原书编者按：1979年10月10日和16日，福柯应邀至斯坦福大学Tanner人类价值讲座发表演讲。“Omnes et Singulatim：Towards a Criticism of Political Reason”（整全与单一：对政治理性的批判）全文发表了这两篇演讲。福柯在这次演讲里考察了理性化和权力的过分使用之间的关系。他提出了一种从“个体化权力”的观念、一种他称为牧领（pastorship）的现象发散出来的关系的转变。在他对这种模态的权力的分析中，福柯展示了牧领权如何对古希腊的社会结构形成了挑战，最后又如何与现代意义上的国家结合到了一起。福柯论证了，早期基督教进一步贯彻了牧领势力的概念，这种牧领势力以“游戏”的方式发挥作用，这种游戏与个体的控制有关，被经验/知识/权力这一三角付诸实施。在现代欧洲的早期，国家理由指的是一种治理的艺术，它预设了一种特定的知识，反映着国家本身的性质。为使国家巩固、实施这种权力，治安科学（Polizeiwissenschaft）作为个体化和总体化制度的角色必须得到加强。不过，如果说福柯在这里批判了政治理性，除了对政治理性根源激进的置疑外，他没有给出任何替代性的方案。他预先排除了其他制度代替这种政治理性的可能性。

本演讲最初用英文发表在The Tanner Lectures on Human Values，Sterling M. McMurrin 编，第二卷（Raymond Aron，Brian Barry，Jonathan Bennett，Robert Coles，George T. Stigler, Wallace Stegner and Michel Foucault），Salt Lake City：University of Utah Press and Cambrige：Cambrige University Press，1981。法文版于1986年秋面世，载Le Débat。

一

我知道，“政治与理性”这样的题目听上去有点自命不凡。但是，它自命不凡的原因正是它自命不凡的籍口。十九世纪以来，西方思想一直不遗余力地批判政治结构中理性的作用或理性的匮乏。因此，我再一次捡起这个庞大的话题就显得极不恰当。然而，这么多先前的尝试也是一个保证，它保证任何新的冒险比先前的也差不到哪儿去，而且不管怎样大约也和以前的一样幸运。

在这样一个旗号下，我的困窘之处在于我只能提供一个梗概和不能完成的草图。哲学很早以前就不再致力于弥补科学理性的无能，哲学也不想再完成它的宏伟大厦了。

启蒙的任务之一是大大扩展理性本身的政治权力。但是十九世纪的人们很快就开始疑惑，在我们的社会中理性是不是已变得过于强大。他们开始担心，在一个倾向理性化的社会和针对个人及其自由权利、种族及其延续的某些威胁之间，存在一种关系，他们搞不清是不是存在这种关系。

换句话说，自康德以降，哲学的作用就是防止理性越出经验给定物的界限；但也是从这个时候起--即从现代国家、从对社会的政治管理发展之日起--哲学的任务也同时是对政治理性的过度权力保持警觉，这样一种未来的生活更能给人以希望。

这种平凡的事实大家都很清楚。但是平凡并不意味着这些事实不存在。对平凡的事实，我们要发现--或者竭力去发现--什么特别的、或者原初的问题跟这些事实联系在一起。

理性化和政治权力的过度之间的关系显而易见。我们无需等到出现了科层制和集中营才认识到存在这种关系。但问题是：如何来处理这样一个显而易见的事实？

我们要“审判”理性吗？在我看来，没有什么比这么干更劳而无功的了。第一，这一领域和有罪或无罪无关。第二，把“理性”当作无理性（non-reason）的对立面毫无意义。第三，这样一种审判会使我们掉进一个陷阱：扮演理性主义者或非理性主义者（irrationalist）武断且乏味的角色。

我们要考察这种现代文化所特有的、源自启蒙的理性主义吗？我想这正是法兰克福学派的某些成员的做法。我不想讨论他们的着作--这些作品非常重要，也很有价值。我建议采取另外一种方式，考察理性化和权力之间的联系。

1．明智的方式或许不是把社会或文化的理性化当作一个整体，而是分析理性化在几个领域的过程，每个过程都基于某种基本经验：癫狂、疾病、死亡、犯罪、性，等等。

2．我认为“理性化”是一个危险的说法。人们在试图对什么事情进行理性化的时候，碰到的主要困难不是考察它们符不符合理性原则，而是去揭示它们运用的是哪种理性。

3．尽管启蒙在我们的历史以及政治技术的发展过程中是一个非常重要的阶段，但是如果我们想理解我们如何陷入自己的历史，我们必须溯及一些更为遥远的过程。

这就是我先前的作品中的“脉络”：分析诸如癫狂、死亡、犯罪、性这样的经验和几种权力技术之间的关系。我目前研究的是个体性问题或者本身就等于 “个体化权力”的问题。

大家知道，在欧洲社会，政治权力趋向于越来越集中的形式。数十年来，历史学家一直在研究国家及其行政管理和科层体制的组织方式。

在这两次讲演中，我将提出，我们还可以分析这些权力关系中的另一种转变方式。这种转变可能并不引人注目，但是我认为它同样重要--主要对现代社会而言。表面上看来，这种演进过程跟朝向集权国家的演进相反。我要说的是这些权力技术的发展，这些权力技术以个体为目标，目的在于以一种连续的、持久的方式对个体进行统治。如果说国家是一种集权的政治形式，也是一种集中权力的政治形式，我们则把“牧领”（pastorship）称为个体化权力。

今天晚上，我的目的就是勾勒出这种”牧领”权形态的起源，或至少是其古老历史的某些方面。在下一讲中，我将说明，这种牧领权是如何与它的对立面--国家碰巧结合在一起的。

神、国王、领袖是身后跟着一群羊的牧人，希腊人和罗马人对这个观念并不熟悉。我知道，这也有若干例外，早期在荷马时代的文学作品中，晚期在东罗马帝国的某些文本中，等会儿我还要讲到这些。不过，粗略说来，古希腊和古罗马的政治典籍中并没有出现羊群这样的隐喻。

古代东方，比如埃及、亚述和犹太社会却不是这样。法老就是埃及人的牧人。而且在他加冕之日的仪式上，他也的确被授予牧人的权杖；“民之牧”也曾经是一个巴比伦君主的封号。但与此同时，上帝也是位牧人，引导人们到草地、确保他们有的吃。一首埃及的赞美诗这样祈求太阳神的保佑：“啊，神，在众人沉睡的时候，你还在照看着他们，为你的畜群某好处……”上帝和国王之间的联系很容易建立，因为他们承担着相同的使命：他们照看的是同一群牲畜；伟大神圣的牧人的造物被托付给牧人-国王。一首亚述的祈祷词……

然而，我们知道，是希伯莱人发展并强化了”牧领”的主题，使之具备了一种高度的特殊性：上帝，只有上帝，才是人民的牧人。只有一个肯定的例外：王国的创立者大卫，只有他一个人被当作牧人看待。上帝赋予他召集羊群的任务。

也有反面的例外，邪恶的国王一直被比作坏牧人；他们驱散羊群，任它们饥渴而死，剪它们的毛只为牟利。耶和华是唯一的、真正的牧人。他亲自引领自己的人民，他的先知们只是帮助他们。正如《诗篇》所言：“你曾藉摩西和亚伦的手引导你的百姓，好像羊群一般”。当然，与这种比拟的起源有关的历史问题，还有这种比拟在犹太思想史上的发展，都非我力所能及。我只求说明一些牧领权力的典型主题。我将指出这些主题与希腊政治思想的差异，并表明这些主题后来在基督教思想及制度中将变得多么重要。

1．牧人行使权力，针对的是一群羊，而不是一块土地。或许实际情况比这个更复杂，但是，大致说来，这种神、土地、人之间的关系和希腊的并不相同。希腊的神拥有土地，这种首要的占有决定着人与诸神之间的关系。而在希伯莱这儿，牧人-上帝（Shepherd-God）与其羊群的关系才是首要的和基本的。土地是上帝给与或者应许给他的羊群的。

2．牧人集合、带领、引导着羊群。无疑，在希腊思想中存在政治领袖要平息城邦中的任何敌对行为、使和谐战胜冲突这种想法。但是，牧人的作用却是把原本散失的个人集中到一起。它们一听到牧人的声音就聚在一起：“我要吹口哨，把它们聚集在一起。”反之，只要羊群解散，牧人就消失。换句话说，牧人的当场现身和直接行动使得羊群得以存在。希腊贤明的立法者，比如梭伦为了控制冲突，制定了法律，他留下了一个强大的城邦，法律使城邦无需他的存在而长存。

3．牧人的作用是保证羊群的得救。希腊人也说神拯救城邦；他们一直宣称，称职的领袖是防止船触礁的舵手。但是牧人拯救羊群的方式与此迥然不同。这种拯救不光体现在危险袭来之时，它还是一种无时无刻的、个体化的、终极的仁慈。首先，无时无刻的仁慈，对于牧人来说就是确保他的羊群有的吃，留意它们每天的饥渴。而对希腊的神，人们只要求他提供一方沃土和五谷丰登。人们不要求他天天养育。其次，个体化的仁慈，对于牧人来说，就是要注意，所有的羊，每一只羊，都吃饱了，都得救了。尤其后来的希伯莱典籍重视这样一种个体化的仁慈权力，一则《出埃及记》的犹太教注释这样解释为什么耶和华选择摩西当人民的牧人：因为摩西曾经离开羊群，自己去寻找一只走失的羊。

最后但并非最不重要的，是一种终极性的仁慈。牧人对他的羊群有一个目标。要么带领它们去水草丰美之地，要么把它们带回羊栏。

4．另外一个不同之处就是这样一种观念：运用权力是一种“义务”。希腊的领袖，做决定必须为为所有人的利益服务，这是很自然的，如果他优先考虑个人利益，便不是好领袖。但是他的义务是一种荣耀的义务：即使在战争中领袖不得不献出自己的生命，这种牺牲也从某种极为珍贵的东西中得到了补偿：不朽。他永不湮没。相形之下，牧人的仁慈更接近于“投身”（devotedness）。牧人做的每一件事都是为了他的羊群好。他时刻关心着羊群，它们睡着的时候，他仍然照看着它们。

照看的主题非常重要。这个主题引出牧人投身的两个方面。第一，对所养育的、沉入梦乡的羊群，他忙忙碌碌，尽心尽力，不辞辛劳；第二，他照看它们。他关怀它们全体，仔细观察它们每一个。对羊群整体了如指掌。他不但要知道哪儿有丰美的草场，知道季节的变化，事物的秩序，还要对每一只羊的特殊需要了然于胸。一则《出埃及记》的犹太教注释这样描述摩西作为一个牧人的品质：他按照这样的次序放牧每一只羊：羊羔吃最嫩的草，然后是大一点的羊，最后是老羊，最粗砺的草老羊也咽得下去。牧人的权力意味着对羊群中的每一只给予个别的注意。

希伯莱文本谈到牧人-上帝及其羊群-人民（flock-people）的隐喻就会涉及这样的主题。我并没有说，耶路撒冷陷落之前，希伯莱社会中的政治权力就是这样运作的。我甚至不认为这样一种政治权力的观念是一以贯之的。

就是一些主题，一些吊诡的、甚至互相矛盾的主题。在中世纪和现代，基督教都相当重视这些主题。在历史上所有的社会当中，我们的社会（我指的是古代结束之后在欧洲大陆西部形成的社会），是最好斗、最侵略成性的，能够实施最骇人的暴力，无论是针对别人还是针对自己。这些社会还发明了许许多多各不相同的政治形式，数次深刻改变自己的法律结构。须知，就是这些社会演化出一种奇怪的权力技术，这种技术把大多数人视为羊群，把少数人视为牧人，并据此在羊群和牧人之间建立一整套复杂的、连续的、吊诡的关系。

在历史进程中这无疑是独一无二的。同样毋庸置疑的是，在对人的治理中“牧领技术”的发展，根本上改变了古代社会的结构。

* * *

为了更好地解释这种改变的重要意义，我要回过头来谈一下刚才谈到的希腊人所说的东西。我知道，人们很容易就能提出一堆反对意见。

一个反对意见是，荷马史诗用牧人来比喻国王。在《伊利亚德》和《奥德赛》中，πσιμην λαων（poimênla?）这个说法出现了好几次。它修饰领袖，突出其权力的伟大庄严。不仅如此，它还是一种通用的头衔，甚至到晚近的印欧语系文学中都很常见。在《贝奥武甫》中，国王依然被看作一个牧人。同样的头衔也可以在古代的史诗中发现，和在亚述文本一样，这根本用不着奇怪。

希腊思想提出了同样的问题。至少有一类文本提到了牧人模式，那就是毕达哥拉斯学派的文本。牧人的隐喻出现在阿基塔斯的《残篇》中，为Stobeus所引用。νομοζ（normos法律）一词和νομευζ（nomeus牧人）一词联系起来：牧人主管公平分配，法律也是。所以宙斯被称为Νομιοζ（Nonios）和Νεμειοζ（Némeios），因为他给他的羊分发食物。最后，执政官必须要φιλαυθωποζ（philanthr?pos），即“无私”，必须满腔热忱，像一个牧人。

阿基塔斯《残篇》的德文编辑Grube说这证明了希伯莱对希腊文学的独特影响。其它评注者，比如Delatte，则说上帝、执政官和牧人之间的比拟在希腊屡见不鲜，无需细论。

我将仅限于考察政治文献。结果很清楚，牧人的政治隐喻既不见于伊索克拉底*、狄摩西尼**，也不见于亚里士多德。这一点不免令人吃惊，在《Areopagiticus》中，伊索克拉底强调执政官的责任，强调他们要全心全意，关心青年人，但没有一个字谈到牧人。

与此形成鲜明对照的是，柏拉图经常谈到牧人-执政官，在《克里底亚》、《理想国》、《法律篇》提到了这个观点，在《政治家篇》中则进行了详细讨论。在前三篇对话中，牧人的主体非常次要。有时，柏拉图诉诸那些幸福的日子，那时候人类直接受上帝的统治，在肥美的牧场上进食（《克里底亚》），有时又坚持执政官必须具备一定的德行--与特拉西马克的恶行相对（《理想国》）。有时，问题又变成界定下级执政官的角色：他们就像牧羊犬一样，必须服从“上级”的命令（《法律篇》）。

然而，在《政治家篇》中，牧领权力成为核心问题，并进行了充分讨论。城邦的决策者，领导人，是否可以被界定为一种牧羊人呢？

柏拉图的分析众所周知。他用二分的方法解决这个问题。他划分了对无生命的东西发号施令的人（如建筑师）和对有生命的东西发号施令的人，对单个的动物（如一对共轭公牛）发号施令的人和对一群动物发号施令的人，对畜群发号施令的人和对人群发号施令的人。他认为政治领袖是这样一种人：人群的牧人。

但这种初步的划分并不令人满意，尚需向前推进。把人与所有其它动物对立并不是好办法。对话又全部重新开始。一系列的区分建立起来：野生的动物和家养的动物；水生的和陆生的；有角的和没角的；蹄子分瓣的和不分瓣的；能杂交的和不能杂交的。分类永无尽头，对话离题万里。

那么，对话的最初发展和随后的失败说明了什么呢？二分法运用不妥，就毫无结果。除此之外也表明，按照牧人和畜群之间的关系分析政治权力的思想，可能在当时还是蛮有争议的。其实，在《政治家篇》中发掘政治家本质的时候，首先掠过对话者脑海的就是这个假定。是否当时这是一个老生常谈？或者柏拉图讨论的是一个毕达哥拉斯派的主题？从同时代的其他政治文本中缺乏牧人隐喻看来，第二个假说更可能是真的。当然，我们可以先不作结论。

我个人的研究涉及的是柏拉图在对话的其余部分抨击这个主题的方式。他首先从方法的角度论辩，然后又使用了那个世界围绕着自己的轴自转的着名神话。。

方法论论辩极为有趣。辨认国王是否某一种牧人不是通过确定哪些不同的种可以构成一个羊群，而是通过分析牧人都做些什么。

牧人的任务有什么特色呢？第一，牧人独自带领着羊群。第二，牧人的任务是给他的畜群提供食物；在它们患病的时候照顾它们；用乐声把他们召集起来，指引它们；安排它们交配以繁衍最优良后代。这样，我们就可以发现东方文本中常用的牧领隐喻主题。

那么，国王的任务又是些什么？和牧人一样，他也是城邦的唯一的头。但是，其余那些给人类提供食物的又是谁呢？国王？非也，给人类提供食物的是农夫和面包师。人们患病的时候照顾的又是什么人呢？国王？非也，照顾病人的是医生。用乐声指引人们的又是谁呢？是体育运动员（gymnast）而不是国王。如果是这样的话，很多公民（citizen）都有理由宣称他们是“民之牧”。正如人群的牧人有许多竞争对手，政治家也有很多人和他竞争民之牧。这样一来，如果我们想发现政治家的真正面目和本质是什么，我们必须将之从“包围的洪水”中筛选出来，从而显现出在什么情况下他不是牧人。

鉴于此，柏拉图诉诸关于世界的神话，这个世界有两种相继的旋转方式，方向正好相反。

在头一阶段，每一动物种群都属于一个守护神-牧人领导的畜群。人群由神亲自领导。大地物产丰富，取之不尽；人群随意定居；死后又会复生。至关重要的是：“神是人的牧人，人类不需要政制。”

在下一个阶段，世界转向相反的方向。神不再是人的牧人；人不得不自己照看自己。因为人类已得到了火。那么政治家的作用是什么？他是否代替神成为人的牧人？根本没有。他的工作是为城邦编织一个牢固的织物。作为政治家并不意味着喂养、照顾和抚养后代，而意味着编织：用大众意见的“梭”把不同的德性编织起来；把相反的性情（不论是鲁莽的还是节制的）编织起来。一流的统治艺术在于把人聚集成“一个以和谐和友谊为基础的共同体”，这样他就能“织出最好的织物”。所有人，“奴隶和自由人一样，都织了进来。”

这样看来，古典时代对后来在基督教西方变得如此重要的牧领主题最系统的思考似乎是《政治家篇》。我们的讨论似乎证明这一也许最初源自东方的主题在柏拉图时代就已经非常重要，就值得研究，但我们不要忘了，这个主题当时受到了责难。

不过，也不全然是责难。柏拉图确实承认医生、农夫、体育运动员、教师像牧人一样行事。但是他不承认他们的行动是政治家的活动。他说得非常明确：政治家怎样会有时间来坐在每一个人身边，喂养他、给他音乐，在生病时照顾他？只有黄金时代的神才会那么做；或是像医生或教师一样，为一些个人的生命和成长负责。但是，处于神与百姓这两者之间、掌握政治权力的人不再是牧人。这些人的任务不包括养育一群个人的生命。他们的任务是构建和确保城邦成为一体。简言之，政治问题是，在城邦和其公民的框架中，一和多的关系问题。“牧领”的问题涉及的是个人的生活问题。

也许，所有这些似乎都非常遥远。我之所以坚持考察这些古老的文本，是因为它们向我们展示了这个问题，或最好说这一系列问题，出现的多早啊。这些问题在西方的历史上一直存在。它们对当代社会依然非常重要。它们涉及的是政治权力和我们称之为”牧领”的权力之间的关系，前一种权力在国家这个统一的法律框架中运作，后一种权力的职责是不断地保证、维持和提高每一个人和所有人的生活。

众所周知的“福利国家问题”不仅暴露出当今世界的需要或当今世界的新治理技术，我们还必须认清福利国家是用来解决什么问题的：支配法律主体的政治权力和支配活着的个人的牧领权力之间曾多次出现需要微妙的调整，这一调整现在又出现了。

我无意叙述牧领权力在整个基督教中的发展。很容易想象这其中会有许多问题：从教义问题，比如基督之被称作“好牧人”，直到那些制度上的问题，比如教区组织，或是牧师和主教分担牧领责任的方式。

我所想做的，是阐释我认为对牧领的发展来说很重要的两三个方面，例如权力技术问题。

首先，让我们对这一主题在古代基督教着作中的理论阐述进行考察：Chrysostom、Cyprian、Ambrose、Jerome，以及过着修士生活的卡西安或是本尼迪克特。希伯莱的主题至少在四个方面发生了变化：

1、首先，关于责任。我们看到，牧人被认为对整个羊群和每头羊的命运都负有责任。在基督教的观念中，不仅是每一头羊，而且还包括所有羊的行为，它们易犯的善恶，所有降临在它们身上的事情，牧人都要给出交待。

不仅如此，基督教还认为在每一头羊和它的牧人之间，存在着罪恶和德性的复杂交换和循环。羊的罪恶也归咎于牧人，在最后审判来临的时候要交待。反过来，通过帮助他的羊群得到拯救，牧人自己也会得到拯救。但是要拯救自己的羊群，他就把自身置于易于迷途的境地；因此，如果他想拯救自己，就必须冒为他人而迷途的危险。如果他确实迷路了，遇到最大危险的将是羊群。不过，让我们把这些悖论搁置一边。我的目的只是强调把牧人和羊群的每个成员绑在一起的道德纽带的威力和复杂性之处。我尤其想强调，这样的纽带不仅涉及到个人的生活，而且涉及到他们行动的细节。

2、第二个重要的变化涉及到服从的问题。在希伯莱的观念中，神是一个牧人，跟从他的羊群遵守他的意志、他的律法。

而基督教认为牧人和羊的关系是一种个人的和完全依赖的关系。这无疑是基督教的“牧领”与希腊思想的根本分歧之一。如果一个希腊人不得不服从，那是由于他服从的是法律，或是城邦的意志。如果他碰巧顺从了某个人（医生、演说家、教师）特别的意志，那是这个人理性地说服了他这么去做。而且这一定是为了一个严格确定的目标：被治愈，或学会一项技艺，或做出最佳的选择。

在基督教中，与牧人的纽带是一种个人性的纽带，是一种人身服从。顺从牧人的意志，不是因为它与律法一致，不是因为这意志只与律法一致，而主要是因为，这是牧人的意志。在卡西安的《修道要旨》中，有许多启迪性的奇闻轶事，在这些故事中，修士由于执行了其上级荒谬绝伦的命令而得到了拯救。顺从是一种美德。这就意味着，顺从不像对希腊人那样，它不是达到目的的一种暂时的手段，它本身就是目的。它是一种永久的状态；羊必须永远顺从于牧人：subditi。如同圣本尼迪克特所说，修士们不根据自己的自由意志生活，他们的愿望处在修道院长的指令之下：ambulantes alieno judicio et imperio。希腊基督教称这种顺从的状态为аπαθεια（apathia）。这个词含义的演变意味深长。在希腊哲学中，аπαθεια表示个人借助理性而对激情施加的控制。在基督教思想中，παθοζ（pathos）是为了自己而对自己施加的意志力。Απαθεια使我们得以从这种任性中解脱出来。

3、基督教的”牧领”（pastorship）暗示着牧师和他的每只羊之间存在一种特殊的知识。

这种知识是有针对性的。它针对个体。仅了解整个羊群的情况是不够的。还必须了解每只羊的情况。在基督教的”牧领”出现之前，这一主题已存在很长时间，但是它现在以三种不同的方式强化了：羊群每个成员的物质需要都必须告知牧人，牧人必须在必要的时候为成员提供物质需要。他必须知道正在发生的情形，每一个成员都在做什么——即这个成员的“公开的罪”。最后但并非最不重要的，他必须知道每个成员的灵魂中都发生着什么，也就是这个成员的“秘密的罪”，它在成圣的道路上的进步。

为了确保这一个体（individual）知识，基督教挪用了希腊化世界实行的两个重要手段：自我审察（self-examination）和良心的指引。基督教把它们拿了过来，但做了相当大的变动。

众所周知，自我审察在毕达哥拉斯学派、斯多亚学派和伊壁鸠鲁学派中广为流传，这种自我审察是对善恶进行每日清点的手段，善恶都是相对于个人的义务而言的。这样，就能对一个人在走向完善的道路上的进展进行衡量：比如自我控制和对激情的主宰。良心的指引在某些有修养的圈子里也很盛行，但是忠告的提出只是在一个人特别艰难的环境下，比如哀悼期，或是一个人正在遭受挫折的煎熬时（有时候是要付钱的）。

基督教的”牧领”紧密结合了这两种实践。一方面，良心的指引形成持续的约束：羊不仅仅要在为了胜利地穿越艰难关口的时候被引导，它在每一秒都要被引导。被引导是一种状态，如果你试图逃避，那就不幸迷途了。人们经常被引用的一句话是：无人指引，他倍受煎熬，宛如枯叶飘零。至于自我审察，它的目的不是让人陷入自我意识之中，而是使自我意识向指引者完全敞开——向他显露灵魂的深处。

公元一世纪，许多禁欲苦行苦修（ascetic and monastic）文本涉及到指引和自我审察之间的联系，这些文本显示出这些技术对基督教有多么重要，而且已经变得有多么复杂。我想强调的是，它们描述了希腊―罗马文明中一种非常奇怪的现象的出现，那就是，完全的顺从、对自我的认识和向他人的忏悔之间的联系建立起来了。

4、还有另外一种变化――也许是最重要的变化。审察、忏悔、指引、顺从，所有这些基督教技术都有一个目的：让人此世在自己的“克己（mortification）”中生活。当然，克己不是死亡，但它是对这个世界和自我的弃绝（renunciation）：一种每天都经历的死亡，假定会在另一个世界得到生命的死亡。这不是我们第一次发现牧这一主题与死亡相连；但在这里，它不同于希腊的政治权力观念。它不是为城邦而牺牲；基督教的克己是一种从自我到自我的关系。它是基督教自我认同构成的一部分。

我们可以说，基督教的“牧领”引进了一个希腊人和希伯莱人都没有想到的游戏。一个奇怪的游戏，它的要素是生命、死亡、真理、顺从、个体、自我认同；这个游戏似乎与通过公民的牺牲来延续城邦的游戏毫无关系。自从我们的社会碰巧把两种游戏（城邦―公民游戏和牧人―羊群游戏）结合到我们所说的现代国家，我们的社会却是变成了一个恶魔般的社会。

大家可能已经注意到了，今天晚上我不是要解决问题，而是提出问题的一个途径。这个问题与我自第一本关于癫狂与精神病的书之后一直研究的那些问题相似。我先前已告诉你们，这个问题涉及的是经验（像疯癫、疾病、违法、性本性和自我认同）、知识（像精神病学、医学、犯罪学、性学、心理学）和权力（比如在精神病和刑事制度、以及所有其它与个人控制有关的制度中，所使用的权力）之间的关系。

我们的文明已经发展出最复杂的知识体系，最精微的权力结构：这种类型的知识、这种权力把我们造就成了什么样的人？即使我们没有觉察到，这些关于疯癫、痛苦、死亡、犯罪、欲望和个体性的基本经验在什么方式上与知识和权力联结了起来？我知道我找不到答案，但这并不意味着我们就不去问问题。

二

上次我讲了原始基督教如何塑造一种“牧领”权力，这种牧领权力通过展示个人自身的真理，不断对个人发挥作用。上次我还讲了，除了某些借用，比如对实践的自我审察和良心指引的借用之外，这一牧牧领权力和希腊思想是多么地格格不入。

这次我想跨越几个世纪，描述另一个时段，这一时段本身在这种通过借助有关个人的真理而对个人进行治理的历史上特别重要。

这段历史与现代词义上的国家的形成有关。我指出这样的历史联系，显然不是暗示牧领权力的这一方面在罗马天主教的基督教欧洲那一千年消失了，对我来说，与人们的预料相反，这一阶段并不是“牧领”成功的阶段。原因有好多，一些原因是纯经济的，对灵魂的牧领是一种城市才有的经验，很难与中世纪初期广泛贫穷的乡村经济相协调。另外一些原因则具有文化的性质：牧领”（pastorate）是一项复杂的技术，它要求一定的文化水平，不仅要求“牧人”具有，还要求其羊群也具有。其他的原因与社会政治结构有关。封建制度在个人之间发展了一套与”牧领”完全不同类型的个人纽带。

我并不是想说对人进行牧领式治理的观念在中世纪的教会完全消失了。事实上它还存在，你甚至可以说它还显示出强大的生命力。有两组事实都能证明这一点。首先，教会本身进行的改革，特别是修会的改革（在已存修道院中不断进行着形形色色的改革）的目标就是在修士之中重建严格“牧领”秩序的目标。至于那些新创立的修会（多明我会和方济各会）本来就打算在信众中间开展牧领工作。在接连不断的危机中，教会不停地试图恢复自己的牧领职司。但是不止于此。在老百姓中间，人们可以看到在整个中世纪里一系列漫长斗争的发展，这些斗争的目标都是牧领权。教会无法履行自己的义务，批评者拒绝接受教会的教阶制，寻求多少是自发的共同体形式，在这种共同体中羊群可以找到自己需要的牧人。人们以各种各样的方式追求表达牧领权力，有时是充满暴力的斗争，例如Vaudois，有时是和平的追寻，比如在Freres de la Vie共同体中。有时激发起广阔的运动，例如胡斯派，有时又酝酿像Amis de Dieu de l’Oberland这样有限的群体。有时，这些运动很接近异端，就像在贝格哈德修会男修士中一样，有时又激发起教会怀抱里的正统运动（就像15世纪意大利的奥拉托利会）。

我随便提到这些问题是为了强调，即使说“牧领”在中世纪还没有作为一种有效、实用的对人的治理而建立起来，它也是是接连不断的斗争中长期关注的对象和关键点。整个中世纪，人们都想在人与人之间安排牧领关系，这种向往同时影响了神秘主义思潮和人们对前年王国的巨大梦想。

* * *

当然，这里我并不打算论述国家如何形成的问题。我也不打算探究国家起源的不同经济、社会和政治过程，不想分析国家为了确保自己的延续而配备的不同制度和机制。我只想给出一些零散的事例，谈谈介于作为政治组织的国家和国家机制（也就是在国家权力的行使中运用的那种理性）之间的一些问题。

第一讲我曾经提到过。与其去探究有违常规的国家权力是源于过分的理性主义还是源于非理性主义这一点，还不如搞清楚国家生产的那种特殊政治理性到底是什么。

归根结底，至少在这个方面，政治实践类似于科学实践：实际上履行的不是什么“一般理性”（reason in general），而总是某种特殊的理性（rationality）。

引人瞩目的是，国家权力的理性具有反思性（reflective），它完全知道自己的特殊性。它没有囿于自发、盲目的实践。单靠某种回溯性的分析并不能解释国家理性。在国家理性和治安理论这两套学说中它得到了详尽的阐述。我知道，这两个词组不久就带上了偏狭和贬损的含意。但是在现代国家形成的那一百五十年到二百年中，它们的含意要比现在宽泛。

国家理性的学说试图说明，国家治理的准则和方法如何不同于上帝治理世界、家父治理家庭、修道院长治理教团的准则和方法。治安学说界定了国家理性活动之目标的性质；这种学说从国家所采用的手段的一般形式来定义这个目标的性质。因此，我今天更想说的是理性的系统。但是首先还要说明两件事：（1）鉴于梅涅克出版过论国家理性的一本极重要的着作，我将主要讲述治安理论。（2）德国和意大利建国时经受的困难最大，因此它们论述国家理性和治安制度的着作最多。我将不时引用意大利文和德语文献。

* * *

我们从国家理性开始。这里有一些定义：

BOTERO：“关于国家形成、强大、维续、生长所运用的手段的完美知识，。”*

PALAZZO：（《论国家的治理和真正理性》, 1606）：“能使我们发现如何在共和国内部建立和平和秩序的方法的规则或艺术。”

CHEMNITZ：（《国家理性》, 1647）:“所有公共事务、会议和计划都需要进行的政治考虑，其唯一目的是国家的维续、扩张和福祉；为达此目的，会采用最容易、最迅捷的手段。”

这些定义中有些共同的特点：

1、国家理性被视为一种“技艺”，也就是，是符合特定规则的一种技术。这些规则不仅是习俗或传统，还有知识――理性的知识。今天，国家理性这一表述会使人联想到“专横”或“暴力”。但是在当时，人们头脑中想的是治理国家的技艺特有的理性。

2、这种特殊治理艺术的理论根据从何而来？新生的政治思想对这个问题的回答令人反感。然而回答很简单：如果反思使得治理的艺术遵循被被治理的对象的性质，也就是国家的性质，治理的艺术就是理性的。

现在，再弹这个老调就是和某种传统决裂，这种传统既是基督教传统又是法律传统，这个传统声称治理本质上是正义的。治理遵从的是一套完整的法律体系：人法、自然法、神法。

关于这些问题，圣托马斯有一本相当重要的书。**他提醒说，这种“技艺在其领域之中，必须仿效自然之然（what nature carries out in its own）”；只有这样，它才是理性的。王对自己王国的治理必须仿效上帝对自然的治理，或是灵魂对身体的治理。王建立城邦，要像上帝创造了世界，要像灵魂赋予身体以形式。王也必须引领人们走向他们的终点，就像上帝对自然物的引领，或灵魂对身体的指引。那么什么是人的终点？什么才对身体有益处？不，那只需要医生，而不是王。什么才对财富有益处？不，一个管家就足够了，不需要王。什么才对真理有好处？甚至也不需要王，因为那样只需要一个教师。人通过自己的顺从需要有人为他打开通往至福的道路，而在此世，则是通往诚实（honestum）的道路。

如同我们看到的，治理技艺的典范就是上帝将他的律法施加给他的造物。圣托马斯所说的理性治理的模型并不是政治治理，但十六、十七世纪在“国家理性”的名义下所追求的，是能够指引一个实际政府的原则。一般而言，这些原则与自然及其普遍法则无关。它们所涉及的是国家究竟是什么，国家的当务之急是什么。

因此我们能够理解这样一种研究引发的宗教愤慨。这说明了为什么国家理性被等同于无神论。特别是在法国，从政治语境中产生的这种说法通常与“无神论”联系在一起。

3、国家理性还反对另外一个传统。在《君主》一书中，马基雅维里的问题是如何面对内外敌人维持继承或是征服来的领地或领土。他的整个分析旨在确定什么可以维持和加强君主与国家之间的联系，而国家理性引起的问题是国家本身的存在和性质问题。这就是为什么国家理性的理论家们总在竭力避开他；马基雅维里名声不好，他们不能承认他们的问题与马基雅维里的问题相同。相反，那些反对国家理性的人竭力贬损这种新的治理艺术，指责这是马基雅维里的遗产。不过，在《君主论》写成后的一个世纪，尽管有这些恼人的争论，国家理性还是标志着一种与马基雅维里所说的极为不同（虽然只是在某些方面）的理性出现了。

这种治理艺术的目的恰恰不是强化君主统治其领土的权力。它的目的是强化国家本身。这是十六、十七世纪提出的所有治理定义中最典型的特点之一。理性的治理就是：考虑到国家的特性，它能够在不可限定尽可能长的时期内压制它的敌人。只有力量不断增强，它才能做到这一点。它的敌人也这么想。只关心维持自己的国家最可能招致灾难。这个观点非常重要。它与一种新的历史观联系在一起。不错，这种观点意味着，国家是现实的存在，必须在有争议的地域内、在不可限定尽可能长的历史时期内能够抗衡它的敌人。

4、最后我们可以看到，国家理性，如果理解为能够依照自身增强国家力量的理性治理，预设了一种特定知识的构成。只有知晓国家的力量，才能治理；也只有如此，治理才能维持。必须了解国家的能力以及扩展这一能力的手段。也必须了解其它国家的力量和能力。治理下的国家必须抗衡其它国家。因此，治理所要做的，不仅仅是贯彻理性、智慧、审慎的普遍原则，有一种知识必不可少，具体、精确、节制的知识与国家的力量有关。治理的艺术、国家理性的特征，与那时被称作政治统计学或是政治算术的发展紧密联系在一起；这政治统计学或政治算术就是不同国家力量的知识。这样的知识对正确的治理来说是不可或缺的。

简而言之，国家理性不是依照神法、自然法或人法而治理的技艺。它并不一定要顾及世界的普遍秩序。它是和国家力量相符的治理。它是在一个广阔、竞争的框架内以增加这一力量为目的的治理。

* * *

因此，十七、十八世纪的作者理解的“治安”（the police）与我们今天所说的极为不同。

为什么这些作者大部分是意大利人和德国人，这一点很值得研究，但是不论怎样，他们理解的“治安”不是在国家内部发挥作用的一个制度或机制，而是一种国家特有的治理技术；是国家干预的领域、技术和目标。

为了简明起见，我将用一个文本来说明，这个文本既是乌托邦式的，又是一项计划。它是最早的治安国家的乌托邦方案之一。此书系Turquet de Mayenne所作，1611年，他把此书呈献给荷兰联合省总督。在《路易十四的治理科学》（Science in the Government of Louis XIV）一书中，J. King说这本奇怪的着作很重要。这本书的题目是《贵族民主君主制》（Aristo Democratic Monarchy），这个标题足以揭示在作者看来什么是最重要的：相对于一个最重要的目的――国家而言，与其在这些不同种类的整体之间挑挑选选，不如把它们混合在一起。Turquet既称它为城邦、共和国，又称它为“治安”。

Turquet设想的组织是这样的。国王左右有四位高官。第一位掌管司法；第二位掌管军队；第三位掌管财政，也就是国王的税收和岁入；第四位掌管治安。第四位官员的职责似乎主要是道德方面的。按照Turquet的看法，他应该向臣民灌输节制、贞节、忠诚、勤劳、和睦、诚实。我们知道有这样一种传统的观念，即臣民的美德保证了王国的良好治理。但是，当我们涉及到细节问题时，看法就会有所不同。

Turquet建议每个省中都应该有维持法律和秩序的部门。其中两个视人，另两个视事。与人有关的一个部门应负责生活中积极、主动、生产性的方面。换句话说，它关注教育；涉及对每个人的爱好和天赋的测定；涉及到职业（有用的那些职业）的选择：每个年过二十五岁的人都必须注册登记自己的职业。那些不能从事有用工作的人被视为社会的渣滓。

第二个部门负责生活的消极方面：需要帮助的穷人（鳏寡孤独）；失业者；那些活动需要财政资助的人（不付利息）；公共卫生：疾病、时疫；水火之灾。

视事的第一个部门专门负责商品和制成品。由这个部门来指示应生产什么、如何生产。市场和贸易也由它来控制。另一个部门负责“属地（demesne）”，即领土、空间：私人财产、遗产、捐赠和买卖要控制；采邑权要改革；道路、河流、公共建筑和森林也都有人负责。

这个文本在很多方面都和当时众多的政治乌托邦有关系。但是它也与关于国家理性和君主制行政机构的理论大讨论发生在同一个时代。它正好反映出这个时代所认为的传统上进行治理的国家的任务是什么。

这个文本说明了什么？

1、表面看来，“治安”和司法、军队、财政一起，是统领国家的一个行政部门。这是对的。不过事实上，它还包括所有其他东西。Turquet是这样说的：“它延伸到所有人们的方方面面，他们做的所有事。治安的领域包含司法、财政和军队。”

2、“治安”无所不包，但这是从一种非常特殊的观点来说。人和事被视为人和事之间的关系：人在领土上的共存；他们与财产之间的关系；他们所生产的东西；在市场进行交换的东西。还要考虑人们怎样生活，可能降临在他们身上的疾病和事故。治安关照的是活生生的、活动的、生产性的人。Turquet用了一个不同寻常的说法：“人是治安真正的对象。”

3、对人的活动的这种干预可以恰当地称为整全的（totalitarian）干预。这种干预追求哪些目标？这分为两类。首先，治安必须竭尽全力，为城邦提供装点、形式、荣耀。荣耀不仅仅表明一个要臻于完善的国家的美，还包括国家的力量和国家的活力。因此，治安保证并凸现了国家的活力。其次，治安另外的目的是促进人们之间的工作和贸易关系，以及援助和互相帮助。Turquet在这里使用的词依然非常重要：治安必须保证人们之间的“交往”，广义上的交往。否则，人将无法生活；就是生活也将不稳定，穷困潦倒，不断受到威胁。

我认为，这里我们能够看到一个重要的观点。作为对人施加政治权力的理性干预的一种形式，治安的作用是为人们提供一点额外（extra）的生活；通过为人们提供一点额外的生活，为国家提供一点额外的力量。这一点通过对“交往”、即个人的共同活动（工作、生产、交换、食宿）的控制来达到。

大家可能会反对说：这只是某个无名作者的乌托邦而已。你几乎不能从中推导出任何重要的结论！但是我要说：当时大多数欧洲国家都有大量此类文献流传，Turquet的书只是其中的一本。

事实是，正是由于这本书过于简单然而细节丰富，反而更好地显露出在别处也可以发现的那些特点。最重要的是，我要说这样的思想并没有夭折。它们在十七、十八世纪一直流传，或者是作为应用政策（比如官厅学或重商主义）；或是作为课程来讲授（德国的治安科学[Polizeiwissenschaft]，别忘了，德国就是在这个标题下讲授今日所谓行政管理学[science of administration]的）。

这里有两个地方，即使不研究，我至少也应该提到。首先我要谈到一本法国的行政大全（administrative compendium），然后是一本德国教材。

1、每个历史学家都知道Delamare的Compendium。十八世纪初，这位行政官承担了整个王国治安规章的编纂工作。此书源源不断地提供具有高度价值的信息。我想要强调的，就是如此庞大的规章使得一个像Delamare的行政官得出了一般治安观念。

Delamare说治安必须负责国家的十一项事务：（1）宗教；（2）习俗；（3）卫生；（4）供应；（5）道路，公路，城镇建筑；（6）公共安全；（7）人文（粗略地说，就是文理）；（8）贸易；（9）工厂；（10）仆役和劳动者；（11）穷人。

每篇论述治安的文献都有同样的分类。就像在Turquet的乌托邦方案中，除了军队、严格意义上的司法、直接税，看上去治安要管所有其他的事。同样的事也能换种说法：此前在武装力量的支持下，通过发展出一套司法制度，并建立起一个税收体系，王室权力才能对抗封建制。这正是传统上王室权力运用的方法。现在，“治安”这个术语涵盖了整个一个新领域，在这个领域中，中央集权的政治权力和行政权力能够进行干预。

那么，对文化仪式、小规模生产技术、智识生活以及道路网络进行干预背后的逻辑是什么？Delamare的答案似乎有些犹疑。有时他说“治安负责与人的幸福（happiness）有关的一切；有时说“治安负责能够调整人与人之间展开的社会（社会关系）的一切事。”有时又说治安负责生活（living）。这个概念我要细说。生活这个概念是最原始的，它澄清了其它两个概念；Delamare本人也详述了这个概念。他对治安的十一项对象作了以下评注。可以肯定，治安对待宗教的方式不是从教义原理的观点出发，而是从生活的道德质量的观点出发。在负责卫生和供应时，它考虑的是生活（life）的维续；在负责贸易、工厂、工人、穷人和公共秩序时，它考虑的是生活的便利。在负责戏剧、文学、娱乐时，它的目标是生活的快乐。简言之，生活是治安的目标：不可或缺的生活，有用的生活，多余的（superfluous）生活。人要活命、人要生活，还要过得好，这就是治安必须保证的东西。

因此，我们要把Delamare提出的其它概念结合起来：“治安的唯一目的是引导人达到生活中能够享受到的最大幸福。”或者，治安在意的是灵魂的善好（借助宗教和道德），身体的善好（衣、食、住、健康），财富（产业、贸易、劳动）。或者，治安负责的是只有生活在社会中才会得到的那些好处。

2、现在让我们来看看那些德国教材。在稍微晚些时候，这些教材被用来教授行政科学。许多大学都教授这门课，特别是哥廷根，这门课对欧洲大陆来说极为重要。训练普鲁士、奥地利、俄罗斯公务员（正是这些人实施了约瑟二世和叶卡捷琳娜二世的改革）的就是这些东西。某些法国人，尤其是在拿破仑的扈从中的某些人，深晓治安科学的教导。这些教材中能发现什么呢？

Huhenthal的《政治书》（Liver de Politia）中以下内容尤为重要：公民的数目；宗教和风俗；卫生；食物；人和货物的安全（特别提到了水火之灾）；司法；公民的便利和快乐（如何获取又如何加以限制）。然后是一系列关于河流、森林、矿产、盐井、住房的章节，最后是关于如何通过农耕、工业或是贸易获取财产的章节。

在《治安概要》（Précis for the Police）中，Willebrand先后谈到了风俗、贸易和手工业、卫生、安全，最后，谈到了城镇建筑和规划。从所涉及的对象来看，至少与Delamare的着作没有太大差别。

但是，所有这些文本中最重要的是Von Justi的《治安原理》（Elements of Police）。治安的特定目标依然被定义为生活在社会中的活生生的个人。不过，Von Justi的书的整个安排方法略有不同。他首先研究了所谓的“国家的不动产（state’s landed property）”，即领土。他考虑了两个方面：居住方式（城镇还是乡村）以及居住者（人的数量、增长、卫生、死亡率、迁移）。他接着分析了“动产”，也就是商品、制成品及其流通，这又涉及成本、信用、货币这些问题。最后一部分谈的是人的行为：他们的风俗、他们的职业能力，他们的诚信，以及他们如何遵守法律。

在我看来，在治安如何发展的这个问题上，Von Justi的着作比Delamare法规大全的“导论”要前进一步。理由有四条。

一，对治安的核心悖谬之处，Von Justi界定得更为清晰。他说，所谓治安，就是能使国家充分增长权力、发挥力量的东西。另一方面，治安还得让公民幸福，这里幸福被理解为生存、生活并提高生活质量。他完美地定义了在我看来属于现代治理艺术或国家理性的目标：发展构成个人生活的诸般要素，以使这些要素的发展也能增进国家的力量。

Von Justi区分了这种他称为“治安”（他同时代人也这样称呼）的任务和“政治”（Die Politik）之间的不同。政治基本上是一种消极的任务，政治就是国家和内外敌人作斗争。而“治安”却是一项积极的任务：治安要同时增进公民的生活和国家的力量。

要紧的是，Von Justi比Delamare更为强调一个在18世纪变得越来越重要的概念，那就是人口。人口被理解为一群活着的个人。他们具有一些属于同一个种族、共同生活的人们才具有的特性。（他们表现出死亡率和生育率；会发生瘟疫和人口过剩；呈现某种类型的地理分布。）的确，Delamare用过“生命”（life）这个词来表示治安的焦点，但是他并没有强调这一点。在整个18世纪，特别是在德国，我们看到治安的对象就是人口，也就是生活在特定地区的一群人。

最后，只有读了Von Justi，才会知道治安不仅仅是一个Turquet描绘的乌托邦，它也不是一个系统编纂的规章大全。Von Justi声称要写出一本“治安科学”。他的书并不是简单地罗列了一些规定。它是一个框架（grid），通过这个框架能够观察到国家，也就是领土、资源、人口、城镇等等。Von Justi把“统计学”（对国家的记述）和治理的技艺结合了起来。治安科学既是一门治理的技艺，又是一种分析生活在一块领土上的人口的方法。

看上去，这样考虑历史扯得太远；相对于今天我们所关心的问题也显得用处不大。我不会像黑赛（Hermann Hesse）走的那么远，他说只有“不断地参照历史、过去、古代”，才能有丰硕的成果。但是经验告诉我，对于动摇我们的确信和教条来说，有时候理性的多种形式的历史比抽象的批评要有效得多。历史上曾有数百年时间，宗教不能忍受人们叙说它的历史。现在，我们的各理性学说则回避书写自己的历史，书写这样的历史无疑具有重大意义。

我要展示的只是一个研究方向。这些只是过去两年我所研究的一些初步看法，也就是对我们可以称之为（用一个过时的术语）治理技艺的东西所作的历史分析。

这项研究建立在几个基本假设上面，我把它们归纳如下：

1．权力不是实体。权力也不是什么神秘的财产，必须孜孜探求这财产的起源。权力只不过是人们之间的某种关系。这种关系自成一类，也就是说，它和交换、生产、交往不是一类，尽管它和它们结合在一起。权力的特殊之处是，一些人多少可以全面地决定其他人的行为，但是从来不会彻底地或强制性地进行。把一个人绑起来鞭打，他承受的只是施加给他的暴力（force），不是权力。但是如果他被诱使说话，当他用最后的手段就是宁死也不说，这样他就是被迫使以一种特定的方式行为，他的自由就受制于权力，他就被治理了。如果一个人能保持自由，不论他的自由多小，权力仍能使他受制于治理。没有潜在的拒斥，就没有权力。

2．对于人与人之间的所有关系来说，许多因素都决定着权力。理性化也持续不断地作用于权力。这种理性化有一些特定形式，和经济过程特有的理性化，或生产、沟通技术特有的理性化不一样，和科学话语的理性化也不一样。无论人们形成的团体是大是小，也无论权力是男人对女人，还是成人对儿童，还是一个阶级对另一个阶级，还是一个官僚集团对全体人民施加的，人对人的治理都包含一定形式的理性，而不是工具性的（instrumental）暴力。

3．因此，那些抵制或反抗某种权力的人，不能仅仅满足于抨击暴力，或批判制度。归咎于一般理性也是不够的。要受到质疑的是特定的理性的形式。我们批评对精神病人或疯人的运用的权力，但不能只局限于对精神病机构的批评；那些质疑惩罚权力的人，也不能只满足于谴责监狱是一个总体化机构。问题是：权力的这些关系是怎样理性化的？问这个问题才能避免其它具有相同目的和作用的制度取代它们。

4.几个世纪以来，国家一直是对人类进行治理的最显着、最可畏的形式之一。非常重要的是，政治批评指责国家既是个体化的因素，又是总体化的原则。只要看看新兴的国家理性，看看国家最初的治安方案是什么，我们就可以认清，从一开始国家就既是个体化的，又是总体性的。将个人及其利益和国家对立起来，和把个人与共同体及共同体的要求对立起来一样危险。

政治理性已经在整个西方社会的历史中成长起来并贯穿始终。它最初表现为牧领观念，后来是国家理性。它的必然后果就是个体化和总体化。只有对政治理性的根源，而不是它的两个效果发起攻击，才能趋于解放。

-------------------------------------

*雅典雄辩家，曾呼吁马其顿国王领导希腊各城邦反对波斯帝国，希腊丧失独立后自杀身亡。

**雅典雄辩家，反对马其顿入侵希腊，发表《斥腓力》等演说，失败后服毒自杀。

*《国家理性十卷书》，校者注

**《论皇家统治》，校者注

译者：赵晓力、王宇洁 校对：福柯小组

Michel Foucault, Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism ofPolitical Reason

——"The Tanner Lectures on Human Values", delivered at Stanford University, October 10 and 16, 1979.

I

The title sounds pretentious, I know. But the reason for that is precisely its own excuse. Since the nineteenth century, Western thought has never stopped labouring at the task of criticising the role of reason – or the lack of reason – in political structures. It’s therefore perfectly unfitting to undertake such a vast project once again. However, so many previous attempts are a warrant that every new venture will be just about as successful as the former ones – and in any case, probably just as fortunate.

Under such a banner, mine is the embarrassment of one who has only sketches and uncompletable drafts to propose. Philosophy gave up trying to offset the impotence of scientific reason long ago; it no longer tries to complete its edifice.

One of the Enlightenment’s tasks was to multiply reason’s political powers. But the men of the nineteenth century soon started wondering whether reason weren’t getting too powerful in our societies. They began to worry about a relationship they confusedly suspected between a rationalisation-prone society and certain threats to the individual and his liberties, to the species and its survival.

In other words, since Kant, the role of philosophy has been to prevent reason going beyond the limits of what is given in experience; but from the same moment– that is, from the development of modern states and political management of society – the role of philosophy has also been to keep watch over the excessive powers of political rationality – which is rather a promising life expectancy.

Everybody is aware of such banal facts. But that they are banal does not mean they don’t exist. What we have to do with banal facts is to discover – or try to discover – which specific and perhaps original problems are connected with them.

The relationship between rationalisation and the excesses of political power is evident. And we should not need to wait for bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognize the existence of such relations. But the problem is: what to do with such an evident fact ?

Shall we ‘try’ reason? To my mind, nothing would be more sterile. First, because the field has nothing to do with guilt or innocence. Second, because it’s senseless to refer to ‘reason’ as the contrary entity to non-reason. Last, because such a trial would trap us into playing the arbitrary and boring part of either the rationalist or the irrationalist.

Shall we investigate this kind of rationalism which seems to be specific to our modern culture and which originates in Enlightenment? I think that that was the way of some of the members of the Frankfurter Schule. My purpose is not to begin a discussion of their works – they are most important and valuable. I would suggest another way of investigating the links between rationalisation and power:

It may be wise not to take as a whole the rationalisation of society or of culture, but to analyse this process in several fields, each of them grounded in a fundamental experience: madness, illness, death, crime, sexuality, etc.

I think that the word ‘rationalisation’ is a dangerous one. The main problem when people try to rationalise something is not to investigate whether or not they conform to principles of rationality, but to discover which kind of rationality they are using.

Even if the Enlightenment has been a very important phase in our history, and in the development of political technology, I think we have to refer to much more remote processes if we want to understand how we have been trapped in our own history.

This was my ‘ligne de conduite’ in my previous work: analyse the relations between experiences like madness, death, crime, sexuality, and several technologies of power. What I am working on now is the problem of individuality – or, I should say, selfidentity as referred to the problem of ‘individualising power’.

Everyone knows that in European societies political power has evolved towards more and more centralised forms. Historians have been studying this organisation of the state, with its administration and bureaucracy, for dozens of years.

I’d like to suggest in these two lectures the possibility of analysing another kind of transformation in such power relationships. This transformation is, perhaps, less celebrated. But I think that it is also important, mainly for modern societies. Apparently this evolution seems antagonistic to the evolution towards a centralised state. What I mean in fact is the development of power techniques oriented towards individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way. If the state is the political form of a centralised and centralising power, let us call pastorship the individualising power.

My purpose this evening is to outline the origin of this pastoral modality of power, or at least some aspects of its ancient history. And in the next lecture, I’ll try to show how this pastorship happened to combine with its opposite, the state.

The idea of the deity, or the king, or the leader, as a shepherd followed by a flock of sheep wasn’t familiar to the Greeks and Romans. There were exceptions, I know – early ones in Homeric literature, later ones in certain texts of the Lower Empire. I’ll come back to them later. Roughly speaking, we can say that the metaphor of the flock didn’t occur in great Greek or Roman political literature.

This is not the case in ancient Oriental societies: Egypt, Assyria, Judaea. Pharaoh was an Egyptian shepherd. Indeed, he ritually received the herdsman’s crook on his coronation day; and the term ‘shepherd of men’ was one of the Babylonian monarch’s titles. But God was also a shepherd leading men to their grazing ground and ensuring them food. An Egyptian hymn invoked Ra this way: "O Ra that keepest watch when all men sleep, Thou who seekest what is good for thy cattle . . . .” The association between God and King is easily made, since both assume the same role: the flock they watch over is the same; the shepherd-king is entrusted with the great divine shepherd’s creatures. An Assyrian invocation to the king ran like this: “Illustrious companion of pastures, Thou who carest for thy land and feedest it, shepherd of all abundance.”

But, as we know, it was the Hebrews who developed and intensified the pastoral theme – with nevertheless a highly peculiar characteristic: God, and God only, is his people’s shepherd. With just one positive exception: David, as the founder of the monarchy, is the only one to be referred to as a shepherd. God gave him the task of assembling a flock.

There are negative exceptions, too: wicked kings are consistently compared to bad shepherds; they disperse the flock, let it die of thirst, shear it solely for profit’s sake. Jahweh is the one and only true shepherd. He guides his own people in person, aided only by his prophets. As the Psalms say: “Like a flock/hast Thou led Thy people, by Moses’ and by Aaron’s hand.” Of course I can treat neither the historical problems pertaining to the origin of this comparison nor its evolution throughout Jewish thought. I just want to show a few themes typical of pastoral power. I’d like to point out the contrast with Greek political thought, and to show how important these themes became in Christian thought and institutions later on.

The shepherd wields power over a flock rather than over a land. It’s probably much more complex than that, but, broadly speaking, the relation between the deity, the land, and men differs from that of the Greeks. Their gods owned the land, and this primary possession determined the relationship between men and gods. On the contrary, it’s the Shepherd-God’s relationship with his flock that is primary and fundamental here. God gives, or promises, his flock a land.

The shepherd gathers together, guides, and leads his flock. The idea that the political leader was to quiet any hostilities within the city and make unity reign over conflict is undoubtedly present in Greek thought. But what the shepherd gathers together is dispersed individuals. They gather together on hearing his voice: “I’ll whistle and will gather them together.” Conversely, the shepherd only has to disappear for the flock to be scattered. In other words, the shepherd’s immediate presence and direct action cause the flock to exist. Once the good Greek lawgiver, like Solon, has resolved any conflicts, what he leaves behind him is a strong city with laws enabling it to endure without him.

The shepherd’s role is to ensure the salvation of his flock. The Greeks said also that the deity saved the city; they never stopped declaring that the competent leader is a helmsman warding his ship away from the rocks. But the way the shepherd saves his flock is quite different. It’s not only a matter of saving them all, all together, when danger comes nigh. It’s a matter of constant, individualised, and final kindness. Constant kindness, for the shepherd ensures his flock’s food; every day he attends to their thirst and hunger. The Greek god was asked to provide a fruitful land and abundant crops. He wasn’t asked to foster a flock day by day. And individualised kindness, too, for the shepherd sees that all the sheep, each and every one of them, is fed and saved. Later Hebrew literature, especially, laid the emphasis on such individually kindly power: a rabbinical commentary on Exodus explains why Jahweh chose Moses to shepherd his people: he had left his flock to go and search for one lost sheep.

Last and not least, it’s final kindness. The shepherd has a target for his flock. It must either be led to good grazing ground or brought back to the fold.

Yet another difference lies in the idea that wielding power is a ‘duty’. The Greek leader had naturally to make decisions in the interest of all; he would have been a bad leader had he preferred his personal interest. But his duty was a glorious one: even if in war he had to give up his life, such a sacrifice was offset by something extremely precious: immortality. He never lost. By way of contrast, shepherdly kindness is much closer to ‘devotedness’. Everything the shepherd does is geared to the good of his flock. That’s his constant concern. When they sleep, he keeps watch. The theme of keeping watch is important. It brings out two aspects of the shepherd’s devotedness. First, he acts, he works, he puts himself out, for those he nourishes and who are asleep. Second, he watches over them. He pays attention to them all and scans each one of them. He’s got to know his flock as a whole, and in detail. Not only must he know where good pastures are, the seasons’ laws and the order of things; he must also know each one’s particular needs. Once again, a rabbinical commentary on Exodus describes Moses’ qualities as a shepherd this way: he would send each sheep in turn to graze – first, the youngest, for them to browse on the tenderest sward; then the older ones; and last the oldest, who were capable of browsing on the roughest grass. The shepherd’s power implies individual attention paid to each member of the flock.

These are just themes that Hebraic texts associate with the metaphors of the Shepherd-God and his flock of people. In no way do I claim that that is effectively how political power was wielded in Hebrew society before the fall of Jerusalem. I do not even claim that such a conception of political power is in any way coherent.

They’re just themes. Paradoxical, even contradictory, ones. Christianity was to give them considerable importance, both in the Middle Ages and in modern times. Among all the societies in history, ours – I mean, those that came into being at the end of Antiquity on the Western side of the European continent – have perhaps been the most aggressive and the most conquering; they have been capable of the most stupefying violence, against themselves as well as against others. They invented a great many different political forms. They profoundly altered their legal structures several times. It must be kept in mind that they alone evolved a strange technology of power treating the vast majority of men as a flock with a few as shepherds. They thus established between them a series of complex, continuous, and paradoxical relationships.

This is undoubtedly something singular in the course of history. Clearly, the development of ‘pastoral technology’ in the management of men profoundly disrupted the structures of ancient society.

*****************

So as to better explain the importance of this disruption, I’d like to briefly return to what I was saying about the Greeks. I can see the objections liable to be made.

One is that the Homeric poems use the shepherd metaphor to refer to the kings. In the Iliad and the Odyssey, the expression ποιμήυ λαώυ crops up several times. It qualifies the leaders, highlighting the grandeur of their power. Moreover, it’s a ritual title, common in even late Indo-European literature. In Beowulf, the king is still regarded as a shepherd. But there is nothing really surprising in the fact that the same title, as in the Assyrian texts, is to be found in archaic epic poems.

The problem arises rather as to Greek thought: There is at least one category of texts where references to shepherd models are made: the Pythagorean ones. The metaphor of the herdsman appears in the Fragments of Archytas, quoted by Stobeus. The word υόμος (the law) is connected with the word νυομεύς (shepherd) : the shepherd shares out, the law apportions. Then Zeus is called Νόμιος and Νέμειος because he gives his sheep food. And, finally, the magistrate must be Φιλάυθρωπος, i.e., devoid of selfishness. He must be full of zeal and solicitude, like a shepherd.

Grube, the German editor of Archytas’ Fragments, says that this proves a Hebrew influence unique in Greek literature. Other commentators, such as Delatte, say that the comparison between gods, magistrates, and shepherds was common in Greece. It is therefore not to be dwelt upon.

I shall restrict myself to political literature. The results of the enquiry are clear: the political metaphor of the shepherd occurs neither in Isocrates, nor in Demosthenes, nor in Aristotle. This is rather surprising when one reflects that in hisAreopagiticus, Isocrates insists on the magistrates’ duties; he stresses the need for them to be devoted and to show concern for young people. Yet not a word as to any shepherd.

By contrast, Plato often speaks of the shepherd-magistrate. He mentions the idea in Critias, The Republic, and Laws. He thrashes it out in The Statesman. In the former, the shepherd theme is rather subordinate. Sometimes, those happy days when mankind was governed directly by the gods and grazed on abundant pastures are evoked (Critias) , Sometimes, the magistrates’ necessary virtue – as contrasted with Thrasymachos’ vice, is what is insisted upon (The Republic). And sometimes, the problem is to define the subordinate magistrates’ role: indeed, they, just as the watchdogs, have to obey “those at the top of the scale” (Laws).

But in The Statesman pastoral power is the central problem and it is treated at length. Can the city’s decision-maker, can the commander, be defined as a sort of shepherd ?

Plato’s analysis is well known. To solve this question he uses the division method. A distinction is drawn between the man who conveys orders to inanimate things (e.g., the architect), and the man who gives orders to animals; between the man who gives orders to isolated animals (like a yoke of oxen) and he who gives orders to flocks; and he who gives orders to animal flocks, and he who commands human flocks. And there we have the political leader: a shepherd of men.

But this first division remains unsatisfactory. It has to be pushed further. The method opposing men to all the other animals isn’t a good one. And so the dialogue starts all over again. A whole series of distinctions is established: between wild animals and tame ones; those that live in water, and those that live on land; those with horns, and those without; between cleft- and plain-hoofed animals; between those capable and incapable of mutual reproduction. And the dialogue wanders astray with these never-ending subdivisions.

So, what do the initial development of the dialogue and its subsequent failure show? That the division method can prove nothing at all when it isn’t managed correctly. It also shows that the idea of analysing political power as the relationship between a shepherd and his animals was probably rather a controversial one at the time. Indeed, it’s the first assumption to cross the interlocutors’ minds when seeking to discover the essence of the politician. Was it a commonplace at the time? Or was Plato rather discussing one of the Pythagorean themes? The absence of the shepherd metaphor in other contemporary political texts seems to tip the scale towards the second hypothesis. But we can probably leave the discussion open.

My personal enquiry bears upon how Plato impugns the theme in the rest of the dialogue. He does so first by means of methodological arguments and then by means of the celebrated myth of the world revolving round its spindle.

The methodological arguments are extremely interesting. Whether the king is a sort of shepherd or not can be told, not by deciding which different species can form a flock, but by analysing what the shepherd does.

What is characteristic of his task? First, the shepherd is alone at the head of his flock. Second, his job is to supply his cattle with food; to care for them when they are sick; to play them music to get them together, and guide them; to arrange their intercourse with a view to the finest offspring. So we do find the typical shepherd-metaphor themes of Oriental texts.

And what’s the king’s task in regard to all this? Like the shepherd, he is alone at the head of the city. But, for the rest, who provides mankind with food? The king? No. The farmer, the baker do. Who looks after men when they are sick? The king? No. The physician. And who guides them with music? The gymnast – not the king. And so, many citizens could quite legitimately claim the title ‘shepherd of men’. Just as the human flock’s shepherd has many rivals, so has the politician. Consequently, if we want to find out what the politician really and essentially is, we must sift it out from ‘the surrounding flood’, thereby demonstrating in what ways he isn’t a shepherd.

Plato therefore resorts to the myth of the world revolving round its axis in two successive and contrary motions.

In a first phase, each animal species belonged to a flock led by a Genius-Shepherd. The human flock was led by the deity itself. It could lavishly avail itself of the fruits of the earth; it needed no abode; and after Death, men came back to life. A crucial sentence adds: “The deity being their shepherd, mankind needed no political constitution.”

In a second phase, the world turned in the opposite direction. The gods were no longer men’s shepherds; they had to look after themselves. For they had been given fire. What would the politician’s role then be? Would he become the shepherd in the gods’ stead? Not at all. His job was to weave a strong fabric for the city. Being a politician didn’t mean feeding, nursing, and breeding off spring, but binding: binding different virtues; binding contrary temperaments (either impetuous or moderate), using the ‘shuttle’ of popular opinion. The royal art of ruling consisted in gathering lives together “into a community based upon concord and friendship,’ and so he wove “the finest of fabrics.” The entire population, “slaves and free men alike, were mantled in its folds.”

The Statesman therefore seems to be classical antiquity’s most systematic reflexion on the theme of the pastorate which was later to become so important in the Christian West. That we are discussing it seems to prove that a perhaps initially Oriental theme was important enough in Plato’s day to deserve investigation, but we stress the fact that it was impugned.

Not impugned entirely, however. Plato did admit that the physician, the farmer, the gymnast, and the pedagogue acted as shepherds. But he refused to get them involved with the politician’s activity. He said so explicitly: how would the politician ever find the time to come and sit by each person, feed him, give him concerts, and care for him when sick ? Only a god in a Golden Age could ever act like that; or again, like a physician or pedagogue, be responsible for the lives and development of a few individuals. But, situated between the two – the gods and the swains – the men who hold political power are not to be shepherds. Their task doesn’t consist in fostering the life of a group of individuals. It consists in forming and assuring the city’s unity. In short, the political problem is that of the relation between the one and the many in the framework of the city and its citizens. The pastoral problem concerns the lives of individuals.

All this seems very remote, perhaps. The reason for my insisting on these ancient texts is that they show us how early this problem – or rather, this series of problems – arose. They span the entirety of Western history. They are still highly important for contemporary society. They deal with the relations between political power at work within the state as a legal framework of unity, and a power we can call ‘pastoral’, whose role is to constantly ensure, sustain, and improve the lives of each and every one.

The well-known ‘welfare state problem’ does not only bring the needs or the new governmental techniques of today’s world to light. It must be recognised for what it is: one of the extremely numerous reappearances of the tricky adjustment between political power wielded over legal subjects and pastoral power wielded over live individuals.

I have obviously no intention whatsoever of recounting the evolution of pastoral power throughout Christianity. The immense problems this would raise can easily be imagined: from doctrinal problems, such as Christ's denomination as 'the good shepherd', right up to institutional ones, such as parochial organisation, or the way pastoral responsibilities were shared between priests and bishops.

All I want to do is bring to light two or three aspects I regard as important for the evolution of pastorship, i.e., the technology of power.

First of all, let us examine the theoretical elaboration of the theme in ancient Christian literature: Chrysostom, Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome, and, for monastic life, Cassian or Benedict. The Hebrew themes are considerably altered in at least four ways:

First, with regard to responsibility. We saw that the shepherd was to assume responsibility for the destiny of the whole flock and of each and every sheep. In the Christian conception, the shepherd must render an account – not only of each sheep, but of all their actions, all the good or evil they are liable to do, all that happens to them.

Moreover, between each sheep and its shepherd Christianity conceives a complex exchange and circulation of sins and merits. The sheep's sin is also imputable to the shepherd. He'll have to render an account of it at the Last Judgement. Conversely, by helping his flock to find salvation, the shepherd will also find his own. But by saving his sheep, he lays himself open to getting lost; so if he wants to save himself, he must needs run the risk of losing himself for others. If he does get lost, it is the flock that will incur the greatest danger. But let's leave all these paradoxes aside. My aim was just to underline the force and complexity of the moral ties binding the shepherd to each member of his flock. And what I especially wanted to underline was that such ties not only concerned individuals' lives, but the details of their actions as well.

The second important alteration concerns the problem of obedience. In the Hebrew conception, God being a shepherd, the flock following him complies to his will, to his law. Christianity, on the other hand, conceived the shepherd-sheep relationship as one of individual and complete dependence. This is undoubtedly one of the points at which Christian pastorship radically diverged from Greek thought. If a Greek had to obey, he did so because it was the law, or the will of the city. If he did happen to follow the will of someone in particular (a physician, an orator, a pedagogue), then that person had rationally persuaded him to do so. And it had to be for a strictly determined aim: to be cured, to acquire a skill, to make the best choice.

In Christianity, the tie with the shepherd is an individual one. It is personal submission to him. His will is done, not because it is consistent with the law, and not just as far as it is consistent with it, but, principally, because it is hiswill. In Cassian’s Coenobiticul Institutions, there are many edifying anecdotes in which the monk finds salvation by carrying out the absurdest of his superior’s orders. Obedience is a virtue. This means that it is not, as for the Greeks, a provisional means to an end, but rather an end in itself. It is a permanent state; the sheep must permanently submit to their pastors: subditi. As Saint Benedict says, monks do not live according to their own free will; their wish is to be under the abbot’s command : ambulantes alieno judicio et imperio. Greek Christianity named this state of obedience άπάθεια.. The evolution of the word’s meaning is significant. In Greek philosophy,άπάθεια denotes the control that the individual, thanks to the exercise of reason, can exert over his passions. In Christian thought, πάθος is willpower exerted over oneself, for oneself. Απάθεια delivers us from such wilfulness.

Christian pastorship implies a peculiar type of knowledge between the pastor and each of his sheep.

This knowledge is particular. It individualizes. It isn’t enough to know the state of the flock. That of each sheep must also be known. The theme existed long before there was Christian pastorship, but it was considerably amplified in three different ways: the shepherd must be informed as to the material needs of each member of the flock and provide for them when necessary. He must know what is going on, what each of them does – his public sins. Last and not least, he must know what goes on in the soul of each one, that is, his secret sins, his progress on the road to sainthood.

In order to ensure this individual knowledge, Christianity appropriated two essential instruments at work in the Hellenistic world: self-examination and the guidance of conscience. It took them over, but not without altering them considerably.

It is well known that self-examination was widespread among the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, and the Epicureans as a means of daily taking stock of the good or evil performed in regard to one’s duties. One’s progress on the way to perfection, i.e., self-mastery and the domination of one’s passions, could thus be measured. The guidance of conscience was also predominant in certain cultured circles, but as advice given – and sometimes paid for – in particularly difficult circumstances: in mourning, or when one was suffering a setback.

Christian pastorship closely associated these two practices. On one hand, conscience-guiding constituted a constant bind : the sheep didn’t let itself be led only to come through any rough passage victoriously, it let itself be led every second. Being guided was a state and you were fatally lost if you tried to escape it. The ever-quoted phrase runs like this: he who suffers not guidance withers away like a dead leaf. As for self-examination, its aim was not to close self-awareness in upon itself, but to enable it to open up entirely to its director – to unveil to him the depths of the soul.

There are a great many first-century ascetic and monastic texts concerning the link between guidance and self-examination that show how crucial these techniques were for Christianity and how complex they had already become. What I would like to emphasise is that they delineate the emergence of a very strange phenomenon in Greco-Roman civilisation, that is, the organisation of a link between total obedience, knowledge of oneself, and confession to someone else.

There is another transformation – maybe the most important. All those Christian techniques of examination, confession, guidance, obedience, have an aim: to get individuals to work at their own ‘mortification’ in this world. Mortification is not death, of course, but it is a renunciation of this world and of oneself: a kind of everyday death. A death which is supposed to provide life in another world. This is not the first time we see the shepherd theme associated with death; but here it is other than in the Greek idea of political power. It is not a sacrifice for the city; Christian mortification is a kind of relation from oneself to oneself. It is a part, a constitutive part of the Christian self-identity.

We can say that Christian pastorship has introduced a game that neither the Greeks nor the Hebrews imagined. A strange game whose elements are life, death, truth, obedience, individuals, self-identity; a game which seems to have nothing to do with the game of the city surviving through the sacrifice of the citizens. Our societies proved to be really demonic since they happened to combine those two games – the city / citizen game and the shepherd / flock game – in what we call the modern states.

As you may notice, what I have been trying to do this evening is not to solve a problem but to suggest a way to approach a problem. This problem is similar to those I have been working on since my first book about insanity and mental illness. As I told you previously, this problem deals with the relations between experiences (like madness, illness, transgression of laws, sexuality, self-identity) knowledge (like psychiatry, medicine, criminology, sexology, psychology), and power (such as the power which is wielded in psychiatric and penal institutions, and in all other institutions which deal with individual control).

Our civilisation has developed the most complex system of knowledge, the most sophisticated structures of power: what has this kind of knowledge, this type of power made of us? In what way are those fundamental experiences of madness, suffering, death, crime, desire, individuality connected, even if we are not aware of it, with knowledge and power? I am sure I’ll never get the answer; but that does not mean that we don’t have to ask the question.

II

I have tried to show how primitive Christianity shaped the idea of a pastoral influence continuously exerting itself on individuals and through the demonstration of their particular truth. And I have tried to show how this idea of pastoral power was foreign to Greek thought despite a certain number of borrowings such as practical self-examination and the guidance of conscience.

I would like at this time, leaping across many centuries, to describe another episode which has been in itself particularly important in the history of this government of individuals by their own verity.

This instance concerns the formation of the state in the modern sense of the word. If I make this historical connection it is obviously not in order to suggest that the aspect of pastoral power disappeared during the ten great centuries of Christian Europe, Catholic and Roman, but it seems to me that this period, contrary to what one might expect, has not been that of the triumphant pastorate. And that is true for several reasons: some are of an economic nature – the pastorate of souls is an especially urban experience, difficult to reconcile with the poor and extensive rural economy at the beginning of the Middle Ages. The other reasons are of a cultural nature: the pastorate is a complicated technique which demands a certain level of culture, not only on the part of the pastor but also among his flock. Other reasons relate to the sociopolitical structure. Feudality developed between individuals a tissue of personal bonds of an altogether different type than the pastorate.

I do not wish to say that the idea of a pastoral government of men disappeared entirely in the medieval church. It has, indeed, remained and one can even say that it has shown great vitality. Two series of facts tend to prove this. First, the reforms which had been made in the Church itself, especially in the monastic orders – the different reforms operating successively inside existing monasteries – had the goal of restoring the rigor of pastoral order among the monks themselves. As for the newly created orders – Dominican and Franciscan – essentially they proposed to perform pastoral work among the faithful. The Church tried ceaselessly during successive crises to regain its pastoral functions. But there is more. In the population itself one sees all during the Middle Ages the development of a long series of struggles whose object was pastoral power. Critics of the Church which fails in its obligations reject its hierarchical structure, look for the more or less spontaneous forms of community in which the flock could find the shepherd it needed. This search for pastoral expression took on numerous aspects, at times extremely violent struggles as was the case for the Vaudois, sometimes peaceful quests as among the Freres de la Vie community. Sometimes it stirred very extensive movements such as the Hussites, sometimes it fermented limited groups like the Amis de Dieu de l’Oberland. It happened that these movements were close to heresy, as among the Beghards, at times stirring orthodox movements which dwelt within the bosom of the Church (like that of the Italian Oratorians in the fifteenth century).

I raise all of this in a very allusive manner in order to emphasise that if the pastorate was not instituted as an effective, practical government of men during the Middle Ages, it has been a permanent concern and a stake in constant struggles. There was across the entire period of the Middle Ages a yearning to arrange pastoral relations among men and this aspiration affected both the mystical tide and the great millenarian dreams.

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Of course, I don’t intend to treat here the problem of how states are formed. Nor do I intend to go into the different economic, social, and political processes from which they stem. Neither do I want to analyse the different institutions or mechanisms with which states equipped themselves in order to ensure their survival. I’d just like to give some fragmentary indications as to something midway between the state as a type of political organisation and its mechanisms, viz., the type of rationality implemented in the exercise of state power.

I mentioned this in my first lecture. Rather than wonder whether aberrant state power is due to excessive rationalism or irrationalism, I think it would be more appropriate to pin down the specific type of political rationality the state produced.

After all, at least in this respect, political practices resemble scientific ones: it’s not ‘reason in general’ that is implemented, but always a very specific type of rationality. The striking thing is that the rationality of state power was reflective and perfectly aware of its specificity. It was not tucked away in spontaneous, blind practices. It was not brought to light by some retrospective analysis. It was formulated especially in two sets of doctrine: the reason of stateand the theory of police. These two phrases soon acquired narrow and pejorative meanings, I know. But for the 150 or 200 years during which modern states were formed, their meaning was much broader than now.

The doctrine of reason of state attempted to define how the principles and methods of state government differed, say, from the way God governed the world, the father his family, or a superior his community.

The doctrine of the police defines the nature of the objects of the state’s rational activity; it defines the nature of the aims it pursues, the general form of the instruments involved.

So, what I’d like to speak about today is the system of rationality. But first, there are two preliminaries:

(1) Meinecke having published a most important book on reason of state, I’ll speak mainly of the policing theory.

(2) Germany and Italy underwent the greatest difficulties in getting established as states, and they produced the greatest number of reflexions on reason of state and the police. I’ll often refer to the Italian and German texts.

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Let’s begin with reason of state. Here are a few definitions:

BOTERO: “A perfect knowledge of the means through which states form, strengthen themselves, endure, and grow.”

PALAZZO (Discourse on Government and True Reason of State, 1606) : “A rule or art enabling us to discover how to establish peace and order within the Republic.”

CHEMNITZ (De Ratione Status, 1647) : “A certain political consideration required for all public matters, councils, and projects, whose only aim is the state’s preservation, expansion, and felicity; to which end, the easiest and promptest means are to be employed.”

Let me consider certain features these definitions have in common.

Reason of state is regarded as an ‘art’, that is, a technique conforming to certain rules. These rules do not simply pertain to customs or traditions, but to knowledge – rational knowledge. Nowadays, the expression reason of state evokes ‘arbitrariness’ or ‘violence’. But at the time, what people had in mind was a rationality specific to the art of governing states.

From where does this specific art of government draw its rationale? The answer to this question provokes the scandal of nascent political thought. And yet it’s very simple: the art of governing is rational, if reflexion causes it to observe the nature of what is governed – here, the state.

Now, to state such a platitude is to break with a simultaneously Christian and judiciary tradition, a tradition which claimed that government was essentially just. It respected a whole system of laws: human laws; the law of nature; divine law.

There is a quite significant text by St. Thomas on these points. He recalls that “art, in its field, must imitate what nature carries out in its own”; it is only reasonable under that condition. The king’s government of his kingdom must imitate God’s government of nature; or again, the soul’s government of the body. The king must found cities just as God created the world; just as the soul gives form to the body. The king must also lead men towards their finality, just as God does for natural beings, or as the soul does, when directing the body. And what is man’s finality? What’s good for the body? No; he’d need only a physician, not a king. Wealth? No; a steward would suffice. Truth? Not even that; for only a teacher would be needed. Man needs someone capable of opening up the way to heavenly bliss through his conformity, here on earth, to what is honesturn.

As we can see, the model for the art of government is that of God imposing his laws upon his creatures. St. Thomas’s model for rational government is not a political one, whereas what the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seek under the denomination ‘reason of state’ are principles capable of guiding an actual government. They aren’t concerned with nature and its laws in general. They’re concerned with what the state is; what its exigencies are.

And so we can understand the religious scandal aroused by such a type of research. It explains why reason of state was assimilated to atheism. In France, in particular, the expression generated in a political context was commonly associated with ‘atheist’.

Reason of state is also opposed to another tradition. In The Prince, Machiavelli’s problem is to decide how a province or territory acquired through inheritance or by conquest can be held against its internal or external rivals. Machiavelli’s entire analysis is aimed at defining what keeps up or reinforces the link between prince and state, whereas the problem posed by reason of state is that of the very existence and nature of the state itself. This is why the theoreticians of reason of state tried to stay aloof from Machiavelli; he had a bad reputation and they couldn’t recognize their own problem in his. Conversely, those opposed to reason of state tried to impair this new art of governing, denouncing it as Machiavelli’s legacy. However, despite these confused quarrels a century afterThe Prince had been written, reason of state marks the emergence of an extremely – albeit only partly – different type of rationality from Machiavelli’s.

The aim of such an art of governing is precisely not to reinforce the power a prince can wield over his domain. Its aim is to reinforce the state itself. This is one of the most characteristic features of all the definitions that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries put forward. Rational government is this, so to speak: given the nature of the state, it can hold down its enemies for an indeterminate length of time. It can only do so if it increases its own strength. And its enemies do likewise. The state whose only concern would be to hold out would most certainly come to disaster. This idea is a very important one. It is bound up with a new historical outlook. Indeed, it implies that states are realities which must needs hold out for an indefinite length of historical time – and in a disputed geographical area.

Finally, we can see that reason of state, understood as rational government able to increase the state’s strength in accordance with itself presupposes the constitution of a certain type of knowledge. Government is only possible if the strength of the state is known; it can thus be sustained. The state’s capacity, and the means to enlarge it, must be known. The strength and capacities of the other states must also be known. Indeed, the governed state must hold out against the others. Government therefore entails more than just implementing general principles of reason, wisdom, and prudence. Knowledge is necessary; concrete, precise, and measured knowledge as to the state’s strength. The art of governing, characteristic of reason of state, is intimately bound up with the development of what was then called either political statistics, or arithmetic; that is, the knowledge of different states’ respective forces. Such knowledge was indispensable for correct government. Briefly speaking, then: reason of state is not an art of government according to divine, natural, or human laws. It doesn’t have to respect the general order of the world. It’s government in accordance with the state’s strength. It’s government whose aim is to increase this strength within an extensive and competitive framework.

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So what the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors understand by ‘the police’ is very different from what we put under the term. It would be worth studying why these authors are mostly Italians and Germans, but whatever! What they understand by ‘police’ isn’t an institution or mechanism functioning within the state, but a governmental technology peculiar to the state; domains, techniques, targets where the state intervenes.

To be clear and simple, I will exemplify what I’m saying with a text which is both utopian and a project. It’s one of the first utopia-programmes for a policed state. Turquet de Mayenne drew it up and presented it in 1611 to the Dutch States General. In his book Science in the Government of Louis XIV, J. King draws attention to the importance of this strange work. Its title is Aristo- Democrutic Monarchy; that’s enough to show what is important in the author’s eyes: not so much choosing between these different types of constitution as their mixture in view to a vital end, viz., the state. Turquet also calls it the City, the Republic, or yet again, the Police.

Here is the organisation Turquet proposes. Four grand officials rank beside the king. One is in charge of Justice; another, of the Army; the third, of the Exchecquer, i.e., the king’s taxes and revenues; the fourth is in charge of the police. It seems that this officer’s role was to have been mainly a moral one. According to Turquet, he was to foster among the people “modesty, charity, loyalty, industriousness, friendly cooperation, honesty.” We recognize the traditional idea that the subject’s virtue ensures the kingdom’s good management. But, when we come down to the details, the outlook is somewhat different.

Turquet suggests that in each province, there should be boards keeping law and order. There should be two that see to people; the other two see to things. The first board, the one pertaining to people, was to see to the positive, active, productive aspects of life. In other words, it was concerned with education; determining each one’s tastes and aptitudes; the choosing of occupations – useful ones: each person over the age of twenty-five had to be enrolled on a register noting his occupation. Those not usefully employed were regarded as the dregs of society.

The second board was to see to the negative aspects of life: the poor (widows, orphans, the aged) requiring help; the unemployed; those whose activities required financial aid (no interest was to be charged) ; public health: diseases, epidemics; and accidents such as fire and flood.

One of the boards concerned with things was to specialise in commodities and manufactured goods. It was to indicate what was to be produced, and how; it was also to control markets and trading. The fourth board would see to the ‘demesne’, i.e., the territory, space: private property, legacies, donations, sales were to be controlled; manorial rights were to be reformed; roads, rivers, public buildings, and forests would also be seen to.

In many features, the text is akin to the political utopias which were so numerous at the time. But it is also contemporary with the great theoretical discussions on reason of state and the administrative organisation of monarchies. It is highly representative of what the epoch considered a traditionally governed state’s tasks to be.

What does this text demonstrate?

The ‘police’ appears as an administration heading the state, together with the judiciary, the army, and the exchecquer. True. Yet in fact, it embraces everything else. Turquet says so: “It branches out into all of the people’s conditions, everything they do or undertake. Its field comprises justice, finance, and the army.”

The police includes everything. But from an extremely particular point of view. Men and things are envisioned as to their relationships: men’s coexistence on a territory; their relationships as to property; what they produce; what is exchanged on the market. It also considers how they live, the diseases and accidents which can befall them. What the police sees to is a live, active, productive man. Turquet employs a remarkable expression: “The police’s true object is man.”

Such intervention in men’s activities could well be qualified as totalitarian. What are the aims pursued? They fall into two categories. First, the police has to do with everything providing the city with adornment, form, and splendour. Splendour denotes not only the beauty of a state ordered to perfection; but also its strength, its vigour. The police therefore ensures and highlights the state’s vigour. Second, the police’s other purpose is to foster working and trading relations between men, as well as aid and mutual help. There again, the word Turquet uses is important: the police must ensure ‘communication’ among men, in the broad sense of the word. Otherwise, men wouldn’t be able to live; or their lives would be precarious, poverty-stricken, and perpetually threatened. And here, we can make out what is, I think, an important idea. As a form of rational intervention wielding political power over men, the role of the police is to supply them with a little extra life; and by so doing, supply the state with a little extra strength. This is done by controlling ‘communication’, i.e., the common activities of individuals (work, production, exchange, accommodation). You’ll object: but that’s only the utopia of some obscure author. You can hardly deduce any significant consequences from it! But I say: Turquet’s book is but one example of a huge literature circulating in most European countries of the day. The fact that it is over-simple and yet very detailed brings out all the better the characteristics that could be recognized elsewhere. Above all, I’d say that such ideas were not stillborn. They spread all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, either as applied policies (such as cameralism or mercantilism), or as subjects to be taught (the German Polizeiwissenschaft; don’t let’s forget that this was the title under which the science of administration was taught in Germany).

These are the two perspectives that I’d like, not to study, but at least to suggest. First I’ll refer to a French administrative compendium, then to a German textbook.

1. Every historian knows Delamare’s Compendium. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, this administrator undertook the compilation of the whole kingdom’s police regulations. It’s an infinite source of highly valuable information. The general conception of the police that such a quantity of rules and regulations could convey to an administrator like Delamare is what I’d like to emphasise.

Delamare says that the police must see to eleven things within the state: (1) religion; (2) morals; (3) health; ( 4 ) supplies; ( 5 ) roads, highways, town buildings; (6) public safety; (7) the liberal arts (roughly speaking, arts and science); (8) trade; (9) factories; (10) manservants and labourers; (11) the poor.

The same classification features in every treatise concerning the police. As in Turquet’s utopia programme, apart from the army, justice properly speaking, and direct taxes, the police apparently sees to everything. The same thing can be said differently: Royal power had asserted itself against feudalism thanks to the support of an armed force and by developing a judicial system and establishing a tax system. These were the ways in which royal power was traditionally wielded. Now, ‘the police’ is the term covering the whole new field in which centralised political and administrative power can intervene.

Now, what is the logic behind intervention in cultural rites, small-scale production techniques, intellectual life, and the road network ?

Delamare’s answer seems a bit hesitant. Now he says, “The police sees to everything pertaining to men’s happiness”; now he says, “The police sees to everything regulating ‘society’ (social relations) carried on between men.” Now again, he says that the police sees to living. This is the definition I will dwell upon. It’s the most original and it clarifies the other two; and Delamare himself dwells upon it. He makes the following remarks as to the police’s eleven objects. The police deals with religion, not, of course, from the point of view of dogmatic truth, but from that of the moral quality of life. In seeing to health and supplies, it deals with the preservation of life; concerning trade, factories, workers, the poor and public order, it deals with the conveniences of life. In seeing to the theatre, literature, entertainment, its object is life’s pleasures. In short, life is the object of the police: the indispensable, the useful, and the superfluous. That people survive, live, and even do better than just that, is what the police has to ensure.

And so we link up with the other definitions Delamare proposes: “The sole purpose of the police is to lead man to the utmost happiness to be enjoyed in this life.” Or again, the police cares for the good of the soul (thanks to religion and morality), the good of the body (food, health, clothing, housing), wealth (industry, trade, labour). Or again, the police sees to the benefits that can be derived only from living in society.

2. Now let us have a look at the German textbooks. They were used to teach the science of administration somewhat later on. It was taught in various universities, especially in Gottingen, and was extremely important for continental Europe. Here it was that the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian civil servants – those who were to carry out Joseph 11’s and the Great Catherine’s reforms – were trained. Certain Frenchmen, especially in Napoleon’s entourage, knew the teachings of Polizeiwissenschaft very well.

What was to be found in these textbooks ? Huhenthal’s Liber de Politia featured the following items : the number of citizens; religion and morals; health; food; the safety of persons and of goods (particularly in reference to fires and floods) ; the administration of justice; citizens’ conveniences and pleasures (how to obtain them, how to restrict them). Then comes a series of chapters about rivers, forests, mines, brine pits, housing, and finally, several chapters on how to acquire goods either through farming, industry, or trade.

In his Precis for the Police, Willebrand speaks successively of morals, trades and crafts, health, safety, and last of all, of town building and planning. Considering the subjects at least, there isn’t a great deal of difference from Delamare’s.

But the most important of these texts is Von Justi’s Elements of Police. The police’s specific purpose is still defined as live individuals living in society. Nevertheless, the way Von Justi organises his book is somewhat different. He studies first what he calls the ‘state’s landed property’, i.e.,its territory. He considers it in two different aspects: how it is inhabited (town vs. country), and then, who inhabit these territories (the number of people, their growth, health, mortality, immigration). Von Justi then analyses the ‘goods and chattels’, i.e., the commodities, manufactured goods, and their circulation which involve problems pertaining to cost, credit, and currency. Finally, the last part is devoted to the conduct of individuals: their morals, their occupational capabilities, their honesty, and how they respect the Law.

In my opinion, Von Justi’s work is a much more advanced demonstration of how the police problem was evolved than Delamare’s ‘Introduction’ to his compendium of statutes. There are four reasons for this.

First, Von Justi defines much more clearly what the central paradox of police is. The police, he says, is what enables the state to increase its power and exert its strength to the full. On the other hand, the police has to keep. the citizens happy – happiness being understood as survival, life, and improved living. He perfectly defines what I feel to be the aim of the modern art of government, or state rationality: viz., to develop those elements constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state.

Von Justi then draws a distinction between this task, which he calls Polizei, as do his contemporaries, and Politik, Die Politik. Die Politik is basically a negative task. It consists in the state’s fighting against its internal and external enemies.Polizei, however, is a positive task: it has to foster both citizens’ lives and the state’s strength.

And here is the important point: Von Justi insists much more than does Delamare on a notion which became increasingly important during the eighteenth century – population. Population was understood as a group of live individuals. Their characteristics were those of all the individuals belonging to the same species, living side by side. (They thus presented mortality and fecundity rates; they were subject to epidemics, overpopulation; they presented a certain type of territorial distribution.) True, Delamare did use the term ‘life’ to characterise the concern of the police, but the emphasis he gave it wasn’t very pronounced. Proceeding through the eighteenth century, and especially in Germany, we see that what is defined as the object of the police is population, i.e., a group of beings living in a given area.

And last, one only has to read Von Justi to see that it is not only a utopia, as with Turquet, nor a compendium of systematically filed regulations. Von Justi claims to draw up a Polizeiwissenschuft. His book isn’t simply a list of prescriptions. It’s also a grid through which the state, i.e., territory, resources, population, towns, etc., can be observed. Von Justi combines ‘statistics’ (the description of states) with the art of government. Polizeiwissenschuft is at once an art of government and a method for the analysis of a population living on a territory.

Such historical considerations must appear to be very remote; they must seem useless in regard to present-day concerns. I wouldn’t go as far as Hermann Hesse, who says that only the “constant reference to history, the past, and antiquity” is fecund. But experience has taught me that the history of various forms of rationality is sometimes more effective in unsettling our certitudes and dogmatism than is abstract criticism. For centuries, religion couldn’t bear having its history told. Today, our schools of rationality balk at having their history written, which is no doubt significant.

What I’ve wanted to show is a direction for research. These are only the rudiments of something I’ve been working at for the last two years. It’s the historical analysis of what we could call, using an obsolete term, the art of government.

This study rests upon several basic assumptions. I’d sum them up like this:

Power is not a substance. Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must be delved into. Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals. Such relations are specific, that is, they have nothing to do with exchange, production, communication, even though they combine with them. The characteristic feature of power is that some men can more or less entirely determine other men’s conduct – but never exhaustively or coercively. A man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him. Not power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to government. If an individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject him to government. There is no power without potential refusal or revolt.

As for all relations among men, many factors determine power. Yet rationalisation is also constantly working away at it. There are specific forms to such rationalisation. It differs from the rationalisation peculiar to economic processes, or to production and communication techniques; it differs from that of scientific discourse. The government of men by men -whether they form small or large groups, whether it is power exerted by men over women, or by adults over children, or by one class over another, or by a bureaucracy over a population – involves a certain type of rationality. It doesn’t involve instrumental violence.

Consequently, those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to denounce violence or criticise an institution. Nor is it enough to cast the blame on reason in general. What has to be questioned is the form of rationality at stake. The criticism of power wielded over the mentally sick or mad cannot be restricted to psychiatric institutions; nor can those questioning the power to punish be content with denouncing prisons as total institutions. The question is: how are such relations of power rationalized? Asking it is the only way to avoid other institutions, with the same objectives and the same effects, from taking their stead.

For several centuries, the state has been one of the most remarkable, one of the most redoubtable, forms of human government. Very significantly, political criticism has reproached the state with being simultaneously a factor for individualisation and a totalitarian principle, Just to look at nascent state rationality, just to see what its first policing project was, makes it clear that, right from the start, the state is both individualising and totalitarian. Opposing the individual and his interests to it is just as hazardous as opposing it with the community and its requirements. Political rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout the history of Western societies. It first took its stand on the idea of pastoral power, then on that of reason of state. Its inevitable effects are both individualisation and totalisation. Liberation can only come from attacking, not just one of these two effects, but political rationality’s very roots.