studies, it was natural for them to understand the central task of metaphysics from the perspective of neo-Confucianism, and even to go further in evaluating various Western metaphysical theories from neo-Confucian point of view.
Bibliography
Caygill, Howard，1995. A Kant Dictionary. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Chan, Wing-Tsit, ed. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
CHEN, Qiwei陈启伟. 2001.“ A source study of the translation of the term ‘philosophy’哲学译名考”.In Philosophical Translations《哲学译丛》. 2001.3:60-68.
Edwards, Paul. ed. 1967. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, volume five, New York: Macmillan Publishing Con., Inc. & the Free Press.
FAN, Binqing樊炳清, ed. 1926. A Philosophical Dictionary《哲学辞典》. Shanghai 上海: The Commercial Press商务印书馆.
FENG, Youlan（Yu-lan Fung）冯友兰. 1948. The New Words of Wisdom《新知言》. Shanghai上海: The Commercial Press 商务印书馆.
______.1996. A New Essay on the Original Man《新原人》. In Mingguo Book Collections 5:14《民国丛书》（第五编, 14）. A photocopy version. Shanghai上海: Shanghai shu dian上海书店.
Fung, Yu-lan (Yu-lan Fung)冯友兰. 1997. A New Treatise on the Methodology of Metaphysics, trans. Chester C. I. Wang, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Flew, Antony (editorial consultant). 1979. A Dictionary of Philosophy, Aylesbury: Laurence Urdang Associates Ltd.
GUO, Mengliang郭梦良. ed. 1923. The Argument about the Outlook on Life《人生观之论战》. Shanghai上海: Taidong Book Company泰东图书公司
Huang, Chichung. 1997. The Analects of Confucius (Lun Yu) , a literal translation with an introduction and notes. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
HUANG, Kejian黄克剑. 1998. “An Introduction of Value-Metaphysics.” In Lun Heng (1)《论衡》（第1辑）. Fuzhou福州: Fujian Educational Press福建教育出版社.
HUANG, Nansong 黄楠森 & YANG Shoukan 杨寿堪. ed. 1993. A New Version of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy《新编哲学大辞典》. Taiyuan太原: Sanxi Educational Press山西教育出版社.
Kant, Immanuel. 1981. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hacktt Publishing Company.
LI, Minghui 李明辉. 1990. Confucianism and Kant《儒家与康德》. Taibei台北: Liangjing Publishing Company联经出版公司.
MOU, Zongsan牟宗三.1968/1991. The Substance of Heart-Mind and the Substance of Human Nature《心体与性体》. vol.1. Taibei台北: Zhengzhong Books Press正中书局.
______. 1980. The Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy《智的直觉与中国文化》. Taibei台北: Taiwan Commercial Press台湾商务印书馆.
______. 1992. A Reconstruction of Moral Idealism: A Collection of Mou’s New-Confucian Essays《道德理想主义的重建 : 牟宗三新儒学论著辑要》. Beijing北京: China Broadcasting and Television Press中国广播电视出版社.
Over, Raymond Van. ed. 1971: I Ching, based on the translation by James Legge, New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library Inc.
Parkinson, G.H.R. ed. 1988. An Encyclopeadia of Philosophy, London: Routledge.
TANG, Junyi 唐君毅. 1986. Human Existence and the Spiritual Condition of Heart-Mind 《生命存在与心灵境界》. In The Complete Works of Tang Junyi, vol. 23《唐君毅全集》(卷二十三). Taibei 台北: Taiwan Students Press 台湾学生书局.
______. 1978. Collected Papers on Comparative Studies between Chinese and Western Philosophical Thoughts《中西哲学思想之比较研究集》. Taibei 台北: Zongqing Publishing Company宗青图书出版公司.
______. 1989a. A General Essay on Philosophy (1) 《哲学概论(上)》. In The Complete Works of Tang Junyi, vol. 21《唐君毅全集》(卷二十一). Taibei 台北: Taiwan Students Press 台湾学生书局.
______.1989b. A General Essay on Philosophy (2) 《哲学概论(下)》. In The Complete Works of Tang Junyi, vol. 22《唐君毅全集》(卷二十二). Taibei 台北: Taiwan Students Press 台湾学生书局.
Thoraval, Jo?l. 2003. “Confucian Experience and philosophical Discourse, reflections on some aporiae in contemporary Neo-Confucianism.” In A Journal of China scholarship《中国学术》. Edited by LIU Dong刘东.Vol. 14. Beijing北京: The Commercial Press商务印书馆.
WANG, Bogong王伯恭, ed. 1999. The Great Chinese Encyclopedia 《中国大百科全书》. 8 vols. Beijing北京: The Great Chinese Encyclopedia Press 中国大百科全书出版社.
YAN, Fu严复. 1986. A Collection of Yan Fu《严复集》.5 vols. Edited by Wang Shi王栻. Beijing 北京: Zhonghua Shuju 中华书局.
____. trans. 1981. John Stuart Mill”s System of Logic《穆勒名学》. Beijing 北京: The Commercial Press 商务印书馆.
ZHANG, Jun-mai 张君劢. 1981. A Collection of Essays on Chinese, Indian and Western Philosophy《中西印哲学文集》. 2 vols. Edited by CHEN Wen-xi 程文熙. Taibei台北: Taiwan Students Press台湾学生书局.
______.1989. “The academic foundation for a revival of Chinese nation 民族复兴之学术基础.” In A Selected Writings of Modern Chinese Philosophical Texts 《现代中国哲学原著选》. Edited by XIN Jianfei 忻剑飞. Shanghai上海: Fudan University Press 复旦大学出版社.
______.1996. “My philosophical thoughts 我的哲学思想.” In The Classical Modern Chinese Academic Writings: Zhang Juanmai 《中国现代学术经典·张君劢卷》. Edited by HUANG Kejian 黄克剑& WANG Tao 王涛. Shijiazhuang 石家庄: Hebei Educational Press 河北教育出版社.
ZHANG, Shiying张世英. 1999. Toward an Enlightenment Spiritual Condition: A New Direction of Philosophy《进入澄明之境：哲学的新方向》.Beijing北京: The Commercial Press商务印书馆.
ZHANG, Tongxiao张腾霄, etc. eds. 1990. A New and Concise Version of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy《新编简明哲学百科辞典》. Beijing北京: Zhuoyue Press卓越出版社.
ZHANG, Xianglong张祥龙. Heidegger and the Dao of Heaven:An Opening of the Ultimate Horizons and their 《海德格尔与中国天道》. Beijing北京: Sanlian Book Store三联书店.
ZHONG, Limeng 锺离蒙 & YANG Fenling 杨凤麟. eds. 1981. A collection of the philosophical texts in modern China《中国现代哲学史资料汇编》, vol. 1, no.6-no.7, Shenyang沈阳: Department of Philosophy of Liaolin University 辽宁大学哲学系.
ZHU, Xi 朱熹 & LU Zhuqian吕祖谦. 1994. Jin Si Lu《近思录》. Comprehensive Interprations by JIANG Yong江永, Shanghai上海: Shanghai Guji Press上海古籍出版社.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] I am grateful to Dr. Jin Y. Park, assistant professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, American University for having done the heavy editing work and proposed important critical comments for this paper. My friend David R. Schiller had also spent quite time in reading this paper, giving me certain important suggestions, polishing my English expressions and correcting some grammatical mistakes inside. His suggestion as to using “excellence in the art of practical daily living” rather than “the meaning of life” to translate some Chinese expressions related to the phrase ren sheng de yi yi人生的意义 in English is quite interesting and accepted by me.
[2] I actually couldn’t have been able to figure out the exact time and writing where Yan Fu took use of such Chinese phrases as “xing er shang xue形而上学” or “xing shang xue形上学” in his various translations of Western works. In so far as what I searched extensively, the terms he used in his translations as Chinese expressions of the term “metaphysics” involves shenglizhixue神理之学, lixue理学，meitaifeiji美台斐辑 but without xing er shang xue. The real reason that he is widely seen as the first Chinese who coined the word “xing er shang xue” may be dated back to his translation of John Stuart Mill”s System of Logic. This issue may deserve a further research.
[3] This translation is made by myself on basis of James Legge. See Over, 397.
[4] Wing-Tsit Chan translated the same sentence as follows: “What exists before physical form [and is therefore without it] is called the Way. What exists after physical form [and is therefore with it ] is called a concrete thing.” See Chan, 267.
[5] A study of both the literal and historic meaning of the Chinese concept “xuan xue” as a Chinese translation of the term “metaphysics” in relation to Zhou Yi is also very interesting. This is because traditionally xuan xue is a specific term of the learning of the dominant school in the Wei-Jin period and some leading figures of this school did have paid its central attention to studying Zhou Yi. But as the character “xuan” (玄) had often been used to refer to something mysterious in a negative sense, many Chinese scholars with a positive attitude toward metaphysics inclined to give up “xuan xue” as a formal translation of the term “metaphysics”. As to the usage of the three Chinese phrases in modern China, Cf. GUO; ZHONG &YANG.
[6] For Tang”s metaphysical views, see: TANG, 1989a, 95-129 (the meaning of metaphysics, of xing er shang xue, comparative study of Confucian-European metaphysics); TANG, 1989b, 359-380 (Confucian and neo-Confucian metaphysics).TANG, 1978, 123-146 (on the concept of ben-ti/substance in Chinese and European philosophy); 227-249 (a comparative study between Daoist metaphysics and Hegel”s metaphysics),295-346 (Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi, Zhou Yi and Zhong Yong”s metaphysics).
[7] As for Feng”s connecting philosophical or metaphysical studies to the practical living (the meaning of life), also see FENG, 1996, 1, 8, 30-31.
[8] Mou”s discussion of ti, ben-ti, xing-ti and in relation to Kant and other Western metaphysians, see MOU, 1968/1991, 75-87,170-171,458-475,492-502,etc. Also see MOU, 1992, 352-375, 417,etc..
[9] As to the meaning of Western metaphysics and its changes through history since Kant, cf. Flew, 230; For a systematic summary, cf. Edwards, 289.
[10] For Tang”s discussion of ti ,ben-ti and shi-ti, see: TANG, 1989a, 97; also see TANG, 1978, 123-146.
[11] Mou takes Kant as one of the best models of Western metaphysicians. Cf. MOU, 1968/1991, 120.
